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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Warranty law is an important supplement to tort law principles 
governing liability for defective products.  Warranties arise from 
promises or assertions associated with either the sale of a product 
or some other transfer of a product for value.1  Such promises or 
assertions about a product may be express, made in the form of the 
seller’s statements about the qualities or attributes of the product, 
or they may simply be implied as a matter of policy. 
Although warranty law is generally regarded today as part of 
the body of contract law, the origins of warranty lie in tort.2  
Important developments in contract law form a critical part of the 
developmental history of products liability law.  Once tort law 
rejected privity as a limitation on the negligence law duty to 
foreseeable victims of personal or property injuries resulting from 
defective products,3 contract law incorporated the idea of 
warranties implied as a matter of law to make product 
manufacturers strictly liable for harms caused by defective 
products.4  This led ultimately to the recognition that the 
manufacturer’s strict liability was not based on an agreement 
between the manufacturer and the plaintiff but imposed instead by 
law for reasons of policy.  “[T]he liability is not one governed by 
the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in 
tort.”5 
Warranty law as it relates to the sale of products evolved as a 
 
 1. A lease of a product, for example, would give rise to one or more 
warranties in the absence of a disclaimer. 
 2. See William L. Prosser, Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer) 
69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1103–10, 1124–27 (1960); William L. Prosser, The Implied 
Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV. 117, 118–22 (1943).  Warranty 
law developed out of the tort action of deceit. 
 3. This was most famously articulated in McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 
N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916), but was stated even earlier in Minnesota in Schubert v. J. R. 
Clarke Co., 49 Minn. 331, 51 N.W. 1103 (1892). 
 4. See e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). 
 5. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963).  
Strict liability for defective products has evolved in Minnesota into a body of law 
that is partly true strict liability and partly negligence law.  It is now clear that 
much of a product manufacturer’s liability is not, in fact, truly “strict” but based 
instead upon negligence principles.  “[N]egligence concepts are at the base of 
design defect and failure to warn claims . . . .”  Mike Steenson, A Comparative 
Analysis of Minnesota Products Liability Law and the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 3 (1998). 
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matter of common law and then was eventually codified.6  In 
Minnesota, warranty law is expressed in Chapter 336 of the 
Minnesota Statues, Minnesota’s version of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (U.C.C.), and in judicial interpretations of that 
statute, particularly Article 2 governing the sale of goods.7  
Additional important sources of warranty law in Minnesota include 
state statutes designed to protect consumers against certain 
deceptive and unfair trade practices8 and the federal Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act.9 
There is substantial similarity between Minnesota warranty law 
under the U.C.C. and products liability in tort,10 but there are also 
important differences.11 
 




A product seller’s representation about the product may give 
rise to an express warranty under the U.C.C., so long as the 
representation is one of fact, rather than opinion, and so long as 
the representation becomes part of the basis of the bargain.12  A 
 
 6. The common law regarding warranties and most other aspects of the sale 
of chattels was first codified in Great Britain in the Sale of Goods Act of 1893, and 
then in the very similar Uniform Sales Act of 1906 in the United States Article 2 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code supplanted the Uniform Sales Act in nearly every 
state during the 1950s and 1960s but did not make a significant change in the 
longstanding principles applicable to warranty law.  The U.C.C. took effect in 
Minnesota in 1966.  State and federal legislation aimed specifically at consumer 
protection was enacted in the 1970s. 
 7. Article 2 of the U.C.C. superceded Minnesota’s version of the Uniform 
Sales Act, MINN. STAT. ch. 512 (1961). 
 8. See infra Part VIII.G2. 
 9. See infra Part VIII.G1. 
 10. Indeed, four states (Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan and Virginia) do 
not overtly use tort doctrine at all but instead have evolved the law regarding an 
implied warranty of product quality to deal with the problems of defective 
products. 
 11. These differences are rooted primarily in general contract law doctrine 
and include the doctrine of privity, the ability of sellers to contractually disclaim 
warranties and limit damages for breach of warranty, the requirement of notice of 
breach, different statutes of limitation governing contract and tort claims, and 
other matters. 
 12. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-313(1)(a) (2002) (providing that “[a]ny affirmation 
of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and 
becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods 
shall conform to the affirmation or promise.”). 
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seller’s representation may be oral13 or written, pictorially 
communicated, or made by some other means including a sample 
or model.14  Thus, the seller’s oral statements made at the time of 
sale15 may give rise to an express warranty.  Information on a 
product’s labeling or packaging or in advertisements for the 
product may also give rise to an express warranty.  A sample or 
model may create a warranty that other, additional products will 
conform to the sample or model.16 
Just as a defect may find its way into a product after the 
product has left the manufacturer’s control, an express warranty 
may arise out of transactions made after the product has left the 
hands of the manufacturer.  A retail seller, for example, may make 
a representation about the product not found in the product’s 
label or packaging nor in the manufacturer’s advertising.  Such a 
representation may create an express warranty from that seller but 
not from the manufacturer or anyone else in the chain of the 
product’s manufacture, distribution, or sale.  This means, of 
course, that an express warranty claim may be available against a 
product seller but not against the product’s manufacturer. 
An express warranty claim also may be available against the 
seller or intermediate distributor of a product even where strict 
liability in tort claims against those parties is barred by Minnesota 
Statutes section 544.41.  This provision shields non-manufacturers 
from strict liability in tort claims provided that the product 
manufacturer is identifiable, subject to jurisdiction, and not 
 
 13. Oral representations giving rise to an express warranty are, of course, 
subject to the parole evidence rule.  See id. § 336.2-202.  If, for example, there is a 
written disclaimer of warranties, the buyer may find it difficult to introduce 
evidence of a prior or contemporaneous oral express warranty.  See infra Part 
VIII.C. 
 14. See MINN. STAT. § 336.2-313(1)(b) and U.C.C. cmts. (2002) (providing the 
methods by which an express warranty may be created). 
 15. Post-sale statements may sometimes amount to a warranty.  Minnesota 
Statutes § 336.2-313 U.C.C. Comment 7 provides that “[t]he precise time when 
words of description or affirmation are made or samples are shown is not material.  
The sole question is whether the language or samples or models are fairly to be 
regarded as part of the contract.  If language is used after the closing of the deal 
(as when the buyer when taking delivery asks and receives an additional 
assurance), the warranty becomes a modification, and need not be supported by 
consideration if it is otherwise reasonable and in order (Section 2-209).”  So 
assurances and other statements made shortly after a technical sale is concluded 
may nevertheless become part of that transaction and form the basis for an express 
warranty. 
 16. See MINN. STAT. § 336.2-313(1)(c) (2002). 
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judgment-proof,17 and so long as the non-manufacturer defendant 
did not (1) exercise significant control over the product’s 
manufacture or design, (2) provide instructions or warnings to the 
manufacturer relevant to the defect, (3) have actual knowledge of 
the defect, or (4) create the defect—in other words, so long as the 
non-manufacturer was not negligent.18 
Furthermore, an express warranty claim may be available in 
those rare instances where the product is not defective in tort law 
terms, but where the product does not meet the promise of the 
warranty.  Milbank Mutual Insurance Co. v. Proksch19 provides an 
example.  There, the seller of a Christmas tree represented to the 
buyer that it was fire-retardant or fireproof.  “While the [buyers] 
normally took their tree down immediately after Christmas, after 
discussing the matter [they] decided to keep the tree up longer 
because of its fireproofing treatment.”20  At a New Year’s Eve party, 
“two of the young people were throwing a pillow back and forth 
when it struck a lower branch of the tree.  A small flame 
immediately appeared in the lower branches and the tree went up 
in flames in a matter of seconds”21 causing substantial damage to 
the house.  The court upheld the jury’s determination that the 
seller’s statements created an express warranty that the tree was fire 
retardant and less likely than an untreated tree to catch fire.22  The 
buyers relied upon this representation in selecting this particular 
tree (a real tree that had been treated with a fire retardant).  The 
warranty was breached when the tree so readily caught fire.  
Nothing about the tree was unmerchantable nor was it produced or 
sold negligently nor was it “defective” in tort law terms.  On 
balance, the fire risks presented by a Christmas tree are not 
unreasonable and no consumer could reasonably expect a dried-
out Christmas tree to be fireproof.  However, the seller had 
represented that it was fireproof.  That representation, not 
negligence nor a defect in the tree, was the basis for liability. 
A cause of action for breach of an express warranty does not 
require a showing of fault.23  Such a warranty represents a promise 
 
 17. See id. § 544.41, subd. 2. 
 18. See id. § 544.41, subd. 3. 
 19. 309 Minn. 106, 244 N.W.2d 105 (1976). 
 20. Id. at 108, 244 N.W.2d at 106. 
 21. Id. at 108–09, 244 N.W.2d at 106–07. 
 22. Id. at 109–10, 244 N.W.2d at 107. 
 23. See O’Laughlin v. Minn. Natural Gas Co., 253 N.W.2d 826, 829 (Minn. 
1977) (stating that “[a] showing of negligence is not necessary for a breach of 
6
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 11
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss4/11
PRINCE 4/25/2005  1:46:44 PM 
2005] PRODUCT WARRANTY CLAIMS IN MINNESOTA 1683 
by the seller to the buyer, about some aspect of the good’s 
performance or quality, which the buyer relied upon in purchasing 
the good.  The seller is liable if the representation that gives rise to 
the warranty is false.  Whether an express warranty has been 
created, the scope of the warranty, and whether the warranty was 
breached are almost always questions of fact. 
Finally, an express warranty cannot be disclaimed.24  Section 
336.2-316(1), the section of the U.C.C. dealing with warranty 
disclaimers, provides that “[w]ords or conduct relevant to the 
creation of an express warranty and words or conduct tending to 
negate or limit the warranty shall be construed whenever 
reasonable as consistent with each other . . . .”  The seller cannot 
give an express warranty with one hand and then take it away with 
the other. 
B. Representation of Fact 
The seller’s statements regarding the good must be statements 
of fact and not simply expressions of the seller’s opinion.25  
Statements of opinion about a product’s attributes are at the heart 
of “sales talk.”  These statements are typically recognizable to the 
buyer as subjective “puffing,” which should be regarded as no more 
than the seller’s often-inflated opinion and should not be taken as 
the literal truth about the quality or performance of the product. 
A good example of statements of opinion that do not give rise 
to an express warranty is Frederickson v. Hackney,26 which involved 
the sale of a bull calf.  The buyer purchased the animal under the 
assumption that, when mature, the calf would be a valuable 
breeding bull.  Buyer and seller were both cattle breeders and the 
purchase price of the calf reflected the expectation that it would 
become a valuable sire.  In fact, the animal was sterile when it 
reached maturity and was worth far less than expected.  At the time 
of sale, the seller told the buyer that the buyer should 
‘buy this bull and keep him’ for breeding purposes; that 
he would be a wonderful asset and would put [buyer] ‘on 
the map.’ ‘[Seller] told [buyer] further of his blood lines 
 
warranty”). 
 24. See infra Part VIII.B. 
 25. “[A]n affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement 
purporting to be merely the seller’s opinion or commendation of the goods does 
not create a warranty.”  MINN. STAT. § 336.2-313(2) (2002). 
 26. 159 Minn. 234, 198 N.W. 806 (1924). 
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and what a great record his relatives had made . . . ; that 
his father was the greatest living dairy bull;’ that if [buyer] 
would keep him, of course, he would be a help to build up 
[buyer’s] herd.27 
The buyer claimed that these representations gave rise to an 
express warranty regarding the future reproductive capacity of the 
calf.  The court disagreed, concluding that this was trade talk upon 
which the buyer had no right to rely.  Several factors seem to have 
supported the court’s conclusion.  There was no intent to mislead 
or carelessness on the part of the seller that might give rise to a 
fraud or misrepresentation claim.28  Both parties were “destitute of 
knowledge or the means of forming an intelligent judgment”29 as to 
the future breeding capacity of an animal only a few days or weeks 
old and fifteen to eighteen months removed from its first possible 
use for breeding purposes.  Buyer “must have understood from the 
nature of the case that the information, experience, and knowledge 
of the vendor are not superior to his own”30 so that the statements 
should have been regarded as no more than expressions of the 
seller’s opinion about what the future will prove concerning the 
desired traits of the good being sold. 
Similarly, no warranty was made where the seller, in the sale of 
a partial interest in a commercial fishing business, “expressed a 
confident belief that the proposed company would obtain in a 
season 1,000,000 pounds of fish, and 400 kegs of caviar . . . .”31  
Even though this statement may have been based on the amount of 
fish caught in the past, it was merely a statement “of expectation, 
opinion, or hope, on which a purchaser has no right to rely”32 
because fluctuations in water levels and other factors may affect the 
catch of fish in the future. 
By way of contrast, a representation that a stallion sold for 
breeding purposes was a “foal getter” constituted a warranty that 
the horse would produce foals a reasonable percentage of the 
time.33  Here the buyer could reasonably take the seller’s statements 
to be representations of fact about a mature animal of breeding age 
 
 27. Id. at 235, 198 N.W. at 806. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 236, 198 N.W. at 806. 
 30. Id. at 236, 198 N.W. at 807. 
 31. Hansen v. Baltimore Packing & Cold-Storage Co., 86 F. 832, 834 (Minn. 
Cir. Ct. 1898). 
 32. Id. at 835. 
 33. Brown v. Doyle, 69 Minn. 543, 72 N.W. 814 (1897). 
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and not, as in Frederickson,34 simply an opinion about how the 
animal would perform as a breeder in the more distant future. 
While the context in which the statements are made is always 
important, representations that are specific and unambiguous, 
particularly if they relate to the safety of the product, are more 
likely to constitute an express warranty.  Such statements are more 
than an expression of opinion or a prediction about the product, 
but a representation by the seller on which the buyer is entitled to 
depend in judging the real worth or value of the product. 
In McCormack v. Hankscraft,35 the court found that a product 
manufacturer’s representations in an instruction booklet and in 
advertising gave rise to an express warranty.  A parent purchased a 
steam vaporizer for use at night in her child’s bedroom.  The child, 
three years and nine months old at the time of injury, apparently 
tripped over the vaporizer’s electric cord when she got up to go to 
the bathroom in the middle of the night.  In so doing, she pulled 
the vaporizer off a stool upon which it had been placed, the top 
readily came off a glass jar which was part of the vaporizer, and 
scalding hot water spilled onto the child, causing severe burns.  
The court described the representations in the vaporizer’s 
instruction booklet as follows: 
The instruction booklet furnished by defendant did not 
disclose the scalding temperatures reached by the water in 
the jar, nor was any warning given as to the dangers that 
could result from an accidental upset of the unit.  While 
plaintiff’s mother realized that the unit could be tipped 
over by a sufficient external force, she justifiably relied 
upon defendant’s representations that it was ‘safe,’ 
‘practically foolproof,’ and ‘tip-proof.’  She understood 
this to mean that the unit was ‘safe to use around (her) 
children’ and that she ‘didn’t have to worry’ about 
dangers when it was left unattended in a child’s room 
since this was the primary purpose for which it was sold. 
In its booklet and advertising, defendant in fact made the 
representations relied upon by plaintiff’s mother.  In 
addition to the simple operating instructions and pictorial 
‘cut-away’ indicating how the steam is generated by the 
electrodes in the heating chamber, the booklet stated: 
‘WHY THE HANKSCRAFT VAPORIZER IS SUPERIOR 
 
 34. Frederickson v. Hackney, 159 Minn. 234, 198 N.W. 806 (1924). 
 35. McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967). 
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TO OTHERS IN DESIGN. 
‘Your vaporizer will run all night on one filling of water, 
directing a steady gentle flow of medicated steam exactly 
where it is needed.  No attention is necessary. 
‘It’s safe, too, and practically foolproof.  Since the water 
itself makes the electric contact, the vaporizer shuts off 
automatically when the water is gone.  The electric unit 
cannot burn out.’ 
The booklet also had a picture of a vaporizer sending 
steam over a baby’s crib, alongside which was printed: 
‘For most effective use, the vaporizer should be placed at 
least four feet away from the person receiving treatment, 
and should not be placed above the patient’s level.’36 
These representations, the court concluded, were 
“sufficient to support a finding of liability upon a breach of an 
express warranty.” 
We are persuaded that whether the previously quoted 
language of the booklet, particularly in combination with 
the picture of a vaporizer sending steam over a body’s 
[sic] crib, amounted to an express warranty that it was 
‘safe’ for a user to let this vaporizer run all night in a 
child’s room without attention was a jury question.  No 
particular words are required to constitute an express 
warranty, and the representations made must be 
interpreted as an ordinary person would understand their 
meaning, with any doubts resolved in favor of the user.  
Since parents instinctively exercise great care to protect 
their children from harm, the jury could justifiably 
conclude that defendant’s representations were factual 
(naturally tending to induce a buyer to purchase) and not 
mere ‘puffing’ or ‘sales talk.’37 
Again, the context in which the representations were made was 
important in concluding that these statements were representations 
of fact.  The court emphasized that the seller was aware of the fact 
that the vaporizer contained scalding hot water, but that the buyer 
was not similarly aware, because the water, as visible to a user in the 
glass jar, never reached the boiling point.  Moreover, the buyers, 
“relying upon their understanding of what defendant represented 
in its instruction booklet, were reasonably led to believe, up to the 
 
 36. Id. at 329–30, 154 N.W.2d at 495. 
 37. Id. at 336, 154 N.W.2d at 498 (internal citations omitted). 
10
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time of plaintiff’s injury, that since steam was generated only in the 
heating unit, the temperature of the water in the jar during the 
entire operation of the vaporizer remained the same as when put 
in” and that they at “no time discovered by touching or handling 
the unit when it was in use that the temperature of any part of the 
water in the jar became hot.”38 
Therefore, in this context, and unlike in Frederickson,39 the 
seller had a level of knowledge about the product that was superior 
to the buyer’s, and reason to believe that a buyer would take its 
representations about the safety of the good as statements of fact. 
C. Basis of the Bargain 
The seller’s representations of fact about the product must 
become part of the basis of the bargain before an express warranty 
arises.40  The predecessor Uniform Sales Act section 512.12 
provided in part: “Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the 
seller relating to the goods is an express warranty . . . if the buyer 
purchases the goods relying thereon.”41  When this language was 
replaced by the Uniform Commercial Code’s formulation that 
“[a]ny affirmation of fact or promise . . . which relates to the goods 
and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express 
warranty,”42 it was natural to think that the different language had a 
different meaning; something different than the buyer’s reliance 
on the seller’s statements was incorporated into the new “basis of 
the bargain” language. 
Official comment 3 to U.C.C. section 2-313 says, in part, that 
“no particular reliance . . . need be shown in order to weave 
[seller’s representations] into the fabric of the agreement.  Rather, 
any fact which is to take such affirmations, once made, out of the 
agreement requires clear affirmative proof.”  One view is that the 
basis of the bargain requirement simply shifts the burden of 
proving non-reliance to the seller.43 Other official comments to 
section 2-313 seem to fortify this view.44  A number of courts have 
 
 38. Id. at 329, 154 N.W.2d at 494. 
 39. See supra notes 26–30 and accompanying text. 
 40. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 41. MINN. STAT. § 512.12 (1961). 
 42. Id. § 336.2-313(1)(a) (2002). 
 43. Mitchell J. Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the California 
Law of Sales Warranties, 8 UCLA L. REV. 281, 285 n.30 (1961). 
 44. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-313, U.C.C. cmt. 8 (2002) (stating that “all of the 
statements of the seller [become part of the basis of the bargain] unless good 
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concluded that reliance is not required in order for an express 
warranty to arise45 while others continue to require reliance by the 
buyer as a necessary element in the creation of any express 
warranty.46  Minnesota appears to be among those states that 
condition express warranty recovery on a showing of reliance, 
though the law on this point is not particularly clear. 
Prior to Minnesota’s adoption of the U.C.C. and its “basis of 
the bargain” requirement for an express warranty, the supreme 
court concluded in Midland Loan Finance Co. v. Madsen,47 that “[t]o 
enable a party relying upon breach of express or implied warranty 
to recover, it must be clear and definite that there was actual 
reliance upon the warranties involved.”48  Midland was a dispute 
over the assignment to the plaintiff finance company of a usurious 
sales contract by the defendant car dealer.  The transaction at issue 
was the assignment of a loan, not the underlying sale of a car.  The 
dispute, therefore, did not involve a sale of goods or the 
application of the Uniform Sales Act’s requirement of reliance.  
The Midland court no doubt relied, therefore, on the longstanding 
common law requirement of reliance needed to show a causal 
connection between the seller’s breach of warranty and the buyer’s 
 
reason is shown to the contrary”). 
 45. See, e.g., Weng v. Allison, 678 N.E.2d 1254, 1256 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997): 
[T]he trial court’s ruling that the statements of the seller could not have 
been part of the basis of the bargain simply because no reasonable 
persons could have relied upon those statements was erroneous.  The 
trial court misconstrued the role of reliance in determining whether an 
affirmation of fact or description is part of the basis of the bargain.  
Affirmations of fact made during the bargain are presumed to be part of 
the basis of the bargain unless clear, affirmative proof otherwise is shown. 
It is not necessary, therefore, for the buyer to show reasonable reliance 
upon the seller’s affirmations . . . . 
Id.  (internal citations omitted). See also Martin v. Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 116 F.3d 
102, 105 (4th Cir. 1997); Lutz Farms v. Asgrow Seed Co., 948 F.2d 638, 645 (10th 
Cir. 1991); Keith v. Buchanan, 220 Cal. Rptr. 392 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Pack & 
Process, Inc. v. Celotex Corp., 503 A.2d 646 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985); Comp-U-Aid v. 
Berk-Tek, Inc., 547 N.W.2d 640 (Mich. 1995); and cases collected in James J. 
White, Freeing the Tortious Soul of Express Warranty Law, 72 TUL. L. REV. 2089, 2099 
n.30 (1998). 
 46. See, e.g., Machs., Inc. v. Lorraine Corp. 633 F.2d 34, 44 n.7 (7th Cir. 1980); 
Sprague v. Upjohn Co., No. 91-40035, 1995 WL 376934 (D. Mass. May 10, 1994); 
State Farm Ins. Co. v. Nu Prime Roll-A-Way of Miami, 557 So.2d 107 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1990); Wendt v. Beardmore Suburban Chevrolet, Inc., 366 N.W.2d 424, 428 
(Neb. 1985); Royal Bus. and the cases collected in White, supra note 45, at 2100 
n.31. 
 47. 217 Minn. 267, 14 N.W.2d 475 (1944). 
 48. Id. at 278, 14 N.W.2d at 481. 
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harm. 
The 1966 Minnesota Code Comment to section 336.2-
313(1)(a) describes that section as “substantially identical” to its 
predecessor, section 512.12 of the Uniform Sales Act.49  The 
comment also describes the change from the Uniform Sales Act’s 
reliance language to the Minnesota U.C.C.’s basis of the bargain 
language as a “minor difference in terminology” which “brings 
about no great change in the results of cases.”50  However, the 
official U.C.C. comment following section 336.2-313(1)(a) 
emphasizes that “[n]o particular reliance [on the seller’s 
affirmations of fact] need be shown in order to weave them into 
the fabric of the agreement” as an express warranty.51  These 
comments do not make clear whether the Minnesota legislature 
intended to eliminate reliance as a requirement for express 
warranty under the U.C.C. There has been little judicial reflection 
on the question since the Code’s adoption. 
In Alley Construction Co. v. State,52 an action to recover on a 
highway construction contract, the plaintiff alleged both breach of 
warranty and breach of contract.  After the plaintiff prevailed at 
trial, the defendant appealed, contending that the breach of 
warranty claim should not have been submitted to the jury since 
there was no evidence that plaintiff had relied upon the 
defendant’s construction specifications in the contract in 
submitting its bid.53  Again, there was no sale of goods involved so 
the precise question at issue in this case was not whether reliance 
was a requirement under Minnesota’s U.C.C. for an express 
warranty.  The supreme court readily found that “an inference of 
reliance properly arises” out of the very fact of the plaintiff’s 
bidding on the contract which included the defendant’s plans 
dictating construction specifications for the highway.54  The court 
then went on, saying that “the [trial] court’s instruction on that 
issue properly covered the evidence to be considered and was in 
accordance with the applicable law . . . .”55  Among the elements 
that the trial court instructed the jury that the plaintiff must prove 
 
 49. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-313, Minnesota Code Comment (2002). 
 50. Id. 
 51. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-313, U.C.C. cmt. 3 (2002). 
 52. 300 Minn. 346, 219 N.W.2d 922 (1974). 
 53. Id. at 349, 219 N.W.2d at 924. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 351, 219 N.W.2d at 925. 
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were “[t]hat the Plaintiff relied on that warranty, or representation, 
and was induced thereby to bid on the contract.”56  Therefore, Alley 
Construction, though not a case involving the sale of a good, appears 
to stand for the proposition that reliance must be shown to recover 
for breach of warranty under Minnesota law. 
This is the conclusion the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit reached in its effort to apply Minnesota law in a diversity 
case involving a purchase agreement for the sale of stock.  The 
court concluded, in Hendricks v. Callahan,57 that “‘the law of 
Minnesota appears to require some form of reliance’ on the part of 
the buyer as an element for a breach of express warranty claim.”58  
After analyzing what little Minnesota case law bears on this 
question and noting that the Minnesota Supreme Court has not 
expressly overruled the pre-U.C.C. Midland59 case since the Code’s 
adoption in Minnesota, the Eighth Circuit concluded that “we are 
not persuaded that Midland no longer reflects the current law in 
Minnesota” and that “some form of reliance on the warranty” is 
required to succeed in a breach of warranty claim.60  Of course, this 
dispute also did not involve a sale of goods and so the court’s 
analysis of Minnesota law is not directly on point as to whether 
reliance is required under Minnesota’s U.C.C. to prove the 
existence of an express warranty.  Nevertheless, all indications are 
that reliance is a requirement under Minnesota law. 
 




The warranty most likely to arise out of the sale of a product is 
an implied warranty of merchantability.  A claim for breach of this 
warranty is, however, the least likely to add anything to tort-based 
claims for product defect.  This is the case simply because a 
product that is “defective” in tort law terms is not merchantable 
and vice-versa.61  Indeed, the courts have gone so far as to say that, 
 
56. Id. at 351, 219 N.W.2d at 926 n.1. 
57.  972 F.2d 190 (8th Cir. 1992). 
58. Id. at 192. 
59. Midland Loan Finance Co. v. Madsen, 217 Minn. 267, 14 N.W.2d 475 
(1944). 
60. Hendricks, 972 F.2d at 194. 
      61. See Peterson v. Bendix Home Sys., Inc., 318 N.W.2d 50, 53 (Minn. 1982) 
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in cases of personal injury, strict products liability tort claims have 
effectively preempted implied warranty claims.62  However, there 
may be some instances in which the breach of an implied warranty 
of merchantability claim will succeed where a tort claim that the 
product is defective will not.63 
The U.C.C., Minnesota Statutes section 336.2-314 provides that 
a warranty that goods are merchantable is implied in a contract for 
the sale of such goods if the seller is a merchant with respect to 
goods of that kind and so long as this implied warranty has not 
been excluded or modified by the seller.64  This provision 
expanded the scope of prior law.  Under the predecessor Uniform 
Sales Act, an implied warranty of merchantability arose only where 
there was a sale by description by a merchant who dealt in goods of 
that description.  The U.C.C. language eliminated the “sale by 
description” requirement and also explicitly extended this warranty 
to sales of food or drink.65  Under the Uniform Sales Act, problems 
sometimes arose in determining when a sale was “by description.”  
Sales of food or drink, especially when they were consumed on the 
premises where sold, were often determined to be the provision of 
a service and not a sale of goods giving rise to an implied 
warranty.66  The new Code’s language was meant to eliminate these 
issues. 
The implied warranty of merchantability amounts to an 
assurance, imposed upon the seller by law and not arising out of 
any agreement between the parties, that a product is “fit for 
 
(stating that: “This warranty is breached when the product is defective to a normal 
buyer making ordinary use of the product.”).  While in many states the U.C.C.’s 
four-year statute of limitations in § 2-725 is longer than the typical two- or three-
year statute of limitations for negligence or strict liability claims, that is not an 
advantage in Minnesota with its four-year statute of limitations for “any action 
based on the strict liability of the defendant and arising from the manufacture, 
sale, use or consumption of a product . . . .” MINN. STAT. § 541.05, subd. 2 (2002). 
 62. See Masepohl v. Am. Tobacco Co., 974 F. Supp. 1245, 1253 (D. Minn. 
1997); Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Loctite Corp., 352 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1984). 
 63. That would be the case, for example where the buyer suffers only an 
economic loss.  Then she may not pursue tort claims at all and must resort to a 
warranty theory for recovery of such losses.  See MINN. STAT. § 604.101 (2002) 
(Minnesota’s economic loss statute). 
 64. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-314(1) (2002). 
 65. Id. § 336.2-314(1), U.C.C. cmt. 5 (2002). 
 66. See BARKLEY CLARK & CHRISTOPHER SMITH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT 
WARRANTIES, §2:20 (2d ed. 2002). 
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ordinary purposes for which such goods are intended.”67  It is based 
upon the policy of incorporating into every sale of goods a quid 
pro quo; a product of fair quality in exchange for a fair price paid.68 
B. Sale of Goods 
The implied warranty provisions of the U.C.C. apply to sales of 
goods but not to sales of services.  When there is a mixed sale of 
both goods and services, the prevailing rule is that the 
predominant aspect of the sale is what determines whether it is a 
sale of goods or services.  If the predominant aspect of the sale is 
one of goods and the provision of services is secondary, then the 
entire transaction is treated as a sale of goods.  The Minnesota 
Supreme Court has taken a liberal view of what amounts to a sale of 
goods.  In O’Laughlin v. Minnesota Natural Gas Co.,69 the defendant 
had selected and installed an under-floor furnace that provided 
heated air to the room above through a floor grate.  The plaintiff 
was injured when she passed out, allegedly from the accumulation 
of carbon monoxide due to improper installation of the furnace, 
fell unconscious on to the hot furnace grate and suffered serious 
burn injuries.  As to whether there was a sale of goods by the 
defendant, the court had this to say: 
While the scope section of Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code applies to “transactions in goods” (see 
Minn. St. 336.2-102), the warranty sections specifically 
require a sale.  (See Minn. St. 336.2-314 and Minn. St. 336-
2-315.)  The present situation presents something slightly 
different from a pure sale situation where goods are sold 
to a customer and do not require the performance of any 
substantial amount of services.  Plaintiffs do not allege 
that the furnace was defective when it left the 
manufacturer or that the furnace malfunctioned, but 
instead claim that the installation of the furnace by [the 
 
 67. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Nishika Ltd., 885 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1994) (applying Minnesota law), question certified, 955 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. 1996), 
certified question answered, 565 N.W.2d 16 (Minn. 1997), modified, 953 S.W.2d 733 
(Tex. 1997). 
 68. See Asbestos Prods. Inc. v. Ryan Landscape Supply Co., 282 Minn. 178, 
180, 163 N.W.2d 767, 769 (1968) (stating that “[t]he doctrine of implied warranty 
[of merchantability] . . . originated and is used to promote high standards of 
business and to discourage sharp dealings.  It rests upon the principle that 
‘honesty is the best policy’ and contemplates business transactions in which both 
parties may profit.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 69. 253 N.W.2d 826, 827 (Minn. 1977). 
16
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 11
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss4/11
PRINCE 4/25/2005  1:46:44 PM 
2005] PRODUCT WARRANTY CLAIMS IN MINNESOTA 1693 
defendant] was faulty.  Thus, the issue raised is whether 
the implied warranties of the Uniform Commercial Code 
apply to the improper installation of a product. 
Although the issue is a matter of some dispute in other 
jurisdictions, the particular instance involved here is 
controlled by a previous Minnesota decision under the 
Uniform Sales Act, Kopet v. Klein, 275 Minn. 525, 148 
N.W.2d 389 (1967).  In Kopet, the defendant sold a water 
softener to the plaintiff and the purchase price included 
the cost of installation.  After the defendant seller 
installed the unit in the plaintiff’s home, it failed to 
function properly and the buyer brought an action for 
breach of warranty.  On appeal, this court stated (275 
Minn. 529, 148 N.W. 389): “Defendant asserts that the 
court erred in informing the jury that breach of implied 
warranty could arise by faulty installation of the unit.  
Essentially, the question raised by this contention seems to 
be whether the installation of the unit was part of the sale 
covered by the warranty.  In Vold, Sales (2 ed.) §1, p. 4, 
the author states: ‘In certain types of sales, too, certain 
services, such as to deliver elsewhere, or to install, are 
many times included.’ (emphasis added.) 
The rule thus seems to be that the warranty applies where 
the sale involves not only a transfer of a chattel but also 
some related service, such as construction.  We think the 
rule applies to this case.  Plaintiff had never owned a water 
softener before and he knew nothing about how to install 
or operate one when he made the purchase from 
defendant.  We think it clear from the record that plaintiff 
was purchasing an installed water softener.” 
Thus, on the basis of Kopet there can be little doubt that 
the installation of the furnace by [defendant] was covered 
by the implied warranties under the Uniform Commercial 
Code. (citations omitted.) 
The Eighth Circuit essentially concluded that “where 
installation or some similar service is related to the sale of goods, 
the implied warranties of the U.C.C. cover the service as well as the 
goods” and “emphasized that implied warranties are favored under 
Minnesota law . . . .”70  It did not explicitly discuss the question as 
one of whether the predominant aspect of the transaction was for 
 
 70. LeSueur Creamery, Inc. v. Haskon, Inc., 660 F.2d 342, 346 n.6 (8th Cir. 
1981). 
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goods or services.  However, “[w]hile the [court] apparently 
liberally construed the U.C.C. implied warranty provisions in 
O’Laughlin and Kopet, it did not expressly reject the prevailing 
‘predominant aspect’ test for determining whether such mixed 
sales contracts create implied warranties.”71 
The O’Laughlin court certainly implied, but did not specifically 
say, that the transaction was for an installed furnace and that for 
purposes of a breach of implied warranty claim, the predominant 
aspect of the transaction was the sale of a good.  The provision of 
the services required to install it in the plaintiff’s home was a 
secondary aspect of the transaction so that the entire transaction 
should be considered one for the sale of a good. 
O’Laughlin and Kopet together certainly do not clearly stand for 
the proposition that all mixed sales of goods and services in 
Minnesota create an implied warranty of merchantability.  They 
may suggest, however, that the courts will be liberal in finding an 
implied warranty to arise out of such mixed sales. 
Another issue that may arise in a transaction for goods is 
whether the nature of the transaction is a “sale” or something 
sufficiently close to a sale to warrant an implied warranty.  Some 
courts have held that no warranty arises where the transaction is 
not sufficiently complete at the time of injury to conclude that 
there was intent on the part of the injured party to buy the good,72 
where the product is leased rather than sold,73 or where there is a 
bailment.74  However, other cases show that where an offer to sell 
combines with an intent to buy, the absence of a technical sale is 
not a barrier to concluding that an implied warranty exists.75  
 
 71. Id. 
 72. See, e.g., McQuiston v. K-Mart Corp., 796 F.2d 1346, 1347 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(shopper injured by lid of cookie jar while examining the good but before she had 
formed any intent to buy). 
 73. See, e.g., Bechtel v. Paul Clark, Inc., 412 N.E.2d 143, 149–50 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 1980) (car with defective brakes). 
 74. See, e.g., Watford v. Jack LaLanne Long Island, Inc., 151 A.D.2d 742, 743–
44 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (use of rowing machine at health club). 
 75. See Fender v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 225 S.E.2d 691 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976).  
The plaintiff in Fender was injured by an exploding Coke bottle as she placed it on 
the defendant’s checkout counter.  The court held that the defendant had offered 
the good for sale by placing it on the shelf, plaintiff had accepted the offer by 
removing it from the shelf, and that there was, therefore, a contract for sale which 
gave rise to an implied warranty.  Official comment 1 to U.C.C. § 2-314 says that 
“[t]he seller’s obligation applies to present sales as well as contracts to sell . . . .” 
(emphasis added).  See also Keaton v. ABC Drug Co., 467 S.E.2d 558 (Ga. 1996).  
The plaintiff in Keaton was injured when she reached up to pull a bottle of bleach 
18
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Leases of goods in Minnesota are now subject to the provisions of 
Article 2A of the U.C.C. that include warranty provisions essentially 
identical to those in Article 2 which apply to the sale of goods.76  
There is no Minnesota case law specifically interpreting the 
meaning of “sale” in section 336.2-314 but the supreme court’s 
indication that implied warranties are favored under Minnesota 
law77 suggests that Minnesota courts will interpret the concept of a 
“sale” broadly for purposes of determining whether an implied 
warranty has arisen out of the transaction. 
C. Seller is a Merchant with Respect to Goods of that Kind 
According to the language of section 336.2-314, the seller of a 
good must be “a merchant with respect to goods of that kind” 
before the transaction gives rise to an implied warranty of 
merchantability.  In general, this language is meant to exclude 
occasional or isolated sales by one who does not sell regularly (one 
who is not a “merchant”) and sales by one who does not deal 
regularly in that type of good (even if a merchant, one must be a 
merchant “with respect to goods of [the] kind” sold to the 
plaintiff).  So the isolated sale of a used car by one not in the 
business of selling cars,78 or the somewhat regular sale of a 
repossessed car by a bank is not a sale by a merchant with respect to 
goods of that kind.79 
 
from a high shelf and bleach spilled due to an unseen loose cap on the bottle.  
The court concluded that her action of reaching up to grasp the bottle was 
sufficient to show her intent to purchase the good. 
 76. See MINN. STAT. §§ 336.2A-210 to -316 (2002).  The U.C.C. Comment to 
§ 336.2A-210 describes the purposes of these sections as follows: 
All of the express and implied warranties of the Article on Sales (Article 
2) are included in this Article, revised to reflect the differences between a 
sale of goods and a lease of goods.  * * * The lease of goods is sufficiently 
similar to the sale of goods to justify the decision.  Hawkland, The Impact 
of the Uniform Commercial Code on Equipment Leasing, 1972 Ill. L.F. 446, 459–
60.  Many state and federal courts have reached the same conclusion. 
 77. See Asbestos Prods. Inc. v. Ryan Landscape Supply Co., 282 Minn. 178, 
180, 163 N.W.2d 767, 769 (1968) (“The doctrine of implied warranty is essentially 
an equitable one favored by this court and should be given effect when it is 
possible to do so.”). 
 78. See, e.g., Ballou v. Trahan, 334 A.2d 409. 409–10 (Vt. 1975) (private sale of 
a used car; defendant not a “merchant”); Prince v. LeVan, 486 P.2d 959 (Alaska 
1971) (sale of a used fishing boat by owner who is not a boat dealer). 
 79. Donald v. City Nat’l. Bank of Dothan, 329 So.2d 92 (Ala. 1976). 
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D. Fitness for Ordinary Purposes 
A “merchantable” good is one that is “fit for the ordinary 
purposes for which such goods are used.”80  This “fitness for 
ordinary purposes” concept is the core of the implied promise 
made by the seller.  It means that the goods are reasonably suitable 
for the ordinary uses for which goods of that kind are sold.81  In 
addition to being suitable for purposes for which they are sold, 
merchantable goods must be reasonably safe for their ordinary 
uses.  Substandard goods do not match this promise.  Obvious 
examples of products that are not fit for ordinary purposes include 
a clothes dryer that overheats and catches fire,82 a ladder that 
collapses when used properly,83 dried milk that is infested with 
insects,84 and CB radios that fail to withstand normal levels of shock 
and vibration.85  Other examples are not so obvious.  A snowblower 
that provides no warning of the risks of attempting to remove 
clogged snow before turning the machine off is not merchantable 
since a product that fails to warn users of foreseeable risks 
associated with its use is defective and, therefore, not 
merchantable.86  Failure on the part of the seller of a liquor 
business to provide to the buyer proper documentation of the 
inventory makes the liquor defective.  Even though the liquor itself 
was not defective, the lack of documentation could result in the 
confiscation of the undocumented liquor and suspension or 
revocation of the new owner’s liquor license by state regulators.  
This meant that the undocumented goods breached the implied 
warranty of merchantability.87 
On the other hand, goods do not have to be flawless or 
perfectly safe in order to be merchantable.  When General Motors 
designed a door-mounted seatbelt that was awkward to use, it did 
 
 80. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-314(2)(c) (2002). 
 81.  “Under Minnesota law goods or products to be merchantable must be 
such as are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such products are used . . . .” 
Minn. Mining & Mfg., 885 S.W.2d at 637. 
 82. Crandell v. Larkin & Jones Appliance Co., 334 N.W.2d 31, 36 (S.D. 1983). 
 83. Lariviere v. Dayton Safety Ladder Co., 525 A.2d 892, 897–98 (R.I. 1987). 
 84. Land O’Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 185 F. Supp. 
412, 422–23 (D. Minn. 1960), aff’d, 308 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1962). 
 85. Indus. Graphics, Inc. v. Asahi Corp., 485 F. Supp. 793, 797 (D. Minn. 
1980). 
 86. Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273, 275 (Mass. 1984). 
 87. Loden v. Drake, 881 P.2d 467 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994). 
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not breach an implied warranty of merchantability.88  The restraint 
system was more difficult to use than anticipated but still 
performed its ordinary function adequately so it was not unfit for 
ordinary purposes.  Similarly, the lack of leg protection on a 
motorcycle neither made it a defective product nor unfit for its 
ordinary purposes since the risk of a leg injury in the event of a side 
collision with a car was obvious to users.89 
Finally, the implied warranty of merchantability is not 
breached unless the product is inadequate or unsafe when used for 
an “ordinary purpose.”  Generally, this means an intended or 
reasonably foreseeable use of the product.  The plaintiff must 
prove that he made proper use of the product, that he exercised 
due care for his own safety, that he was not aware of the defect and 
that he did not mishandle the product.90  A beer bottle that breaks 
when intentionally thrown against a utility pole is not 
unmerchantable91 nor are safety glasses that shatter when subjected 
to forces far greater than could reasonably be expected,92 nor is a 
twenty-year-old used front axle and steering mechanism, installed 
by the plaintiff on his tractor, which fails.93 
Hence, unless the good is defective in some way, it is fit for its 
ordinary purposes. 
E. Other Merchantablility Standards 
Although fitness for ordinary purposes is the primary standard 
for determining whether a good satisfies its implied warranty of 
merchantability, the language of section 336.2-314 also provides 
additional criteria for determining whether goods are 
merchantable.  Section 336.2-314 provides that, in order for goods 
to be merchantable, they must be at least such as 
 
 
 88. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Brewer, 959 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. 1998). 
 89. Toney v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 975 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(applying Mississippi law).  Risks that are obvious to the ordinary consumer will 
not ordinarily render the product unfit for ordinary purposes.  The U.C.C. 
disclaimer provisions of § 336.2-316 provide, in subsection 3(b), that “there is no 
implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination [of the product by 
the buyer] ought in the circumstances to have revealed . . . .” MINN. STAT. § 336.2-
316, U.C.C. cmt. (2002). 
 90. Rients v. Int’l Harvester Co., 346 N.W.2d 359 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). 
 91. Venezia v. Miller Brewing Co., 626 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1980). 
 92. Am. Optical Co. v. Weidenhamer, 457 N.E.2d 181 (Ind. 1983). 
 93. Rients, 346 N.W.2d 359. 
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(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract 
description; and 
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average 
quality within the description; and 
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods 
are used; and 
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, 
of even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and 
among all units involved; and 
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as 
the agreement may require; and 
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made 
on the container or label if any. 
Some of these criteria may be irrelevant and others redundant 
in the case of any particular good or product.  Goods that cannot 
“pass without objection in the trade under the contract 
description,” fungible goods which are not of “fair average quality,” 
goods that are not of “even kind, quality and quantity” from one 
unit to another, and goods that are not adequately packaged and 
labeled, are all substandard or defective in some way.  Each of these 
criteria seems to be synonymous with fitness for ordinary purposes. 
The requirement that goods “pass without objection in the 
trade” has been the focus of litigation because the seller has argued 
that goods meeting this criterion do not breach the implied 
warranty of merchantability.  A product does not have to be perfect 
or even state-of-the-art to meet existing trade standards.94 
Goods that fail to “conform to the promises or affirmations of 
fact made on the container or label” may not be defective in the 
tort law sense.  The failure to meet the promise may make the 
product unsafe, but it may also make the product unsuitable for the 
buyer’s needs.  This criterion for merchantability is meant, similar 
to an express warranty, to hold the seller to a promise—a 
representation about the goods.  Unlike an express warranty, 
 
 94. See, e.g., Royal Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 
1092, 1099 (11th Cir. 1983) (applying Florida law) (stating that an older model 
photocopier was not unmerchantable simply because it was not the best copier on 
the market or even equal to competitor’s copiers so long as it met “existing 
standards of the trade at the time of sale”); Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Zallea Bros., 
443 F. Supp. 946, 953 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (concluding that steam pipe expansion 
joints, which corroded and cracked after a short period of use, were nevertheless 
merchantable since they met the design standards in the industry). 
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however, the buyer is not required to show reliance on the seller’s 
representation95 in order to show that there is an implied warranty 
of merchantability because of promises or affirmations made on 
the container or label. 
Finally, the “must be at least such as” language in section 
336.2-314 leaves open the possibility that there may be other 
attributes of merchantability, at least in some cases. 
There is relatively little case law, and virtually none in 
Minnesota, applying the merchantability criteria in section 336.2-
314 that are in addition to fitness for ordinary purposes. 
 




The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose has 
some attributes of both an express warranty and an implied 
warranty of merchantability, though it is conceptually distinct from 
either.  This warranty is essentially an implied promise by the seller 
of a product that the product will meet the particular or special 
needs of the buyer.  It is similar to an express warranty in that it is 
rooted in the premise that the seller has made a representation to 
the buyer about some attribute of the product—in this instance, 
that the product will meet the buyer’s particular needs.  It is similar 
to an implied warranty of merchantability in that the 
representation arises by implication from the transaction between 
seller and buyer.  It is, however, distinct from the implied warranty 
of merchantability in that it promises that the product will safely 
and effectively serve the particular, as distinct from the ordinary, 
purposes of the buyer.  Thus, the product may be free of defects, 
yet breach an implied warranty of fitness for purpose, because it 
does not satisfy the buyer’s special purposes.96 
 
 95. See supra Part II.C. 
 96. A good example of a product that is not defective or unmerchantable, but 
nonetheless breaches the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is 
found in Emerald Painting, Inc. v. PPG Indus., Inc., in which the defendant advised 
the plaintiff, a painting contractor, to use a particular epoxy paint and sealer to 
paint concrete surfaces in accordance with the specifications in a contract.  472 
N.Y.S.2d 485 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).  The paint and sealer were not compatible 
with each other and, as a consequence, the paint peeled off the surface to which it 
had been applied.  Id. at 486.  Neither the paint nor the sealer was defective, but 
the combination of the two failed to serve the particular needs of the plaintiff.  Id. 
at 486–87. 
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Minnesota Statutes section 336.2-315 provides that: 
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to 
know of any particular purpose for which the goods are 
required and that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill 
or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is 
unless excluded or modified under the next section an 
implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such 
purpose. 
The buyer, in order to establish the existence of this warranty, 
thus must prove that (1) the seller knew or should have known of 
the buyer’s particular purpose for the product; (2) the seller knew 
or should have known that the buyer was relying on the seller’s skill 
and judgment in selecting and furnishing the product; and (3) the 
buyer actually relied on the seller. 
The seller need not be a merchant with respect to goods of 
that kind as is required in order for an implied warranty of 
merchantability to arise,97 nor is a technical sale necessarily 
required.98 
B. The Seller’s Knowledge of the Buyer’s Particular Purpose 
The seller must know or have reason to know that the buyer 
plans to use the product for some special use that is different from 
the product’s ordinary uses.  Unless the buyer can first establish 
that the seller was or should have been aware of the buyer’s 
particular purpose, it will be impossible to show that the seller 
implicitly represented that the product would satisfy that purpose.  
The plaintiff may show that he communicated his particular 
purpose for obtaining the product to the seller.99 
A classic example of a buyer’s communication of special need 
to a seller giving rise to an implied warranty of fitness for a 
 
 97. See supra Part III.C. 
 98. An implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose may arise in a lease 
contract.   MINN. STAT. § 336.2A-213 (2002).  Given the Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s declaration that implied warranties are “favored” under Minnesota law, 
perhaps other transactions not technically amounting to a sale could also give rise 
to this warranty.  See Asbestos Prods. Inc. v. Ryan Landscape Supply Co., 282 Minn. 
178, 180, 163 N.W.2d 767, 769 (1968) (“The doctrine of implied warranty is 
essentially an equitable one favored by this court and should be given effect when 
it is possible to do so.”). 
 99. See Luther v. Standard Conveyor Co., 252 Minn. 135, 89 N.W.2d 179 
(1958) (applying the predecessor Uniform Sales Act provision, Minnesota Statutes 
§ 512.15 subd. 1, which provided that the buyer must have made known, expressly 
or by implication, the particular purpose for which the goods were required). 
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particular purpose is Klein v. Sears Roebuck & Co.100  The buyer of a 
riding lawnmower made his purchase contingent upon the seller 
inspecting the buyer’s property and the seller’s determination that 
the mower was safe for use on his hilly property.  After inspection 
of the buyer’s property, the seller confirmed that the mower was 
suitable for the buyer’s use so long as it was driven straight up the 
steeper hills.  When driven vertically up a hill, the mower tipped 
over backwards and injured the buyer.  The court affirmed the 
verdict for the plaintiff for breach of an implied warranty of fitness 
for a particular purpose.101  Another good example is found in 
Barrington Corp. v. Patrick Lumber Co.,102 where the plaintiff ordered 
windows that the defendant-seller knew had to conform to 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) energy efficiency specifications.  
The defendant supplied windows that it claimed were “TVA 
windows” which in fact were not in compliance with the TVA 
standards.  The windows were not inherently defective, but they 
breached the implied warranty of fitness for purpose since they did 
not fulfill the buyer’s particular purpose.  This warranty arose 
because the buyer had communicated his particular purpose to the 
seller. 
The buyer may also make his intended special need for or use 
of the product evident to the seller from the context of the 
transaction.103  This most often occurs in situations where the seller 
and buyer have dealt often enough with one another so that the 
seller is familiar with the buyer’s business practices and needs. 
 
 100. 773 F.2d 1421 (4th Cir. 1985) (applying Maryland law). 
 101. Id. at 1425.  The exchange between buyer and seller also gave rise to an 
express warranty because of the seller’s explicit representation that the mower was 
safe for operation on the buyer’s property.  See id. at 1424.  If, after the buyer had 
made his special needs known, the seller had simply delivered the mower and 
made no explicit representation of any kind, then only an implied warranty of 
fitness for purpose would have arisen. 
 102. 447 So.2d 785 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984). 
 103. See Riviera Imports, Inc. v. Anderson Used Cars, Inc., 268 Minn. 202, 207, 
128 N.W.2d 159, 163 (1964) (stating “[t]he seller may be informed of the 
intended use by the buyer by implication”).  U.C.C. Comment 1 states that “the 
buyer need not bring home to the seller actual knowledge of the particular 
purpose for which the goods are intended . . . if the circumstances are such that 
the seller has reason to realize the purpose intended . . . .”  MINN. STAT. § 336.2-
315, U.C.C. cmt. 1 (2002).  The implied warranty of fitness for a particular 
purpose discussed in Riviera, a case decided under the Uniform Sales Act, would 
constitute an implied warranty of merchantability under the U.C.C. because the 
purpose for which a car buyer needs an accurate certificate of title is an ordinary, 
not a particular or special, purpose for obtaining a car’s title. 
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The seller may also have “reason to know” of the buyer’s 
special need because a third party has made the seller aware.104 
Finally, the “particular purpose” that gives rise to this warranty 
is different than the ordinary purposes for which the product is 
used.  A “particular purpose” means a specific use of the goods that 
is peculiar to the nature of the buyer’s needs, whereas an “ordinary 
purpose” envisages a use customarily made of the goods.105  The 
Minnesota Court of Appeals failed to see this distinction in Willmar 
Cookie Co. v. Pippin Pecan Co.,106 where the court held that a pecan 
supplier had breached the implied warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose by supplying moldy pecans when it knew that 
the buyer wanted the pecans for resale.  Whether or not the nuts 
were to be resold, human consumption is an ordinary, not a 
particular, purpose of food.  Since the nuts were not fit for human 
consumption, they were simply not merchantable. 
In Nelson v. Wilkins Dodge, Inc.,107 the buyer of a pickup truck 
alleged breach of both the implied warranty of merchantability and 
that of fitness for a particular purpose.  The buyer claimed that a 
fitness for particular purpose warranty arose out of a conversation 
with the dealer at the time of sale.  In this conversation, the dealer 
promised that the truck was fit for driving at sustained high rates of 
speed.  In reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for 
the defendant, the Minnesota Supreme Court said: 
Defendant suggests that the warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose is inapplicable in this case because 
sustained high-speed driving is an ordinary purpose for 
which an automobile is used.  The implied warranties of 
merchantability and fitness often overlap, however, and 
though it is a close question, both should be applicable 
here.108 
Minnesota courts are not alone in confusing the two concepts.  
However, according to a leading authority on the U.C.C., “[s]uch 
confusion under the Code is inexcusable.  Sections 2-314 and 2-315 
make plain that the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is 
narrower, more specific, and more precise.”109 
 
 104. CLARK & SMITH, supra note 66, § 6:1. 
 105. See MINN. STAT. § 336.2-315, U.C.C. cmt. 2 (2002). 
 106. 357 N.W.2d 111 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). 
 107. 256 N.W.2d 472 (Minn. 1977). 
 108. Id. at 476 n.2 (citations omitted). 
 109. 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-
10 at 369 (5th ed. 2000). 
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Even though the buyer’s particular or special need for a 
product can be brought home to the seller in a variety of ways and 
can be inferred from the overall context of the transaction, the 
seller still has plenty of opportunity to argue that he had no reason 
to know of the buyer’s particular needs.  If, for example, the buyer 
is in control of installation or application of the product, it is much 
less likely that the seller would have reason to know of a particular 
use intended by the buyer.110  Similarly, where the defendant is a 
manufacturer of the product that was sold by a retailer who dealt 
directly with the buyer, the lack of privity between manufacturer 
and buyer very likely means that the manufacturer did not 
impliedly represent anything about the product’s fitness for the 
buyer’s particular purpose.  This contrasts, of course, with the rule 
regarding the implied warranty of merchantability where a breach 
occurs if there is a defect in the product when it leaves the 
manufacturer’s hands despite the lack of privity between the 
manufacturer and the consumer.111 
C. The Seller’s Knowledge of the Buyer’s Reliance 
The seller must also have reason to know that the buyer is 
relying on her skill and judgment to provide a product suitable for 
the particular needs of the buyer.  For example, in Freeman v. Case 
Corp.,112 the evidence showed that the plaintiff had purchased a 
particular model of mower-equipped tractor for mowing his lawn 
“after seeing and admiring one owned by an acquaintance,”113 and 
that he did not seek the seller’s advice about the purchase.114  In 
such circumstances, the seller had no reason to know that the 
buyer was relying on the seller’s skill and judgment to furnish a 
product fit for the buyer’s particular needs.  The court concluded, 
as a matter of law, that there was no implied warranty of fitness for 
a particular purpose that arose from the sale.  Similarly, in Laird v. 
Scribner Coop, Inc.,115 the evidence showed that the buyer of feed 
corn had considerable experience with grain and hogs and had in 
 
 110. See, e.g., Friendship Heights v. Koubek, 573 F. Supp. 100 (D. Md. 1983); 
Standard Structural Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 597 F. Supp. 164 (D. 
Conn. 1984). 
 111. See infra Part VI.C. 
 112. 924 F. Supp. 1456 (W.D. Va. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 118 F.3d 1011 
(4th Cir. 1997). 
 113. Id. at 1461. 
 114. Id. at 1464. 
 115. 466 N.W.2d 798 (Neb. 1991). 
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fact trained the feed corn seller’s manager.  The court had no 
difficulty in concluding that there was “no credible evidence upon 
which one could conclude that [the buyer] relied on [the seller’s] 
skill and knowledge to select this particular feed corn.”116 
In general, if the buyer’s expertise is greater than that of the 
seller, if the seller supplies a product that satisfies specifications 
provided by the buyer,117 or if the buyer or his agent thoroughly 
inspects the goods prior to sale, it is much less likely that the buyer 
can show that he relied on the seller’s skill and judgment rather 
than upon his own. 
D. The Buyer’s Reliance on the Seller 
The buyer must actually rely on the seller’s skill and judgment 
in selecting a product fit for the buyer’s need or no implied 
warranty of fitness for purpose arises.  Generally speaking, if the 
buyer can show that he made his particular need evident to the 
seller and also made evident that he was relying on the seller to 
provide a product that would meet that particular need, there is a 
very strong implication that the buyer did in fact rely on the seller 
to provide a suitable product.  Courts and counsel tend to combine 
the seller’s “reason to know” of the buyer’s reliance and the buyer’s 
reliance in fact into a single “reliance” element.  The buyer’s actual 
reliance is a critical element of the claim.  Even if the seller knew of 
the buyer’s particular or special needs and believed that the buyer 
was relying upon her to provide a suitable product, the seller’s 
failure to provide a suitable product is simply not the cause of any 
resulting harm to the buyer where the buyer did not in fact rely on 
the seller. 
 
V. PLEADING A WARRANTY THEORY 
A. Generally 
 
The typical complaint in a products liability suit tends to plead 
everything but the kitchen sink and sometimes even throws in the 
sink for good measure.  Perhaps this is tactically sound but there 
may be virtue in being more selective.  A “shotgun” approach to 
pleading has the potential for confusing the issues and diffusing 
 
 116. Id. at 804. 
 117. See, e.g., Cent. Warehouse Lumber Co. v. Redlinger & Hansen Co., 193 
Minn. 42, 257 N.W. 656 (1934). 
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the focus on a party’s strongest arguments.  Therefore, a buyer 
aggrieved with a product’s performance should think carefully 
about whether to plead breach of warranty claims and about which 
warranty claims to plead. 
B. Implied Warranty of Merchantability 
A plaintiff should plead a claim for breach of an implied 
warranty of merchantability only in the most limited circumstances.  
A product that is not merchantable is not merchantable because it 
is “defective” in tort law terms.118  The plaintiff’s argument that the 
product is not merchantable is essentially an argument that the 
product is not fit for ordinary purposes.119  Therefore, plaintiff’s 
evidence and arguments are very likely to be exactly the same as 
those brought to bear in an effort to show that the product is 
defective because it is not reasonably safe.  In such instances, 
pleading and arguing both tort and warranty theories adds nothing 
to the strength of the plaintiff’s case and creates the possibility of 
confusing the court, or the jury, or both.  Moreover, not pleading 
the merchantability warranty claim avoids any of the issues of 
whether the seller is a merchant,120 whether the transaction was a 
sale of goods,121 whether notice of revocation was timely given,122 or 
whether the warranty has been disclaimed.123 
However, the buyer may have suffered only economic harm as 
a consequence of the product being unmerchantable.  In that 
instance, the claimant cannot, under the economic loss statute, 
 
 118. The comments to the revised, but as-of-yet unadopted, U.C.C. § 2-314 
explicitly note that there is: 
disagreement over whether the concept of defect in tort and the concept 
of merchantability in Article 2 are coextensive where personal injuries 
are involved, i.e., if goods are merchantable under warranty law, can they 
still be defective under tort law, and if goods are not defective under tort 
law, can they be unmerchantable under warranty law?  The answer to 
both questions should be no, and the tension between merchantability in 
warranty and defect in tort where personal injury or property damage is 
involved should be resolved as follows:  When recovery is sought for 
injury to person or property, whether goods are merchantable is to be 
determined by applicable state products liability law. 
U.C.C. Revised Article 2, § 2-314, cmt. 7.  See also supra Part III.A. 
 119. See supra Part III.D. 
 120. See supra Part III.C. 
 121. See supra Part III.B. 
 122. See infra Part VII.A. 
 123. See infra Part VIII.D. 
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bring a tort claim and must resort to a warranty claim.124  In such 
cases, it is important to remember that although the statute of 
limitations period for warranty claims is the same as for strict 
products liability tort claims, the limitation period for a breach of 
warranty claim begins to run upon breach, which usually occurs 
when the product is delivered to the buyer, whereas the limitation 
period for a tort claim does not begin to run until the buyer is 
harmed by the defective product.125 
C. Express Warranty 
Claims for breach of an express warranty or the warranty of 
fitness for a particular purpose are especially important to a 
plaintiff in instances where it will be difficult or impossible to show 
that the product is defective in tort law terms.  The essence of both 
of these warranty claims is that the seller, either explicitly or 
implicitly, has made a representation about the product that is not 
true.  The product may be free of defects but still not fulfill the 
promise made by the seller.  It is also possible that the seller has 
made an express warranty that effectively promises that the product 
is merchantable, such as a promise that the product is “free of all 
defects.”  Unlike the implied warranties, this express promise 
cannot then be disclaimed once it has been made.126 
It is also quite possible that facts that give rise to an express 
warranty claim may also form the basis for a negligent or even 
intentional misrepresentation claim or simply a basic negligence 
claim. 
D. Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose 
The implied warranties of merchantability and of fitness for a 
particular purpose represent very different implied promises about 
a product and the distinction between the two implied warranties is 
quite clear.  An implied warranty of merchantability promises that 
the good is fit for all ordinary purposes for which such a good is 
 
 124. See MINN. STAT. § 604.101 (2002). 
 125. See MINN. STAT. § 336.2-725(1) (2002) (requiring that an action for 
breach of a contract for sale be commenced within four years of the breach, unless 
the parties have agreed to a shorter period); § 541.05 subd. 2 (stating “[a]ny 
action based on the strict liability of the defendant and arising from the 
manufacture, sale, use or consumption of a product shall be commenced within 
four years”). 
 126. See infra Part VIII.B. 
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obtained.  An implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose 
promises that the good is fit for a particular purpose or need of the 
buyer.  A particular purpose is, by definition, something other than 
an ordinary purpose.127  Even though the courts sometimes confuse 
the two,128 counsel should keep this distinction clear.  In particular, 
it is important to remember that a buyer must show reliance on the 
seller in order to show that there is an implied warranty of fitness 
for purpose.  No reliance need be shown to establish that there is 
an implied warranty of merchantability.129 
It is also useful to remember that the warranty of fitness for 
purpose can only be disclaimed in writing, whereas the warranty of 
merchantability can be disclaimed orally.130  Furthermore, the 
disclaimer must mention fitness.  Therefore, a defendant may be 
able to prove that she effectively disclaimed the implied warranty of 
merchantability but, unless there is a written disclaimer, the buyer 
may still have an implied warranty of fitness for a particular 
purpose. 
Of course, a product or good may breach both of these 
implied warranties if the product is unsuitable in more than one 
way; for example, one feature of the product breaches the 







 127. See supra Part IV.B. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See, e.g., Schenck v. Pelkey, 405 A.2d 665 (Conn. 1978).  The plaintiff 
alleged in his complaint that a defective swimming pool slide that had caused 
personal injury was not “reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was purchased.”  
Id. at 670.  The trial court interpreted this as a complaint that the product 
breached the § 2-315 implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Id.  In 
order to establish this warranty, the buyer must show reliance which he could not 
do. Id. The appellate court later saved the day for the plaintiff when it determined 
that, although the complaint “refers somewhat confusingly to ‘fitness,’” the 
plaintiff’s complaint should be understood to refer instead to merchantability and 
that plaintiff’s essential complaint was that the good was not suitable for “the 
ordinary purpose for which such goods are used.”  Id. at 671. 
 130. See infra Part VIII.D. 
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Negligence law long ago rejected privity of contract as a 
defense to liability for failure to take reasonable care.131  Courts 
generally came to conclude that the duty of care that lies at the 
heart of negligence law does not arise out of a contract between the 
plaintiff and the defendant, but is imposed independently as a 
matter of policy.  Therefore, a contractual relationship between 
plaintiff and defendant is irrelevant to the question of liability for 
negligence.  Consequently, contract law doctrine—including the 
doctrine of privity—is also irrelevant.  However, this broad, general 
conclusion suggests, at least by implication, that a contract between 
the seller of a product and a person claiming to have been harmed 
by the product is critical to a claim for breach of contract, 
including claims for breach of warranty. 
Historically, the general rules of contract law provided that 
only those who were a party to a contract could sue under it for 
breach of warranty.  Around the turn of the twentieth century, 
however, courts began to create exceptions to the general privity 
defense of product manufacturers.  The culminating event in this 
history was the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in 
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,132 which concluded that, even where 
the basis for the seller’s liability was a contract, privity should not 
bar recovery.  The Henningsen court described the changed 
commercial circumstances that justified a change in the law: 
There is no doubt that under early common-law concepts 
of contractual liability only those persons who were parties 
to the bargain could sue for a breach of it.  In more 
recent times a noticeable disposition has appeared . . . to 
break through the narrow barrier of privity when dealing 
with sales of goods in order to give realistic recognition to 
a universally accepted fact.  The fact is that the dealer and 
the ordinary buyer do not, and are not expected to, buy 
goods . . . exclusively for their own consumption or use.  
Makers and manufacturers know this and advertise and 
market their products on that assumption; witness the 
“family” car, the baby foods, etc.  The limitations of privity 
 
 131. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 132. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). 
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in contracts for the sale of goods developed their place in 
the law when marketing conditions were simple, when 
maker and buyer frequently met face to face on an equal 
bargaining plane and when many of the products were 
relatively uncomplicated and conducive to inspection by a 
buyer competent to evaluate their quality . . . . With the 
advent of mass marketing, the manufacturer became 
remote from the purchaser, sales were accomplished 
through intermediaries, and the demand for the product 
was created by advertising media.  In such an economy it 
became obvious that the consumer was the person being 
cultivated.  Manifestly, the connotation of “consumer” was 
broader than that of “buyer.”  He signified such a person 
who, in the reasonable contemplation of the parties to the 
sale, might be expected to use the product.  Thus, where 
the commodities sold are such that if defectively 
manufactured they will be dangerous to life and limb, 
then society’s interests can only be protected by 
eliminating the requirement of privity between the maker 
and his dealers and the reasonably expected ultimate 
consumer.133 
In Henningsen, the wife of the buyer of a new car was injured 
when, ten days after the car had been purchased, she lost control of 
the car and it crashed apparently because of a faulty steering 
mechanism.  Among other claims brought by the injured driver was 
a breach of implied warranty of merchantability claim against 
Chrysler Corporation, the manufacturer of the car.  Chrysler 
argued that “since it was not a party to the sale by the dealer . . . 
there is no privity of contract between it and the plaintiffs, and the 
absence of this privity eliminates any such implied warranty.”134  
The court, however, observed that, in the modern marketplace, a 
buyer’s remedies “and those of persons who properly claim 
through him should not depend upon the intricacies of the law of 
sales.  The obligation of the manufacturer should not be based 
alone on privity of contract.  It should rest . . . upon the demands 
of social justice.”135  Further, as to the wife, who was not a party to 
the contract of sale, 
 
 133. Id. at 80–81.  See generally William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict 
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1960) (discussing the fall of the 
privity requirement in products liability cases after the Henningsen decision). 
 134. Henningson, 161 A.2d at 80. 
 135. Id. at 83 (quoting Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 135 P. 633, 635 (1913)) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
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the cause of justice in this area of the law can be served 
only by recognizing that she is such a person who, in 
the reasonable contemplation of the parties to the 
warranty, might be expected to become a user of the 
automobile.  Accordingly, her lack of privity does not 
stand in the way of prosecution of the injury suit 
against defendant Chrysler.136 
Henningsen presented issues of both vertical and horizontal 
privity.  The distinction between the two is important because both 
the courts and the U.C.C. treat the concepts differently.  Vertical 
privity refers to the relationship among those in the chain of 
manufacturing, distribution and sale of a product to the ultimate 
buyer.  Those adjacent to one another in this chain are in vertical 
privity with each other.  So, for example, the manufacturer and a 
distributor who obtained the product directly from the 
manufacturer would be parties in vertical privity with one another.  
Likewise, the retail seller and the ultimate buyer would be in 
vertical privity with one another.  However, the manufacturer and 
the ultimate buyer are not in vertical privity since they have no 
direct contractual nexus.  Horizontal privity refers to the 
relationship between those who may be injured or otherwise 
affected by the product and the buyer of the product; in other 
words, those who wish to stand in the shoes of the buyer and have 
the benefits of any warranties obtained by the buyer.  These non-
buyers may include members of the buyer’s family, visitors in the 
buyer’s home, the buyer’s employees, and others.  The court in 
Henningsen concluded that the lack of vertical privity between 
Chrysler, the car’s manufacturer, and the buyer, Mr. Henningsen, 
did not bar Mrs. Henningsen’s warranty claims against Chrysler.  
Nor was her claim barred by the lack of horizontal privity between 
Chrysler and the injured Mrs. Henningsen, who as a non-buyer was 
outside the chain of the car’s distribution. 
B. U.C.C. Section 2-318—Horizontal Privity 
In the wake of Henningsen, the law regarding privity began to 
change rapidly so that, at the time the U.C.C. was being adopted by 
many states in the mid-1960s, the common law doctrine of privity 
varied greatly from one state to another.  The Official Text of the 
U.C.C. provided three alternatives for section 2-318, the section 
 
 136. Id. at 99–100. 
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titled “Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express and 
Implied.”  These three alternatives reflected the differences in state 
common law.  Each alternative describes the extent to which 
warranty protection extends to others beyond the buyer of the 
product.  About half the states adopted Alternative A, the most 
restrictive, or a similar provision.137  Minnesota, however, adopted a 
close equivalent of Alternative C, the broadest version of the Code’s 
alternatives for section 2-318.138  Section 336.2-318 of Minnesota’s 
U.C.C. provides as follows: 
A seller’s warranty whether express or implied extends to 
any person who may reasonably be expected to use, 
consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured 
by breach of the warranty.  A seller may not exclude or 
limit the operation of this section.139 
This language addresses the issue of horizontal privity and says, 
in essence, that the absence of such privity does not bar a warranty 
claim by non-buyers so long as they are persons “who may 
reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the 
goods and who is injured by breach of the warranty.”  Non-buyer 
beneficiaries of the buyer’s warranties are not limited to natural 
persons or members of the buyer’s family and household, or guests 
in the buyer’s home as is the case in those jurisdictions that have 
adopted the more restrictive language of Alternative A or B of the 
U.C.C. 
Of course, section 336.2-318 presumes that there is a warranty 
in the first place that has arisen from the transaction between seller 
and buyer.  If no express warranty was made and the implied 
warranties were disclaimed under section 336.2-316,140 then the 
product is not warranted and questions regarding third party 
beneficiaries will not arise.  If the seller has contractually limited an 
express warranty to, for example, the first buyer, then there is no 
express warranty attached to the good once it passes into the hands 
of a subsequent buyer.141  If there is a warranty, however, then the 
seller cannot exclude or limit the operation of section 336.2-318’s 
extension of that warranty’s protection to third persons who may 
 
 137. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 109, at 402 n.3. 
 138. Compare U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternative C (2003), with MINN. STAT. § 336.2-318 
(2002). 
 139. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-318 (2002). 
 140. See infra Part VIII.D. 
 141. See infra Part VI.D. 
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reasonably be expected to use the warranted product. 
C. Vertical Privity 
On its face, section 336.2-318 addresses only the issue of 
horizontal privity by extending warranty protection to third persons 
who may reasonably be expected to use warranted products.142  
Issues of vertical privity are left to common law development.143  
Vertical privity is very unlikely to arise as an issue in a products 
liability case since the claim ordinarily will be brought in tort.  In 
such a case, contract law concepts are simply not relevant.  As a 
consequence, there is little Minnesota case law directly addressing 
the question of whether privity bars claims brought against remote 
sellers in the chain of a product’s distribution with whom the buyer 
did not contract directly.  In general, however, the case law leaves 
little doubt that privity is rarely, if ever, a bar to a warranty claim 
made by what Henningsen called a “remote purchaser” —one who 
did not buy the product directly from the seller against whom the 
claim is brought. 
For example, in TCF Bank & Savings, F.A. v. Marshall Truss 
Systems, Inc.,144 TCF brought negligence and breach of warranty 
claims against the manufacturer of roof trusses used in the 
construction of the plaintiff’s bank building.  Marshall Truss had 
supplied the trusses to Robert L. Carr Co., a general contractor 
who constructed the bank building for Pipestone Federal Savings 
and Loan Association.  About two years after it was built, TCF 
purchased the building from Pipestone.  The defendant contended 
that TCF was not a party to the contract for the sale of the roof 
trusses and therefore was barred from recovery under that contract.  
The court concluded that TCF, “upon purchase of the building 
from Pipestone, assumed Pipestone’s rights under the warranty 
provisions.”145  The court of appeals appears to treat this as a 
question of horizontal privity, observing that: 
 
 142. See Transp. Corp. of Am. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 30 F.3d 953, 958–59 
(8th Cir. 1994). 
 143. See MINN. STAT. § 336.2-318, U.C.C. cmt. 3 (2002) (stating that “[b]eyond 
[the language of the section which extends warranty protection horizontally to 
non-buyers], the section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the 
developing case law on whether the seller’s warranties, given to his buyer who 
resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain”). 
 144. 466 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). 
 145. Id. at 52. 
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[u]nder section 336.2-318, a seller’s express or implied 
warranty ‘extends to any person who may reasonably be 
expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and 
who is injured by breach of the warranty.’  ‘Person’ 
includes organizations.  Minn. Stat. § 336.1-201(30).  
Pipestone, as owner of the building, could reasonably be 
expected to be affected by the sale of the trusses to the 
contractor who built the building, thus it was covered by 
the U.C.C. warranty provisions.146 
The problem with this rationale, of course, is that Pipestone 
was a buyer of the trusses as part of the building, not a non-buyer 
outside the chain of the product’s distribution to whom the quoted 
language of section 336.2-318 is meant to refer.  The trusses were 
sold, in a chain of transactions, by Marshall Truss to Carr, then to 
Pipestone, and finally to TCF.  None of these parties was outside 
the distributive chain, so no horizontal privity issue arises, only a 
question of vertical privity. 
TCF Bank & Savings is not the only case in which section 336.2-
318 is cited as the basis for concluding that vertical privity is no bar 
to remote buyers’ claims against the manufacturer of the good, 
even though that section, addressing the issue of horizontal privity, 
does not presume to say anything about vertical privity and indeed 
“is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on 
whether the seller’s warranties, given to his buyer who resells, 
extend to other persons in the distributive chain.”147  In Nelson v. 
International Harvester,148 farmers bought combines manufactured by 
the defendant from dealers or other farmers.  The combines 
caught fire resulting in their destruction.  The owners of the 
combines brought breach of warranty claims against the combine 
manufacturer.  The defendant argued that it was not a party to any 
of the sales transactions involving the plaintiffs because the 
plaintiffs were sub-purchasers in the distributive chain who were 
not in vertical privity with the product manufacturer.  The court of 
appeals, appearing to rely on section 336.2-318, concluded that 
“there is no question that the farmers here could have brought a 
warranty action against the manufacturer.”149 
In SCM Corp. v. Deltak Corp.,150 a case involving the sale of a 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. See MINN. STAT. § 336.2-318, U.C.C. cmt. 3 (2002). 
 148. 394 N.W.2d 578 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 
 149. Id. at 581. 
 150. 702 F. Supp. 1428, 1433–34 (D. Minn. 1988). 
37
Prince: Defective Products and Product Warranty Claims in Minnesota
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005
PRINCE 4/25/2005  1:46:44 PM 
1714 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:4 
superheater by the manufacturer to an intermediary who then sold 
it to the plaintiff, the federal district court made the same mistake.  
The plaintiff was a sub-purchaser in the distributive chain, not a 
non-buyer outside the chain of the product’s distribution to whom 
section 336.2-318 refers.  The court nevertheless relied on that 
section: 
Under Minnesota law, privity of contract is not a 
prerequisite for recovery in an action for breach of 
warranty. . . .  As noted, Minnesota has adopted section 2-
318 of the Uniform Commercial Code . . . .151 
In all of these cases, the plaintiff alleged breach of an implied 
warranty of merchantability resulting in economic loss.  In SCM, 
the plaintiff also alleged that an express warranty and an implied 
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose had been breached.  
Under the economic loss rule, these claimants had to resort to 
breach of warranty claims because they could not sue in tort.  In 
none of these opinions is there any indication that any party raised 
the distinction between horizontal and vertical privity as an issue 
nor is there any indication that the courts really thought about that 
distinction.  It is therefore unclear what a Minnesota court would 
conclude if faced directly with the issue of whether vertical privity 
is, under any circumstances, a bar to a breach of warranty claim.  It 
is difficult to ignore or explain away the clear indication in the 
U.C.C. that section 336.2-318 does not address the question of 
vertical privity at all and that the U.C.C. leaves the resolution of 
that issue to common law development.152  Therefore, the reason 
given by the courts in these cases for concluding that there was no 
privity bar to the plaintiffs’ claims is unconvincing and, indeed, 
appears to be just plain wrong. 
This does not mean, however, that the courts in these cases 
 
 151. Id. at 1432 (internal citations omitted). 
 152. See MINN. STAT. § 336.2-318, U.C.C. cmt. 3 (2002).  See also Touchet Valley 
Grain Growers, Inc. v. Opp & Seibold Gen. Const., Inc., 831 P.2d 724 (Wash. 
1992).  Touchet observes that § 2-318: 
limits only horizontal privity, that is, privity between the seller and the 
immediate purchaser.  The type of privity at issue here is vertical privity – 
privity between a manufacturer and end users down the distribution 
chain.  Unlike horizontal privity, which is governed by statute, 
development of vertical privity is found in case law. *** Official 
Comment 3 is most emphatic that this section is otherwise intended to be 
neutral on the question of whether a seller’s warranties extend to other 
than the original buyer. 
Id. at 729. 
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reached the wrong results.  The most sound and convincing 
rationale for extending the protection of a manufacturer’s 
warranties to remote buyers of the product is the rationale 
expressed in the leading case on this point, Henningson v. Bloomfield 
Motors.153 The underlying reason is that, in today’s commercial 
world, manufacturers make products for, and market them directly 
to, consumers who include not only the ultimate buyer but also 
others who foreseeably may use or be affected by the product.  
Generally speaking, though not always, the consumer (1) is not as 
able to protect himself against the risk of product defects as is the 
manufacturer, and (2) has less bargaining strength to bargain over 
the question of liability in the event of a product-related harm 
occurring.  Therefore, strict adherence to traditional privity 
limitations is often unfair to the consumer.  These fairness 
concerns remain, though are greatly reduced, if the plaintiff is 
another commercial party rather than a consumer. 
Henningson, however, found that privity should not be a bar 
where the claim was for personal injury due to breach of an 
implied warranty of merchantability.  Should the result be different 
if the claim is one for breach of an express warranty or the warranty 
of fitness for a particular purpose?  Should it matter whether the 
claim is for personal injury, property loss, economic loss, or for 
revocation of the contract? 
Certainly, the Minnesota courts have consistently found that 
privity limitations should not be a bar to breach of warranty 
claims.154  There are circumstances, however, in which observance 
of the privity limitation makes good sense.  The relevant 
circumstances that affect the proper answer to this question are:  
(1) the type of warranty at issue; and (2) whether the claim is for 
personal injury, property loss, economic loss, or for revocation. 
1. Vertical Privity and Express Warranty 
Where the claim is for breach of an express warranty, the 
absence of vertical privity should not be a bar to a remote buyer’s 
claim.  An express warranty is founded upon a representation the 
 
 153. See supra notes 131–36 and accompanying text. 
 154. See Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imps., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 358 (Minn. 1977); 
Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. Proksch, 309 Minn. 106, 107, 244 N.W.2d 105, 109 
(1976); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 339–40, 154 N.W.2d 488, 
500–01 (1967); Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 562, 99 N.W.2d 670, 683 (1959); 
Schubert v. J.R. Clark Co., 49 Minn. 331, 340, 51 N.W. 1103, 1106 (1892). 
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seller makes about the product upon which the buyer relies in 
buying the product.  If the product manufacturer makes the 
representation in its advertising or on its packaging, that 
representation is surely intended for the ultimate buyer of the 
product with whom the manufacturer does not contract directly. 
What sensible or sound reason then exists as to why, when 
the goods purchased by the ultimate consumer on the 
strength of the advertisements aimed squarely at him do 
not possess their described qualities and goodness and 
cause him harm, he should not be permitted to move 
against the manufacturer to recoup his loss.  In our minds 
no good or valid reason exists for denying him that right.  
Surely under modern merchandising practices the 
manufacturer owes a very real obligation toward those 
who consume or use his products.  The warranties made 
by the manufacturer in his advertisements and by the 
labels on his products are inducements to the ultimate 
consumers, and the manufacturer ought to be held to 
strict accountability to any consumer who buys the 
product in reliance on such representations and later 
suffers injury because the product proves to be defective 
or deleterious.155 
The vast majority of authority now holds that express 
warranties in a product’s advertising and packaging run directly to 
the ultimate purchaser and that lack of privity does not bar such 
claims.156 
Moreover, the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act provides a 
private right of action for breach of an express warranty.  Lack of 
vertical privity does not bar this statutory claim.157  Finally, where 
 
 155. Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 147 N.E.2d 612, 615–16 (Ohio 
1958). 
 156. See, e.g., Reid v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 512 F.2d 1294 (6th Cir. 1975) 
(car manufacturer made express representations regarding vehicle quality); N. 
Feldman & Son, Ltd. v. Checker Motors Corp., 572 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) 
(manufacturer of diesel engines for taxicabs made representations regarding 
reliability of engines to cab manufacturer who relayed them to the taxicab buyer, 
and manufacturer could foresee that its representations would be relayed to this 
ultimate buyer); Hauter v. Zogarts, 534 P.2d 377, 381 (Cal. 1975) (manufacturer 
represented that golf practice aid was “completely safe”); Hamon v. Digliani, 174 
A.2d 294, 294 (Conn. 1961) (manufacturer’s advertising represented that 
detergent was “all-purpose” and “for all household cleaning and laundering”); 
Kinlaw v. Long Mfg. N.C., Inc., 259 S.E.2d 552, 553 (N.C. 1979) (manufacturer 
represented that tractor was “free from defects in material and workmanship”). 
 157. See infra Part VIII.H.  Magnuson-Moss provides that such suits may be 
brought against the person “actually making” a written warranty.  15 U.S.C. § 
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the manufacturer’s representations about the product upon which 
the buyer has relied prove to be untrue, a tort claim for 
misrepresentation will typically be available and the privity issue 
can be avoided altogether. 
2. Vertical Privity and Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular 
Purpose 
On the other hand, vertical privity should usually be a bar to a 
claim for breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular 
purpose by a remote buyer.  Unlike the express warranty situation, 
this warranty is very unlikely to arise unless plaintiff and defendant 
were adjoining links in the product’s distributive chain.  An 
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose arises only if the 
seller has “reason to know” of the buyer’s special needs or purposes 
and if the buyer relies on the seller’s expertise in supplying a 
product for that special purpose.  In cases where the seller does not 
deal directly with the buyer, it is very unlikely that such a warranty 
is made directly to that remote buyer.  It is very unlikely that the 
seller knows of that buyer’s particular needs or that such a buyer is 
relying on the seller’s expertise even if the buyer actually relies 
somehow on the expertise of the remote seller with whom he does 
not contract directly.  Therefore, it is very unlikely that a remote 
buyer could show that all of the requisite elements of this warranty 
have been satisfied. 
In a case where someone, typically the retail seller, has made 
an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose to the 
plaintiff, privity should bar the plaintiff’s claim against the 
product’s manufacturer who did not make the representations 
upon which the plaintiff-purchaser relied.  Assume, for example, 
that a prospective buyer of a riding lawnmower conditions his 
purchase on the mower’s suitability for a steep hill on his property.  
He expresses this condition to the retail seller who inspects the 
buyer’s property and then represents that the mower is safe for the 
buyer’s particular need.  When the mower is used on the steep hill, 
 
2310(f) (1975).  This provision would apply in the many situations where the one 
actually making the representation is the product manufacturer through its 
advertising or packaging.  Claims brought under this federal statute give rise to a 
federal cause of action, although the federal jurisdictional requirements are quite 
stringent, and allow for the recovery of all litigation expenses, including attorney’s 
fees. 
41
Prince: Defective Products and Product Warranty Claims in Minnesota
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005
PRINCE 4/25/2005  1:46:44 PM 
1718 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:4 
it tips over backwards and injures the buyer.158  If the buyer then 
attempts to make a breach of implied warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose claim against the manufacturer of the mower, 
lack of privity between the defendant-manufacturer and the injured 
buyer should bar the claim.  The manufacturer has no reason to be 
aware of the buyer’s particular needs, nor has it made any 
representations about the suitability of the product for the buyer’s 
particular needs, nor is it likely that the buyer has in fact relied 
upon the manufacturer.  Finally, if we assume that the 
manufacturer is not negligent because it cannot reasonably foresee 
that a retail seller will make such a representation, there is no good 
basis for voiding the privity barrier even though the plaintiff has 
suffered a personal injury. 
3. Vertical Privity and Implied Warranty of Merchantability 
It is very different in a case where personal injury or property 
loss results from a breach of an implied warranty of 
merchantability.  If the product is not safe for the ordinary 
purposes for which such products are used, the manufacturer 
should foresee the risk of harm, not only to a remote purchaser, 
but also possibly to many others.  The absence of vertical privity 
should not be a bar to the buyer’s claim against the remote 
manufacturer, as the Henningsen court decided in that pre-U.C.C. 
case for reasons that remain sound.159 
However, this privity issue should arise rarely, if ever, in 
Minnesota.  If the plaintiff has suffered personal injury or property 
loss, it is completely redundant to plead breach of an implied 
warranty of merchantability in addition to tort theories of 
liability.160  It is also foolish to plead it instead of the tort theories 
 
 158. These facts are similar to those in Klein v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 773 F.2d 
1421 (4th Cir. 1985) (applying Maryland law), except that the injured buyer in this 
example brings his claim for breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose not against his seller, but against the manufacturer of the 
mower. See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text. 
 159. See supra notes 131–36 and accompanying text. 
 160. See Goblirsch v. W. Land Roller Co., 310 Minn. 471, 475, 246 N.W.2d 687, 
690 (1976), in which the court concluded that the trial court did not err in 
refusing to instruct the jury on breach of implied warranty of merchantability, 
observing that “the instructions would have been mere surplusage, redundant in 
view of the instructions on strict liability.”  The court further observed that an 
instruction on breach of implied warranty “in the circumstances of this case, 
merely would have been redundant and possibly confusing.”  Id. at 476, 246 
N.W.2d at 690. 
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since doing so brings into play many contract law considerations 
that could work to the plaintiff’s detriment.  The defendant may 
allege and be able to prove that the seller is not a merchant, that 
the transaction was not a “sale,” that the warranty has been 
effectively disclaimed, or raise other impediments to relief based 
on a warranty theory.  Furthermore, the defendant’s evidence on 
these issues could undermine the plaintiff’s independent tort 
claims.  Therefore, even if privity is not a bar to recovery in cases of 
personal injury, many hurdles rooted in contract law doctrine 
could prevent the plaintiff’s recovery on a breach of warranty 
theory. 
In a personal injury or property damage case, if plaintiff’s 
counsel pleads redundant theories out of a concern that he might 
possibly miss something unless he pleads everything he can think 
of, then the trial judge should insist that counsel clean up the 
complaint by dismissing the redundant claims.  Moreover, the 
court must not submit the case to the jury on more than one theory 
of recovery where those theories are truly redundant.  To do so 
invites an inconsistent verdict.161  Assume, for example, that the 
case is submitted to the jury on both breach of the implied 
warranty of merchantability and strict liability for design defect 
theories.  The jury finds that there is no breach of the implied 
warranty of merchantability but that the product was defectively 
designed.  But a product cannot be both merchantable and 
defective.  These inconsistent verdicts leave the court and the 
parties at a loss as to what the jury concluded on the critical issue of 
whether there is any basis upon which the defendant may be liable 
to the plaintiff. 
4. Vertical Privity and Claims for Economic Loss 
What if the plaintiff is not injured in his person or property, 
but suffers only economic loss?  In that case, he will be precluded 
from suing on most tort theories and breach of warranty may be 
the only available theory of liability.  Minnesota’s most recent 
version162 of an economic loss statute, Minnesota Statutes section 
604.101, provides that “[a] buyer may not bring a product defect 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. Section 604.101 applies only to claims arising after August 1, 2000.  See 
MINN. STAT. § 604.101(6) (2002).   
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tort claim”163 unless the defective goods “caused harm to the 
buyer’s tangible personal property other than the goods or to the 
buyer’s real property.”164  The statute does not apply to “claims for 
injury to the person.”165  The statute provides in section 604.101, 
subd. 2(1), that economic loss claims can be brought “regardless of 
whether the seller and the buyer were in privity regarding the sale 
or lease of the goods.”  Therefore, privity of contract between 
plaintiff and defendant is not required in claims for economic loss 
brought under this statute. 
Section 604.101, applies only to claims arising after August 1, 
2000.166  A predecessor statute, Minnesota Statutes section 604.10, 
was first enacted in 1991 and may still apply to some economic loss 
claims.  As time goes by, claims under this earlier statute are 
increasingly unlikely to arise. 
The primary reason for distinguishing between economic loss 
and other harms is to set a boundary between contract and tort law.  
The economic loss doctrine acts as a screen to prevent tort theories 
of liability from undermining the law of sales enacted by the 
legislature in the U.C.C.  This law is designed to reflect and enforce 
the understanding of contracting parties, within the limits of 
contract law doctrine.  These limits include the doctrine of 
unconscionability,167 the ability to disclaim warranties168 and limit 
remedies,169 and the doctrine of privity.  Therefore, in economic 
loss cases not ruled by tort theory, whether lack of privity protects a 
seller against warranty claims by remote buyers is an important 
question.  The Minnesota legislature has answered the question in 
its enactment of section 604.101, apparently assuming that a 
remote seller will always be able to limit its liability for economic 
loss through disclaimers and remedy limitations so that it does not 
need the additional protection of the privity bar. 
Economic loss is often broken down into subcategories of 
primary economic loss and consequential economic loss.  Primary 
 
 163. Defined in Minnesota Statutes § 604.101, subd. 1(e) to mean “a common 
law tort claim for damages caused by a defect in the goods but does not include 
statutory claims.  A defect in the goods includes a failure to adequately instruct or 
warn.”  Tort claims for intentional or reckless misrepresentation may still be 
brought.  See MINN. STAT. § 604.101, subd. 4. 
 164. MINN. STAT. § 604.101, subd. 3 (2002). 
 165. Id. § 604.101 subd. 2. 
 166. See id. § 604.101 subd. 6. 
 167. See id. § 336.2-302 (2002). 
 168. See id. § 336.2-316. 
 169. See id. § 336.2-719. 
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economic loss is the difference between the value of the goods 
accepted by the buyer and the value they would have had if they 
had been as warranted, frequently measured by the cost of repair 
or replacement.170  Consequential economic loss is all other 
economic harm that might flow as a consequence from the primary 
economic loss.  It may include loss of productivity, profits, goodwill, 
or business reputation from the failure of the goods to function as 
warranted.171 
No matter how remote or unforeseeable the plaintiff claiming 
primary economic loss might be, the seller’s liability is capped by 
the purchase price of the product.  Consequently, the vertical 
privity barrier is not especially important to the seller who can 
predict her risk potential on the warranties she has made and act 
accordingly.  There is a sharp split of authority outside of 
Minnesota on the issue of whether vertical privity is a bar to a 
remote buyer’s claim for primary economic loss.  The leading case 
allowing recovery of primary economic loss despite the absence of 
privity between plaintiff-buyer and defendant-seller is Morrow v. New 
Moon Homes, Inc.,172 a decision of the Alaska Supreme Court.  The 
court reasoned that: 
[t]he policy considerations which dictate the abolition of 
privity are largely those which also warranted imposing 
strict tort liability on the manufacturer:  the consumer’s 
inability to protect himself adequately from defectively 
manufactured goods, the implied assurance of the maker 
when he puts his goods on the market that they are safe, 
and the superior risk bearing ability of the manufacturer.  
In addition, limiting a consumer under the Code to an 
implied warranty action against his immediate seller in 
those instances when the product defect is attributable to 
the manufacturer would effectively promote circularity of 
litigation and waste of judicial resources.173 
Observing that “[c]ontemporary courts have been more 
reticent to discard the privity requirement and to permit recovery 
in warranty by a remote consumer for purely economic losses,”174 
the court nevertheless concluded that it was appropriate to do so. 
The fear that if the implied warranty action is extended to 
 
 170. See id. § 336.2-714(2). 
 171. See id. §§ 336.2-714(3), 336.2-715. 
 172. 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976). 
 173. Id. at 289. 
 174. Id. 
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direct economic loss, manufacturers will be subjected to 
liability for damages of unknown and unlimited scope 
would seem unfounded.  The manufacturer may possibly 
delimit the scope of his potential liability by use of a 
disclaimer . . . or by resort to the limitations [on liability 
under § 2-719].  These statutory rights not only preclude 
extending the theory of strict liability in tort . . . but also 
make highly appropriate this extension of the theory of 
implied warranties.175 
Our decision today preserves the statutory rights of the 
manufacturer to define his potential liability to the 
ultimate consumer, by means of express disclaimers and 
limitations, while protecting the legitimate expectation of 
the consumer that goods distributed on a wide scale by 
the use of conduit retailers are fit for their intended use.176 
Consequential economic losses, however, present an entirely 
different context for the question of whether privity should bar the 
claims of remote buyers.  These losses will almost always be claimed 
by a commercial party rather than an ordinary consumer.  The 
pickup truck that suffers catastrophic engine failure will, for most 
buyers, represent at most only the loss of the value of the truck 
itself.  A commercial user who experiences that same loss, however, 
may well suffer, as additional consequences, the loss of business 
opportunities, customers, and profits.  These consequential 
economic losses can be enormous, exposing the remote seller to 
the potential of open-ended damages. 
Among other jurisdictions, there is again a conflict as to 
whether a buyer can recover consequential economic loss from a 
remote seller, typically the product’s manufacturer.177  A leading 
commercial law authority agrees with the courts that have refused 
to allow recovery of consequential economic loss by remote, non-
privity buyers. 
If remote sellers wish to sell at a lower price and exclude 
liability for consequential economic loss to sub-
purchasers, why should we deny them that right?  Why 
should we design a system that forces a seller to bear the 
unforeseeable consequential economic losses of remote 
purchasers?  Indeed, by forcing the buyer to bear such 
losses we may save costly lawsuits and even some economic 
 
 175. Id. at 291. 
 176. Id. at 292. 
 177. See CLARK & SMITH, supra note 65, § 10:21, at 10-54. 
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losses against which buyers, knowing they have the 
responsibility, may protect themselves.  In short, we 
believe that a buyer should pick its seller with care and 
recover any economic loss from that seller and not from 
parties remote from the transaction.  Put another way, we 
believe the user is often the “least cost avoider.”  By 
placing the loss on the users or by forcing them to bargain 
with their immediate sellers about the loss, we may 
minimize the total loss to society.  If manufacturers are 
not the least cost risk avoider, but must nevertheless bear 
the loss, we may cause them to spend more of society’s 
resources than optimal to avoid the loss and may 
unnecessarily increase the cost of the commodity sold.178 
Despite the Minnesota legislature’s decision to the contrary in 
section 604.101, it makes good sense to abolish vertical privity for 
primary economic loss claims where the product’s price is the 
ceiling of potential liability but retain it for consequential 
economic loss claims where the liability exposure is open-ended.  
The manufacturer often cannot foresee how a remote purchaser 
will use the goods and cannot, therefore, predict her liability 
potential.  Such unpredictability undermines the manufacturer’s 
loss-spreading ability through either insuring against liability or 
incorporating the cost of her risk into the price of the product.  
Remember that, in tort law, usually under the concept of direct or 
proximate cause, a defendant’s ability to foresee risk of harm to 
another is the primary factor that limits liability to that other 
person. 
It is not clear whether, in its deliberations over the provisions 
of section 604.101, the legislature thought about these distinctions 
between primary and consequential economic loss and the 
different policy considerations relevant to the issue of whether 
privity should bar claims against remote sellers for one, or the 
other, or both kinds of economic loss.  As noted above, there is still 
the argument that a remote seller can limit its liability for 
economic loss through disclaimers and remedy limitations so that it 
doesn’t need the additional protection of the privity bar.  The 
court in Morrow emphasized this point.179 
The commercial reality, however, is that the manufacturer may 
not always be able to make effective her efforts to disclaim or limit 
 
 178. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 109, § 11-6 at 407. 
 179. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
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remedies against a remote buyer.  If, for example, the 
manufacturer includes in the contract for sale to a distributor a 
written warranty disclaimer that meets the requirements of section 
336.2-316,180 there is no guarantee that that written documentation 
will get through the entire chain of transactions, including the 
transaction between distributor and retailer, and the transaction 
between retailer and ultimate buyer, so that the disclaimer gets to 
the ultimate buyer in a form that will make it enforceable against 
that buyer under the Code.  A component part supplier to the 
manufacturer is removed even further from the ultimate purchaser 
making it even more difficult for such a seller to effectively disclaim 
warranty liability to such a purchaser.  It seems particularly harsh to 
deprive the manufacturer of the benefit of the privity bar where it 
is (1) also unable to effectively disclaim warranty liability to 
unknown remote buyers, and (2) unable to predict its liability 
potential for unforeseeable and unknowable consequential losses, 
thus undermining its loss-spreading ability.181 
Perhaps all of this discussion of privity and the distinctions 
between primary and consequential economic loss is merely of 
academic interest to Minnesota practitioners. Mindful, however, of 
the possibility that some economic loss claims may still arise in 
Minnesota under section 604.10, the predecessor to section 
604.101, the question of whether vertical privity is required to 
succeed in such a claim could still arise.  The legislature has now 
declared in section 604.101 that, as a matter of public policy, privity 
should not bar any economic loss claim arising under that statute 
and the statute does not distinguish between direct and 
consequential economic loss. Perhaps, then, the easy answer for a 
court presented with a privity issue in a consequential economic 
loss claim that arises under section 604.10 is to simply adopt the 
same policy.  The Minnesota cases which reach the conclusion that 
 
 180. See infra Part VIII.A regarding disclaimers of warranties generally. 
 181. See Beyond the Garden Gate, Inc. v. Northstar Freeze-Dry Mfg., Inc. 526 
N.W.2d 305, 309 (Iowa 1995) (quoting with approval from WHITE & SUMMERS, 
supra note 109). 
Remote buyers may use a seller’s goods for unknown purposes from 
which enormous losses might ensue.  Since the remote seller cannot 
predict the purposes for which the goods will be used she faces unknown 
liability and may not be able to insure [herself.]  Insurers are hesitant to 
insure against risks they cannot measure.  Moreover, here more than in 
personal injury and property damage cases, it is appropriate to recognize 
the traditional rights of parties to make their own contract. 
Id.  See also Tomka v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 528 N.W.2d 103 (Iowa 1995). 
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vertical privity is not a bar to recovery for consequential economic 
loss are based on the faulty reasoning that this question is answered 
by the provisions of section 336.2-318 which, as discussed above, 
relates only to the question of horizontal privity.182  On the other 
hand, a court that is mindful of the ongoing debate over this issue 
in many other jurisdictions and is not bound by section 604.101, 
may sensibly decide that, in the particular case of a claim for 
consequential economic loss due to breach of a warranty, privity of 
contract should remain a requirement for recovery under the 
warranty.  This result strikes a fair balance between the rights of 
aggrieved buyers and the interests of upholding freedom of 
contract under Article 2 of Minnesota’s U.C.C. 
5. Vertical Privity and Revocation of Acceptance 
Finally, is privity an issue if the buyer does not seek damages 
but simply wishes to revoke acceptance of the goods183 and recover 
his purchase price?184  Most cases that have considered the question 
have concluded that revocation of acceptance is a remedy available 
only against the buyer’s immediate seller.185  However, one 
Minnesota case has concluded that privity will not act as a bar to 
revocation against a remote seller where the immediate seller has 
gone out of business, because it makes no sense to force a buyer to 
keep a product “which is sufficiently defective so as to justify his 
returning it and then requiring him to sue the distributor for 
damages merely because the dealer is insolvent or no longer in 
business.”186 
 
 182. See supra Part VI.C. 
 183. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-608 (2002) (allowing a buyer to revoke acceptance of 
defective products only in situations where the defect “substantially impairs” the 
product’s value, not just in any instance of breach of warranty.) 
 184. See MINN. STAT. § 336.2-711(1) (2002). 
 185. See, e.g., Voytovich v. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. 494 F.2d 1208 (6th 
Cir. 1974) (applying Ohio law); Seekings v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc., 638 P.2d 
210 (Ariz. 1981); Conte v. Dwan Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. 374 A.2d 144 (Conn. 1976); 
Edelstein v. Toyota Motor Distribs., 422 A.2d 101 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980); 
Wright v. O’Neal Motors, Inc., 291 S.E.2d 165 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982). 
 186. Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imps., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 357 (Minn. 1977).  See 
also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Harper, 671 F.2d 1117 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying 
Arkansas law) (affirming claim against a tractor manufacturer for revocation 
where tractor dealer had gone out of business). 
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D. Time Limits, First-Buyer Limits on Warranty Coverage 
The lack of privity generally will not protect a seller subject to 
Minnesota law, who has made a representation about its product 
that gives rise to an express warranty, from warranty claims by 
remote buyers or third parties adversely affected by the product.  
Nor will it be able to disclaim that warranty except under unusual 
circumstances.  Similarly, section 336.2-318 would not allow the 
seller to limit the warranty’s coverage to only the buyer or only to 
certain designated persons such as members of the buyer’s 
household.  According to that section of the Code, the seller’s 
warranty “extends to any person who may reasonably be expected 
to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured by 
breach of the warranty.  A seller may not exclude or limit the 
operation of this section.”  Official U.C.C. Comment 1 explains 
that: 
The last sentence does not mean that a seller is precluded 
from excluding or disclaiming a warranty . . . provided 
such exclusion or modification is permitted by Section 2-
316.  Nor does that sentence preclude the seller from 
limiting the remedies of his own buyer and of any 
beneficiaries, in any manner provided in Sections 2-718 or 
2-719.  To the extent that the contract of sale contains 
provisions under which warranties are excluded or 
modified, or remedies for breach are limited, such 
provisions are equally operative against beneficiaries of 
warranties under this section.  What this last sentence 
forbids is exclusion of liability by the seller to the persons 
to whom the warranties which he has made to his buyer would 
extend under this section.187 
In other words, so long as a warranty has been extended to the 
buyer, then the seller cannot limit its liability to third persons that 
may be adversely affected by breach.  However, the seller may 
disclaim warranties or limit remedies as to the buyer.  If the seller 
does so, those limitations also apply to third party beneficiaries. 
Therefore, the seller may, by contract, limit the express 
warranty for a certain period of time or to certain persons and not 
run afoul of section 336.2-318.  Furthermore, even if the absence of 
vertical privity is not a bar to a warranty-based claim by a remote 
buyer, that buyer’s claim is limited by the terms of the warranty 
 
 187. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-318 U.C.C. cmt. 1 (2002) (emphasis added). 
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itself.  A good illustration of the seller’s ability to contractually limit 
warranty coverage in this way is found in Haas v. DaimlerChrysler 
Corp.188  In that case, a new car manufacturer expressly warranted 
certain features of a new car for a certain number of miles or 
months to the first buyer only.  The contract also provided that the 
remainder of the warranty could be transferred to a subsequent 
buyer, but only upon payment of a fee.  Specifically, the 
manufacturer’s warranty provided that: 
The Chrysler “Owner’s Choice Protection Plan” Warranty 
is extended only to the first buyer/owner of the vehicle.  
If you’re the second buyer/owner of the vehicle, you may 
transfer the warranty coverage under the “Owner’s Choice 
Protection Plan” Warranty and the “7/100 Corrosion 
Warranty” * * * into your name. 
To transfer the warranty, you must have an authorized 
Chrysler Corporation Dealer process a “Transfer of 
Coverage Application” for you.  The cost for this service is 
$150.  You pay this fee directly to the dealer.  You must 
apply for a coverage transfer within 30 days from the date 
you buy the vehicle.  As a Second Buyer/Owner, you may 
transfer only the remaining “Owner’s Choice Protection 
Plan” coverage which the first buyer/owner elected, 
together with the remaining portion of the “7/100 
Corrosion Warranty.”189 
Haas bought a used Chrysler from a Chrysler dealer.  The 
dealership charged $150 to transfer to her the remainder of the 
factory warranty.  Haas then brought a class action lawsuit alleging 
that the fee violated section 2-318 of the U.C.C. and certain 
provisions of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.  On appeal of the 
district court’s dismissal of the claim, the court of appeals discussed 
the section 2-318 claim as follows: 
Haas contends that the statute by its terms extends the 
warranty to persons who would reasonably be expected to 
use the vehicle, including second-hand purchasers such as 
she.  According to Haas, because Chrysler cannot 
“exclude or limit” the operation of this statute, it cannot 
charge a fee to transfer the warranty.  Instead, Haas 
contends, the warranty transfers by operation of law. 
The flaw in Haas’s argument is that it confuses the first-
 
 188. 611 N.W.2d 382 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). 
 189. Id. at 383–84 (emphasis in original). 
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party right to receive services under the warranty with the 
third-party statutory right to recover for damages caused 
by breach of the warranty.  As Haas concedes and the 
statute’s caption reflects, this provision of the U.C.C. deals 
with “Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or 
Implied.”  Section 2-318 provides that the “seller’s 
warranty whether express or implied extends to any 
person * * * who is injured by breach of the warranty.”  Until 
Haas is injured by a breach of the warranty, section 2-318 
grants her no third-party beneficiary rights. 
The warranty in this case specifically provides that it “is 
extended only to the first buyer/owner of the vehicle.”  
The warranty goes on to provide that the vehicle’s second 
buyer can transfer any remaining warranty coverage by 
having the Chrysler dealer submit a “Transfer of Coverage 
Application” at a cost to the second purchaser of $150. 
Those contractual terms define and limit any rights Haas 
may have as a third-party beneficiary of the warranty.  As 
the Minnesota Supreme Court has observed, the rights of 
third-party beneficiaries “depend upon, and are measured 
by, the terms of the contract.”190 
The Haas court also concluded that this limited warranty did 
not violate the provisions of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 
because it conspicuously limited the warranty to the first buyer 
only.191 
E. Warranty Liability of Successor Corporations, Parent Corporations 
What happens if a predecessor corporation breaches a 
warranty attached to a product sold by that predecessor and the 
buyer wishes to recover from the successor corporation?  Common 
law rules regarding the liability of a successor corporation for the 
debts of a predecessor determine the answer to this question.  In 
general, those rules provide that when a successor acquires the 
assets of a predecessor, it is not liable for the debts of the 
transferor-predecessor.  The successor is not the seller of a product 
that was put into commerce by the predecessor and is not at fault 
in putting the product into the buyer’s hands.  However, there are 
several exceptions to this general rule of non-liability of successor 
corporations.  A successor may be responsible for the liabilities of 
 
 190. Id. at 385 (citations omitted). 
 191. Id. at 384–85. 
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its predecessor if:  (1) the successor assumes its predecessor’s 
liabilities; (2) the sale of assets amounts to a consolidation or 
merger of the two companies; (3) the successor is a mere 
continuation or reincarnation under a new corporate charter of 
the predecessor business; or (4) the sale amounts to a fraudulent 
effort to avoid the predecessor’s liabilities.192 
In the case of parent companies of the manufacturer of the 
defective product, the separate identity of the parent will ordinarily 
shield it from warranty liability to an aggrieved buyer.  Courts are 
very reluctant to pierce the corporate veil, recognizing that limited 
liability is an exceedingly important principle of corporate law, and 
will do so only in very limited circumstances.193 
 




Once a buyer has bought and accepted a product and then 
discovers a defect or other attribute of the product amounting to a 
breach of warranty, he must notify the seller of the breach within a 
reasonable time.  Failure to do so means loss of his right to any 
remedy.  This requirement of notice, and the “no remedy” 
consequences for the buyer who fails to give timely notice, is found 
in the language of Minnesota Statutes section 336.2-607(3) which 
provides: 
Where a tender has been accepted 
(a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he 
discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the 
seller of the breach or be barred from any remedy . . . . 
Failure on the part of a buyer to give timely and sufficient 
notice is an obvious, and can be a very effective, defense for a seller 
against whom a breach of warranty claim is brought.  The effect of 
failing to give notice may have a devastating impact on the buyer.  
Not only is he “barred from any remedy” against the seller, but he 
remains liable to the seller for the price of the product.  “Any 
 
 192. See CLARK & SMITH, supra note 66, §10.23; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12 (1998). 
 193. See 1 JAMES D. COX, THOMAS LEE HAZEN & F. HODGE O’NEAL, 
CORPORATIONS § 7.7 at 7.11 (1995 & Supp. 2000); HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. 
ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 202 at 547 
(3d ed. 1983). 
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remedy” would include not only damages but also the right to 
reject the goods or revoke acceptance of the goods.  In a seller’s 
action for the price, the buyer who fails to give notice is barred 
from right of setoff or a counterclaim for damages.  However, the 
cases indicate that the courts are often unwilling to apply this 
notice requirement with as much stringency as its language seems 
to suggest. 
A buyer’s duty to give notice of breach is one of long standing 
in Minnesota law.  There is a similar requirement in the U.C.C.’s 
predecessor, the Uniform Sales Act.194  The requirement of prompt 
notice pursues several important goals.  First, prompt notice 
“informs the seller that the transaction is claimed to involve a 
breach, and thus opens the way for normal settlement through 
negotiations.”195  If the seller’s first notice of an alleged breach is 
the buyer’s complaint, there is no opportunity to negotiate and 
resolve the problem prior to litigation.196  Second, notice provides 
the seller an opportunity to quickly address the problems 
presented by the defect or breach.  Given notice, she may be able 
to cure the defect and minimize the losses to the buyer and her 
own liability.  In the case of product manufacturers, prompt notice 
of the defect provides an opportunity to fix any design or warning 
problems, thereby minimizing risk to others.197  Third, given notice, 
a seller has the opportunity to make her own investigation of the 
alleged breach by, for example, examining the product.  Unless 
afforded this opportunity, the seller may not have a fair and 
effective opportunity to defend herself.198  Finally, the notice 
requirement serves a purpose similar to a statute of limitations in 
that it provides the seller with some sense of finality regarding her 
 
 194. MINN. STAT. § 512.49 (1961) (repealed by the Uniform Commercial Code, 
ch. 811, art. 10, § 336.2-412 (1965)) (stating “if . . . the buyer fail[s] to give notice 
to the seller of the breach of any promise or warranty within a reasonable time 
after the buyer knows, or ought to know of such breach, the seller shall not be 
liable therefor.”). 
 195. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-607, U.C.C. cmt 4 (2002). 
 196. See Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. WatPro, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 1, 5 
(Minn. 1992), overruled on other grounds by Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.302 (Minn. 
2000) (“[N]otice affords the seller an opportunity to prepare for negotiation and 
litigation.”).  See also generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 109, § 11-10 
(discussing buyer’s notice to seller). 
 197. Church of the Nativity of Our Lord, 491 N.W.2d at 5 (“notice provides the 
seller a chance to correct any defect”). 
 198. Id. (“notice provides the seller a safeguard against stale claims being 
asserted after it is too late for the manufacturer or seller to investigate them”). 
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sale of a product.  The seller should be able to assume that her 
exposure for warranty liability has ended if the buyer, given a 
reasonable opportunity to do so, has failed to discover and give 
notice of a breach.199 
Before looking in more detail at what constitutes a reasonable 
time for giving notice and the requirements for form and content 
of the notice, remember this:  If the buyer’s product defect claim is 
brought on a tort theory, there is no such notice requirement.  
This again emphasizes that a plaintiff-buyer should generally avoid 
warranty claims if a tort theory of recovery is available.  Even if the 
buyer has given the seller notice of breach, the seller can, and likely 
will, raise questions of timeliness and sufficiency of the notice.  In 
tort, the filing of the complaint is all the notice that the buyer need 
give the defendant-seller. 
B. Burden of Pleading Notice 
The “plaintiff in a breach of warranty case is precluded from 
recovery if he does not plead and prove the giving of notice within 
a reasonable time . . . .”200  So the plaintiff must specifically plead 
that he provided timely notice as a condition precedent to 
maintaining an action for breach of warranty. 
C. Timeliness of the Notice 
Section 336.2-607(3)(a) requires that the buyer give notice of 
breach “within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have 
discovered any breach.”  Timeliness is thus always a factual issue,201 
to be determined case by case, though in a very clear case the court 
could conclude that the time that elapsed before giving notice was 
unreasonable as a matter of law.  Both the remedy sought and the 
status of the buyer affect the answer to the question of whether 
 
 199. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 108, § 11-10 (stating “[t]here is some value 
in allowing sellers, at some point, to close their books on goods sold in the past 
and to pass on to other things”). 
 200. Truesdale v. Friedman, 270 Minn. 109, 125–26, 132 N.W.2d 854, 865 
(1965).  Truesdale was decided under Minnesota Statutes § 512.49 of the Uniform 
Sales Act, the predecessor to § 336.2-607(3)(a), which continued the requirement 
that the buyer must give notice of breach or be barred from recovery for breach of 
warranty.  Id. 
 201. See Willmar Cookie Co. v. Pippin Pecan Co., 357 N.W.2d 111, 115 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1984) (“What constitutes a ‘reasonable time’ is a jury question and 
depends on the facts and circumstances of the case”). 
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notice was timely.  Official U.C.C. Comment 4 to this section 
provides: 
The time of notification is to be determined by applying 
commercial standards to a merchant buyer.  “A 
reasonable time” for notification from a retail consumer is 
to be judged by different standards so that in his case it 
will be extended, for the rule of requiring notification is 
designed to defeat commercial bad faith, not to deprive a 
good faith consumer of his remedy. 
This comment makes clear that the time after discovery of the 
breach during which notice is timely is “extended” in the case of a 
consumer.  The same is true, perhaps to an even greater extent, in 
the case of a nonbuyer third party who is injured by the breach.202  
The cases show that several other factors also may affect the 
timeliness issue. 
The seller’s own behavior in responding to a consumer’s 
complaints in a way that suggests “we’ll work it out” can be 
important in determining whether the buyer’s notice was timely.  
For example, in Kopet v. Klein,203 the buyer of a water softener, that 
failed to work properly, first complained of difficulties with the 
product two weeks after its purchase.  For several months 
thereafter, the buyer cooperated with the seller’s service agent to 
try to remedy the defects before finally, after a year, notifying the 
seller that he should either replace the water softener or refund the 
purchase price.  In response to the seller’s contention that the 
buyer’s notice was untimely, the court said that the first complaint, 
made two weeks after purchase, served as notice of breach and any 
delay between that time and the time the plaintiff specifically 
requested a replacement or a refund “was due to the indulgence 
and cooperation by the plaintiff in the defendant’s attempts to 
 
 202. Section 336.2-607, Official U.C.C. Comment 5 provides: 
Under this Article various beneficiaries are given rights for injuries 
sustained by them because of the seller’s breach of warranty.  Such a 
beneficiary does not fall within the reason of the present section in 
regard to discovery of defects and the giving of notice within a reasonable 
time after acceptance, since he has nothing to do with acceptance.  
However, the reason of this section does extend to requiring the 
beneficiary to notify the seller that an injury has occurred.  What is said 
above, with regard to the extended time for reasonable notification from 
the lay consumer after the injury is also applicable here; but even a 
beneficiary can be properly held to the use of good faith in notifying, 
once he has had time to become aware of the legal situation. 
 203. 275 Minn. 525, 148 N.W.2d 385 (1967). 
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remedy its defaults.  This period should not be charged to the 
buyer as delay in notifying the seller of the defects.”204 
Similarly, in Willmar Cookie Co. v. Pippin Pecan Co.,205 a buyer 
purchased cases of shelled pecans for rebagging and sale to the 
retail market.  Four days after their delivery, the buyer notified the 
seller that some of the pecans were moldy.  The seller instructed 
the buyer to set aside the questionable pecans and indicated that 
the seller would take care of the problem.  After about ten days, the 
buyer decided that it was not financially worthwhile to continue to 
sort the good pecans from the bad and began to receive complaints 
from customers who had purchased some of the pecans sent out 
for retail sale.  The buyer then proceeded to pick up many of the 
re-bagged pecans that had been sent out for sale and issued credit 
memos for them.  The buyer again called the seller to complain but 
was told that “70 days is an unreasonable amount of time to make a 
complaint.”206  After several more unsatisfactory contacts to 
complain about the pecans, the buyer finally sent a formal letter of 
revocation of acceptance.  At trial, the jury decided that the buyer’s 
notice of breach was timely.  On appeal, the court of appeals 
affirmed the jury’s determination, saying that the buyer’s first 
contact with the seller four days after receipt of the goods “could 
be construed by the jury to constitute reasonable notice of breach.  
Even if the jury did not consider the October 5 call to be notice, it 
could have determined that the December 9 notice was reasonable 
because there was a delay before customer complaints reached 
Willmar Cookie, and the October 5 call had given Pippin Pecan 
preliminary notice of the problem.”207 
To the contrary, in Truesdale v. Friedman, an action by a service 
station owner against his gasoline supplier for delivering allegedly 
inferior gasoline, the court concluded that “[a] delay in 
notification from 12 to 23 months, apparently established by the 
record in this case, would be unreasonable as a matter of law when 
the buyer is aware, or should be aware, of the defect.”208  Delay in 
giving notice, of course, may result in loss of evidence crucial to the 
defense or other prejudice to the defendant.209 
 
 204. Id. at 531, 148 N.W.2d at 390. 
 205. 357 N.W.2d 111 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). 
 206. Id. at 113. 
 207. Id. at 115–16. 
 208. Truesdale v. Friedman, 270 Minn. 109, 121, 132 N.W.2d 854, 862 (1965). 
 209. See, e.g., Sacramona v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 F.3d 444 (1st Cir. 
1997) (three years elapsed after accident before notice of breach given); Hebron 
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These and similar cases210 are a reflection of the policies which 
underlie the notice requirement of section 336.2-607(3)(a).  The 
timeliness of the notice should be evaluated in light of the policies 
that encourage the buyer and seller to work together to try to first 
address the defect and then negotiate and resolve any problems 
presented by the defect before resorting to litigation.211 
As noted above, the Official Comments to the U.C.C. indicate 
that the nature of the party claiming breach is a relevant 
consideration in determining the timeliness of the breach.  In 
general, commercial buyers are expected to be more prompt in 
giving notice than are ordinary consumers212 or bystanders.213  The 
nature of the harm suffered is also very relevant in determining 
whether notice of breach is timely given.  In cases of personal 
injury, the availability of tort theories of liability, unencumbered by 
a notice requirement, make the question of timely notice under the 
U.C.C. largely irrelevant.  Indeed, at least in cases of personal injury 
to a bystander, it seems clear that Minnesota courts will not allow 
the absence of notice to stand in the way of a breach of warranty 
claim. 
In McCormack v. Hankscraft Co.,214 the case adopting strict 
liability for product defects, the defendant argued that the plaintiff, 
who was not a purchaser but an injured third party, was barred 
from recovery for breach of warranty because of failure to give 
notice of breach within a reasonable time.  The supreme court 
responded to this argument as follows: 
We cannot agree.  This argument, not unlike the 
defendant’s suggestion that the absence of privity of 
contract between defendant and plaintiff should likewise 
bar recovery, does not appeal to our sense of justice.  It 
can be disposed of by adopting the rule of some 
jurisdictions that in personal injury actions alleging 
breach of warranty no such notice need be given because, 
as here, the plaintiff is not a “buyer” within the 
contemplation of the statute.  But such disposition, and 
 
v. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc., 60 F.3d 1095 (4th Cir. 1995) (two years elapsed after 
accident before notice of breach given). 
 210. See, e.g., N. States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Indus., 777 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 
1985) (applying Minnesota law). 
 211. See supra notes 192–96 and accompanying text. 
 212. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-607 U.C.C. cmt. 4 (2002). 
 213. Id. § 336.2-607 U.C.C. cmt 5. 
 214. 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967). 
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similarly the elimination of privity, is only a transparent 
device to reach a desired result by eliminating bars to 
recovery imposed by the law of sales.  
[W]e hold that neither notice nor privity need be alleged 
or proved in cases like the one before us.  We do so simply 
to eliminate these contractual limitations upon a claim for 
personal injury against a manufacturer based upon a 
breach of an express warranty (as was done long ago with 
respect to implied warranties) but, more importantly, to 
declare our agreement with the principles underlying the 
rule of strict tort liability and to record our intention of 
applying that rule in this type of case.215 
This is all part of the court’s discussion of the policy reasons 
for adopting strict tort liability for product defects and depends, in 
part, on an assumption that the plaintiff would be denied recovery 
if the notice requirement were enforced: 
If traditional commercial contractual limitations, such as 
the requirement of notice or the doctrine of privity, were 
applied to this case, defendant’s liability upon the ground 
of breach of an express warranty could not be upheld.  
Plaintiff would be denied recovery despite adequate proof 
that the vaporizer was “in a defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous to the user”; that the plaintiff was 
injured thereby; and that defendant represented the 
vaporizer as “safe” and did everything by advertising and 
otherwise to induce that belief while creating the risk and 
reaping the profit from its sales.216 
Perhaps the court unnecessarily merged its thinking about 
warranty law and tort law in this opinion.  Perhaps that is not 
surprising since it was only first recognizing the doctrine of strict 
products liability and may have been a bit hazy about some of the 
details of that doctrine and its relationship to other theories of 
liability.  Even if the plaintiff’s breach of warranty claim in 
McCormack had been barred by failure to give notice, the court’s 
adoption of strict tort liability provided another, wholly 
independent, basis for imposing liability on the manufacturer and 
the plaintiff would not have been “denied recovery.” 
The court does seem to recognize that the language of the 
applicable statute specifically refers only to the “buyer” of a 
 
 215. Id. at 339–40, 154 N.W.2d at 499–501. 
 216. Id. at 338–39, 154 N.W.2d at 500. 
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product,217 so the court’s conclusion is perhaps limited only to cases 
like McCormack where the plaintiff is not the buyer, but an injured 
bystander.  Read closely, McCormack abolishes the notice 
requirement in breach of warranty cases only where the plaintiff is 
a bystander who has suffered a personal injury, but not where the 
plaintiff is a buyer of the product who alleges a personal injury.  In 
the cases of product buyers who have suffered personal injury, it 
would be wrong for the court to rewrite the statute and cavalierly 
ignore a statutory requirement of notice adopted by the 
legislature.218  The availability of tort theories of liability argues in 
favor of requiring a buyer who chooses to sue in warranty for 
whatever reason to meet the Code’s requirement of notice.219  
Nevertheless, it is fair to assume that, even in cases of personal 
injury to a buyer, a court will go out of its way to find that the 
notice requirement of section 336.2-607(3)(a) has been satisfied.  
Again, it bears remembering that this whole question is avoided if 
the personal injury claim is brought exclusively on a tort theory and 
the wholly redundant warranty theory is not added to the plaintiff’s 
complaint. 
Thus, the most likely sort of case in which the timeliness or 
sufficiency of notice may cause problems for a plaintiff is one in 
which a commercial buyer is claiming economic loss.  In these 
cases, the policies of giving a seller the opportunity to address the 
defect in the product and the opportunity to resolve the resulting 
breach of warranty before the buyer feels the need to resort to 
litigation220 strongly favor requiring commercial buyers to promptly 
satisfy the notice of breach requirement. 
Comment 4 states that in these cases section 2-607 defeats 
“commercial bad faith,” and if the court senses that merchant 
 
 217. MINN. STAT. § 512.49 (1961) (the predecessor Uniform Sales Act).  The 
language of U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) also specifically refers only to “the buyer.” 
 218. For a case baldly holding that the requirement of notice is inapplicable 
because the plaintiff claiming breach of warranty is a consumer buyer, see Fischer 
v. Mead Johnson Labs., 341 N.Y.S.2d 257 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973). 
 219. In Parrillo v. Giroux Co., 426 A.2d 1313, 1317 (R.I. 1981), the court 
recognizes the virtues of keeping tort and warranty theories analytically separate: 
[S]trict liability and implied warranty are parallel theories of recovery, 
one in contract and the other in tort, with each having its separate 
analytical elements and procedural conditions precedent.  If litigants 
seek to prevail by relying on alternate theories of recovery, they may; but 
in so doing, they must touch all the bases as they present each theory 
(reference omitted). 
 220. See supra notes 192–96 and accompanying text. 
60
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 11
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss4/11
PRINCE 4/25/2005  1:46:44 PM 
2005] PRODUCT WARRANTY CLAIMS IN MINNESOTA 1737 
buyers are lying in the grass with the thought of increasing their 
damages, it will not hesitate a moment to cut them off.  A case in 
point is A. C. Carpenter, Inc. v. Boyer Potato Chips.221  In that case the 
buyer sent a “breach” letter to the seller eight days after receiving 
the nonconforming potatoes.  The seller received the letter four 
days after it was sent.  The hearing officer held that the notice was 
not timely; twelve days was too long for the parties dealing in 
perishables.  The hearing officer might have suspected that the 
buyer was not acting in good faith, for the buyer did not call the 
seller although he knew the seller’s address and the telephone 
number.  In G. & D. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Long Island Butter & Egg 
Co.,222 the court found a delay unreasonably long because, in part, 
the buyer had ordered and paid for additional goods without 
notifying the seller that the initial goods were in any way 
unsatisfactory.  In short, a merchant buyer who receives defective 
goods and who expects to reject, revoke acceptance, or sue under 
sections 2-714 and 2-715, should act fast.223 
D. Sufficiency of the Notice 
“The content of the notification need merely be sufficient to 
let the seller know that the transaction is still troublesome and must 
be watched.  There is no reason to require that the notification 
which saves the buyer’s rights under this section must include a 
clear statement of all the objections that will be relied on by the 
buyer, as under the section covering statements of defects upon 
rejection (section 2-605).  Nor is there reason for requiring the 
notification to be a claim for damages or of any threatened 
litigation or other resort to a remedy.  The notification which saves 
the buyer’s rights under this Article need only be such as informs 
the seller that the transaction is claimed to involve a breach  
. . . .”224  The drafters of the U.C.C. “[q]uite clearly . . . intended a 
loose test; a scribbled note on a bit of toilet paper will do . . . .”225 
Interpreting the predecessor Uniform Sales Act notice 
requirement, the Minnesota courts concluded that “a mere 
complaint as to quality of goods sold is not sufficient notice of the 
 
 221. 1969 WL 10993 (U.S. Dept. Agri. 1969) (discussed in WHITE & SUMMERS, 
supra note 109 at 419). 
 222. 306 N.Y.S.2d 243 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969). 
 223. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 108, § 11-10 (footnotes omitted). 
 224. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-607, U.C.C. Comment 4 (2002). 
 225. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 109, § 11-10 at 419. 
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breach of warranty” and that the notice “must apprise the seller 
that the buyer intends to claim damages for a breach of 
warranty.”226  However, under the U.C.C. “[n]otification need not 
take a specific form;” even oral notice is good enough.227  This 
current view that there is no magic form which the notice must 
take seems eminently justified in light of the U.C.C. drafter’s 
comments. 
Finally, the fact that the seller is already aware of defects in the 
product does not dispense with the notice of breach requirement.  
In Christian v. Sony Corp. of Am.,228 the buyer failed to give notice in 
accordance with section 336.2-607(3)(a) to either the defendant 
manufacturer or to the retailer but argued, in resisting a motion 
for summary judgment on the breach of warranty claims, that he 
might, after discovery, be able to produce evidence that the 
manufacturer was aware of the product’s defects either because 
they were made aware by other litigation or because of hearing 
complaints from other customers.  In granting the manufacturer’s 
motion for summary judgment, the federal district court, applying 
Minnesota law, concluded that: 
Plaintiff’s argument misses the mark.  In discussing the 
provision of the now-defunct Uniform Sales Act which 
corresponds to U.C.C. section 2-607, Judge Learned Hand 
made the following observation: 
The plaintiff replies that the buyer is not required to give 
notice of what the seller already knows, but this confuses 
two quite different things.  The notice “of the breach” 
required is not of the facts, which the seller presumable 
[sic] knows quite as well as, if not better than, the buyer, 
but of buyer’s claim that they constitute a breach.  The 
purpose of the notice is to advise the seller that he must 
meet a claim for damages, as to which, rightly or wrongly, 
the law requires that he shall have early warning. 
Indeed, the Minnesota Supreme Court has identified 
 
 226. Truesdale v. Friedman, 270 Minn. 109, 123, 132 N.W.2d 854, 863 (1965). 
 227. Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. WatPro Inc., 491 N.W.2d 1, 5 
(Minn. 1992); see also State v. Patten, 416 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); 
Alafoss v. Premium Corp. of Am., Inc., 599 F.2d 232, 235 n.5 (8th Cir. 1979) 
(applying Minnesota law) (“The type of notification required to preserve PCA’s 
right to a remedy for Alafoss’ breach need not be an explicit statement of all its 
objections to the goods.  The content of the notification need merely be sufficient 
to let the seller know that the transaction is still troublesome and must be 
watched.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 228. 152 F. Supp. 2d 1184 (D. Minn. 2001). 
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three purposes behind the notice provision found in 
Minn. Stat. section 336.2-607: (1) to provide the seller 
with an opportunity to correct the defect (a particularly 
compelling purpose where, as here, the sales contract 
limits the buyer’s remedy to repair or replacement); (2) 
to provide the seller with an opportunity to prepare for 
negotiation and litigation; and (3) to provide the seller 
with an opportunity to investigate the claims 
independently while the merchandise remains in a 
relatively pristine state.  While general knowledge of 
problems with a product may serve the last two of these 
purposes, the first purpose may only really be served if the 
seller is aware of a defect in the product and that a 
particular seller [sic] wishes to have that defect 
addressed.229 
E. Notice to Whom? 
One question that is not clearly answered by the language of 
section 336.2-607(3)(a), which requires that the buyer “notify the 
seller,” is whether the aggrieved buyer must give notice of breach to 
more than one party in the chain of sale of the product.  Does this 
language require only that the buyer give notice to his immediate 
seller or also to remote sellers against whom the buyer wishes to 
bring a breach of warranty claim? 
If the immediate seller is an agent of the manufacturer, then 
“notice given by the buyer to the identified agent of a remote 
manufacturer is sufficient.”230  In many instances, however, there 
will be no agency relationship between the immediate seller and 
the remote manufacturer.  What, then, must the buyer do?  If he 
chooses to sue the remote manufacturer directly or join the 
manufacturer with the immediate seller in his breach of warranty 
action, must the buyer give notice under section 336.2-607(3)(a) to 
the remote manufacturer?  There is no Minnesota law that bears 
directly on this issue. 
A leading authority on U.C.C. warranties sees the matter this 
way: 
If the retail buyer is given the right to pursue a non-privity 
seller on a warranty theory, he ought to retain the duty of 
giving notice to that seller.  Moreover, the duty should not 
 
 229. Id. at 1187–88 (citations omitted). 
 230. Church of the Nativity of Our Lord, 491 N.W.2d at 6. 
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be deemed satisfied by giving notice to the immediate 
seller only and then pursuing a warranty action against 
the remote manufacturer. 
Some courts suggest that notice to the dealer will 
preclude the manufacturer from raising § 2-607(3)(a) as a 
defense, but the better approach is to read the words “the 
seller” to mean “any seller who is sued in the warranty 
action.”  Why should the remote manufacturer not be 
given the protection of notice?  Although the duty should 
be satisfied if the buyer gives notice to the immediate 
seller, who in turn notifies the manufacturer in a timely 
manner, the manufacturer should be off the hook if 
notice is not communicated upstream to it.  Otherwise the 
result would be the anomalous situation of the retail 
buyer being able to sue the manufacturer directly in a 
case where the immediate seller would probably be 
precluded on any indemnity claim because of failure to 
pass the notice upstream.231 
If the buyer has given notice to his immediate seller who then 
passes that notice on up the chain to the remote manufacturer, 
then there should be no argument about whether notice was given 
to the manufacturer.  In such instances, the manufacturer has 
actual notice though, of course, there may still be a question of 
timeliness.  However, the fact that she did not receive the notice 
directly from the buyer is not important. 
The case law in other jurisdictions generally shows that, if the 
buyer has notified his immediate seller, then he will be excused 
from giving notice to the remote manufacturer especially in the 
case of personal injury.232  Where the buyer has suffered personal 
injury as a result of the breach, courts are strongly averse to barring 
his claim against a remote seller because of lack of notice just as 
they are for lack of privity. 
If, however, the buyer has suffered only economic loss, his 
failure to give notice to the remote manufacturer may very well bar 
his breach of warranty claim233 even where the manufacturer is in 
fact generally aware of a defect in the product’s design.234  Even in 
 
 231. CLARK & SMITH, supra note 65, § 9:15. 
 232. See, e.g., Snell v. G.D. Searle & Co., 595 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ala. 1984); 
Owens v. Glendale Optical Co., 590 F. Supp. 32 (S.D. Ill. 1984); Palmer v. A.H. 
Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984). 
 233. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Hillcrest Mem’l Park of Dallas, 696 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. 
App. 1985). 
 234. See Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660 (N.J. 
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economic loss cases, some courts are willing to overlook the lack of 
notice to the remote manufacturer when the buyer has given notice 
to his immediate seller, even if that notice was not passed along to 
the manufacturer.235 
 




One of the most important goals of commercial law is to 
preserve the ability of parties to freely bargain and contract with 
one another, setting the price and other terms of a sale according 
to their mutual agreement.  If the buyer and seller of a product 
were always equally well-informed of the product’s qualities and 
risks, and if they always had equal bargaining strength, there would 
be little need for the law to constrain the terms of their agreement.  
However, the commercial reality is that the buyer of a product is 
typically not as well informed about risks associated with the 
product as is the seller, and one party often has greater bargaining 
power than the other.  The law, therefore, also seeks to control 
these imbalances in the interest of fairness to both parties. 
The law allows buyers and sellers to agree to limit, or entirely 
eliminate, warranty terms from their agreement and also to limit 
the buyer’s remedies for breach of warranty but imposes some 
constraints on doing so.  The U.C.C. provides, in section 2-316, that 
sellers may disclaim warranties in whole or in part so that the 
product is sold without any warranties at all or so that the 
warranties are limited.  Such disclaimers may mean that no 
warranty associated with the product ever arises.  Or, a seller may 
limit the duration of the warranty to a certain period of time, for 
example twelve months, or limit her warranty to only certain parts 
of the product, like the engine and drivetrain of a car.  Through a 
disclaimer, the parties effectively agree to shift the risk of some or 
all product defects to the buyer. 
To the extent that a warranty does exist, sections 2-718 and 2-
719 of the Code also allow sellers to prescribe and limit the type of 
remedy or amount of damages for breach of a warranty.  A seller 
 
1985). 
 235. See, e.g., Cooley v. Big Horn Harvestore Sys., Inc., 813 P.2d 736 (Colo. 
1991); Ragland Mills, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 763 S.W.2d 357 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1989). 
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might, for example, provide an express warranty against defects in 
material or workmanship and limit the remedy for breach to repair 
or replacement of the product. 
The U.C.C. requires that a seller who wishes to disclaim 
warranties or limit remedies for breach must do so clearly and 
conspicuously so that the buyer is not unfairly surprised or 
mislead.236   
In addition, anti-disclaimer legislation designed specifically to 
provide greater protection to consumers against unfair seller 
practices substantially restricts a seller’s ability to disclaim warranty 
liability in consumer sales.  These laws, most notably the Magnuson-
Moss Federal Warranty Act237 and the Minnesota Consumer 
Protection Act,238 tip the law’s balance in favor of protecting 
consumer warranty rights by sharply limiting, or altogether 
prohibiting, a product seller’s ability to disclaim implied warranties 
in consumer transactions.   
Finally, the Revised Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, which will likely soon become law in Minnesota, imposes 
some more explicit requirements for effective warranty 
disclaimers.239 
Because warranty disclaimers and remedy limitations are part 
of the contract between buyer and seller, these terms may constrain 
the buyer who sues in contract.  If an aggrieved buyer sues on a tort 
theory, however, such contractual terms will be ineffective in 
protecting the seller from liability.240  This distinction again 
emphasizes that plaintiffs who have tort theories of recovery 
available to them should usually avoid pleading breach of warranty.  
Defendants who are faced with a breach of warranty claim may find 
rich ground to plow in the disclaimer and limitation of remedy 
 
 236. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-316, U.C.C. cmt. 1 (2002) (explaining the basic 
purpose of the section: 
This section is designed principally to deal with those frequent clauses in 
sales contracts which seek to exclude “all warranties, express or implied.”  
It seeks to protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained language 
of disclaimer by denying effect to such language when inconsistent with 
language of express warranty and permitting the exclusion of implied 
warranties only by conspicuous language or other circumstances which 
protect the buyer from surprise.). 
 237. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312.  See infra Part VIII.G[1]. 
 238. MINN. STAT. §§ 325G.17–325G.20 (2002). 
 239. See infra Part X. 
 240. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. m (1965); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 18 (1997). 
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terms of the contract before they ever turn to questions of privity or 
notice of breach. 
B. Disclaimers of Express Warranties 
“A ‘disclaimer’ of an express warranty may seem an 
oxymoron.”241  It makes no sense for a seller to make an express 
representation about the product in one part of the contract and 
then disclaim that same promise in another.  On the other hand, 
sellers may certainly limit their express warranties to certain parts 
of the product, certain aspects of its performance, to a fixed period 
of time, or in other ways.  Indeed, it is common for a sales contract 
to speak of an “express warranty” and then limit that warranty in 
some way.  A manufacturer of a new car may limit its warranty to a 
certain number of years or number of miles.  The same 
manufacturer will further limit its warranty so that normal 
maintenance and normal wear and tear are not covered. 
How are words in a sales agreement that extend a warranty and 
other words that limit or altogether disclaim a warranty to be read 
together?  Minnesota Statutes section 336.2-316(1) provides that: 
Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express 
warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit 
warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as 
consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of 
this article on parol or extrinsic evidence (section 336.2-
202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent 
such construction is unreasonable. 
A disclaimer that contradicts the essential promise of the 
warranty is unreasonable and therefore invalid.  For example, a 
term of the agreement that provides that “this product is expressly 
warranted to be free of all defects in materials and workmanship” is 
essentially inconsistent with a term that provides that “this product 
is sold ‘as is’ without any warranties express or implied.”  Either the 
product is promised to be free of all defects in materials and 
workmanship or it is not.  Under section 336.2-316(1), it would be 
unreasonable to allow the latter term to disclaim the express 
promise of the former term.  Thus, the disclaimer language would 
be invalid.  However, there is nothing inconsistent in language that 
warrants the product to be “free of all defects in materials and 
workmanship” and the language “for a period of 12 months.”  Such 
 
 241. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 109, § 12-2. 
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a time limitation is not inconsistent with the essential promise of 
the warranty.  It is simply part of the seller’s express promise and 
would be a valid limitation on the duration of the express warranty.  
Since the seller need not make such a promise at all, she should be 
able to circumscribe the promise by limiting its duration. 
Not surprisingly, courts disfavor outright disclaimers of express 
warranties and ambiguities are generally construed in favor of 
warranty coverage.  Some specific examples help to illustrate.  In 
Northern States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Industries,242 the buyer sued for 
breach of warranty when screw anchors intended to anchor towers 
for an electric transmission line failed and the towers collapsed.  In 
the course of negotiations for the purchase of the anchors, the 
buyer provided detailed performance specifications to which the 
seller agreed, specifying that “the material we propose to supply 
meets the design requirements as specified.”243  This agreement was 
expressly incorporated into the contract.  The contract also 
contained terms that provided as follows: 
Meyer warrants for one (1) year that all Products (a) are 
designed in accordance with generally accepted 
engineering practice, (b) will withstand destruction test 
loads to the extent of the calculated loads of yield stress 
the Products are designed to withstand, (c) will be 
fabricated in accordance with drawings furnished by 
Meyer and approved by the Buyer, and (d) are free from 
defects in materials and workmanship. 
Meyer’s liability for any breach of this warranty shall be 
limited solely to job site replacement or repair, at the sole 
option of Meyer, of any defective part or parts, during a 
period of one (1) year from the date of shipment, 
providing the Product is properly installed and is being 
used as originally intended. 
IT IS EXPRESSLY AGREED THAT THIS SHALL BE THE 
SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE REMEDY OF THE BUYER.  
UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHALL MEYER BE 
LIABLE FOR ANY COSTS, LOSS, EXPENSE, DAMAGES, 
SPECIAL DAMAGES, INCIDENTAL DAMAGES, OR 
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING DIRECTLY OR 
INDIRECTLY FROM THE USE OF THE PRODUCTS, 
WHETHER BASED UPON WARRANTY, CONTRACT, 
 
 242. 777 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1985) (applying Minnesota law). 
 243. Id. at 411. 
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NEGLIGENCE OR STRICT LIABILITY. 
THE WARRANTY AND LIMITS OF LIABILITY 
CONTAINED HEREIN ARE IN LIEU OF ALL OTHER 
WARRANTIES EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.  ALL IMPLIED 
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS 
FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE HEREBY 
DISCLAIMED BY MEYER AND EXCLUDED FROM THIS 
WARRANTY.  FURTHER MEYER DOES NOT WARRANT 
THAT THIS PRODUCT COMPLIES WITH LOCAL, 
MUNICIPAL, STATE OR FEDERAL CODES, IF ANY.  
THE BUYER ALONE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR 
KNOWLEDGE OF AND COMPLIANCE WITH ANY 
SUCH CODES.244 
At trial, the jury found that Meyer made an express warranty 
that the anchors would perform in accordance with the buyer’s 
technical specifications.  The trial court found that the disclaimers 
quoted above were in conflict with that warranty, that the 
specifications were an important element in the anchor design, 
that the buyer had relied upon those specifications being 
incorporated into the finished anchors, and that the specifications 
were thus a crucial part of the contract.  The court of appeals 
affirmed the results at trial saying that: “We agree that the . . . 
disclaimer of all warranties directly and unavoidably conflicts with 
the specifications warranty.245 
Similarly, in Hydra-Mac v. Onan Corp.,246 the seller of engines 
made express representations about the reliability, durability and 
general suitability of their engines for the needs of the buyer, a 
manufacturer of skidloaders.  On the back of the sales invoice, the 
seller purported to disclaim both express and implied warranties.  
The court concluded that the seller had made express warranties 
that were inconsistent with the disclaimer and that, therefore, the 
disclaimer was ineffective.247 
 
 244. Id. at 411 n.6. 
 245. Id. at 412. 
 246. 450 N.W.2d 913 (Minn. 1990). 
 247. Id. at 917.  See also Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Nishika Ltd., 885 S.W.2d 
603 (Tex. App. 1994) (applying Minnesota law), question certified, 955 S.W.2d 853 
(Tex. 1996), certified question answered, 565 N.W.2d 16 (Minn. 1997), modified, 953 
S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1997) (holding as incompatible an express warranty and 
attempted disclaimer thereof); Wenner v. Gulf Oil Corp., 264 N.W.2d 374, 384 
(Minn. 1978) (noting that the seller had “attempted both to warrant his product 
and to disclaim any warranties” and concluding that the “warranty and disclaimer 
cannot be reasonably reconciled . . . and thus the language of the express warranty 
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C. Disclaimers of Oral Express Warranties 
The same general principles regarding disclaimers, discussed 
above in Part VIII.A., also apply to an express warranty that arises 
out of oral representations made about the product.  If a warranty 
arises out of oral representations, any attempted disclaimer that is 
inconsistent with the warranty is inoperable.  However, section 
336.2-316’s rule that language inconsistencies must be resolved in 
favor of the warranty is “subject to the provisions . . . on parole or 
extrinsic evidence (section 336.2-202).”248  If the only evidence of 
the existence of a warranty is an oral representation made prior to 
or contemporaneously with a written contract, that evidence may 
be precluded by the operation of the parole evidence rule.  Thus, 
the buyer may not be able to prove the existence of the warranty. 
Section 336.2-202 provides that contract terms which are “set 
forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of 
their agreement . . . may not be contradicted by evidence of any 
prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement.”  The 
key question, then, is whether the product was sold under written 
terms that amount to the “final expression” of the parties’ 
agreement with respect to a warranty.  If so, the buyer will be 
precluded from introducing evidence of an oral express warranty 
and the seller gets the same result as she would from an effective 
disclaimer of express warranties. 
The most interesting problem of contract interpretation arises 
when an oral express warranty is alleged and there is also a written 
agreement containing disclaimer language.  In Minnesota Forest 
Products, Inc. v. Ligna Machinery, Inc.,249 a lumber company which 
had purchased sawmill equipment sued the seller and 
manufacturer of the equipment for breach of warranty, claiming 
that the seller had “made specific representations . . . that their 
sawmill design and equipment would meet certain specifications 
and would perform at certain rates.”250  The seller alleged that 
those representations gave rise to an express warranty.  The court 
concluded that the written contract did not contain an integration 
clause stating that the writing was the final expression of the 
parties’ agreement, so the parol evidence rule did not preclude the 
 
must prevail.”). 
 248. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-316(1) (2002). 
 249. 17 F. Supp. 2d 892 (D. Minn. 1998). 
 250. Id. at 917. 
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evidence which might prove this oral representation.  The court 
therefore denied the seller’s motion for summary judgment on the 
buyer’s express warranty claim, concluding that the seller “did not 
validly disclaim any express warranties . . . .”251 
In Minnesota Forest Products, however, the contract did contain a 
limited warranty on materials and workmanship and provided that 
this warranty “is exclusive and in lieu of all other express and 
implied warranties . . . .”  Why should this language not be 
regarded as the “final expression” of the parties’ agreement 
regarding an express warranty that could not, according to section 
336.2-202, be “contradicted” by the evidence of the seller’s oral 
representations?  The court does not explain except to say that 
there was no “integration clause” in the contract.  This result 
obviously suggests that even a clearly-drafted disclaimer of express 
warranties will not necessarily work as an integration clause.  Sellers 
must, therefore, include a specific integration clause in a written 
contract such as: “The seller makes no other warranty beyond that 
contained in this writing,” or “This writing supersedes all prior oral 
or written agreements or representations and excludes all 
warranties not set forth herein,” in order to make clear that the 
written disclaimer language is the “final expression” of the parties’ 
agreement regarding an express warranty. 
D. Disclaimers of Implied Warranties—U.C.C. Section 2-316 
The implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a 
particular purpose may generally be disclaimed so long as the 
seller: (1) fully complies with the provisions of section 336.2-316; 
and (2) is not prohibited from doing so by consumer protection, 
anti-disclaimer statutes.252  Attempts to disclaim the implied 
warranties are viewed with disfavor.  Therefore, the courts tend to 
read and apply the Code’s provisions for such disclaimers strictly.  
Furthermore, the typical inability of consumers to bargain over the 
content of product warranties has led to both federal and state 
legislation prohibiting, or severely restricting, product 
manufacturers and other sellers from disclaiming implied 
warranties or from limiting damages for breach of warranty in sales 
of consumer products.253 
 
 251. Id. at 918. 
 252. See infra Part VIII.G. 
 253. Id. 
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1. The Safe Harbor of Subsection (2) 
Section 336.2-316(2) provides as follows: 
Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the 
implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the 
language must mention merchantability and in case of a 
writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify 
any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a 
writing and conspicuous.  Language to exclude all implied 
warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, 
that “There are no warranties which extend beyond the 
description on the face hereof.” 
Thus, subject to the provisions of subsection (3), disclaimers 
which strictly comply with the provisions of subsection (2) will, 
except in extraordinary circumstances, be effective.  The implied 
warranty of merchantability, the basic warranty of product quality 
and safety, may be disclaimed only by explicitly mentioning the 
magic word “merchantability.”254  Furthermore, if the disclaimer is 
in writing, it must be conspicuous.255  This requirement is meant to 
put the buyer on notice that the product is being sold without any 
implied warranties of quality or performance.  Under the U.C.C., a 
contract term or clause is conspicuous “when it is so written that 
against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it.”256  Thus, a 
 
 254. See, e.g., Soo Line R.R. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365, 1373 n.13 
(8th Cir. 1977) (applying Minnesota law) (“the need for contractual certainty 
dictates against abandoning the requirement for a disclaimer to mention the word 
‘merchantability’”); S-C Indus. v. Am. Hydroponics Sys., Inc., 468 F.2d 852 (5th 
Cir. 1982) (express warranty superseded “all other warranties . . . express or 
implied”); Curtis v. Murphy Elevator Co., 407 F. Supp. 940 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (the 
language “all warranties, express, implied and statutory, shall terminate upon final 
acceptance of the work covered by this contract” did not effectively disclaim the 
implied warranty of merchantability since it did not mention “merchantability”); 
Pearson v. Franklin Labs., Inc., 254 N.W.2d 133 (S.D. 1977) (seller stated that he 
had no responsibility for results from use of cattle vaccine but did not mention 
merchantability); Disc. Drug Corp. v. Honeywell Prot. Servs., Div. of Honeywell, 
Inc., 450 A.2d 49 (Pa. 1982).  But see Sterner Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 
F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1974) and Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 
(1st Cir. 1962) (both cases upholding disclaimers that did not mention the word 
“merchantability”). 
 255. See Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Nishika Ltd., 885 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. App. 
1994) (applying Minnesota law), question certified, 955 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. 1996), 
certified question answered, 565 N.W.2d 16 (Minn. 1997), modified, 953 S.W.2d 733 
(Tex. 1997) (seller’s attempted disclaimers were in small type on form invoice, 
were not capitalized or of contrasting typeface or color, and were thus not 
conspicuous). 
 256. MINN. STAT. § 336.1-201(10) (2002). 
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disclaimer of an implied warranty must be made to stand out from 
the rest of the contract by means of bold type or a different 
typeface, by placing the disclaimer in a box of text that separates it 
from the remainder of the contract, by a heading such as 
DISCLAIMER OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES, or by some other 
means calculated to assure that the product’s buyer will be 
protected from surprise.  There is no magic formula or language 
for making a disclaimer conspicuous, but courts expect a 
significant effort on the part of the seller to make the language 
stand out in a way that calls the disclaimer to the buyer’s 
attention.257 
A disclaimer of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular 
purpose must be conspicuous and it must be in writing.  No 
particular language is required to disclaim this warranty, but the 
Code provides that the language “is sufficient if it states, for 
example, that “There are no warranties which extend beyond the 
description on the face hereof.” 
2. The Exceptions of Subsection (3) 
The requirements for a valid warranty disclaimer in section 
336.2-316(2) are “[s]ubject to subsection (3)” of that same Code 
section.  Subsection (3) provides as follows: 
Notwithstanding subsection (2) 
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all 
implied warranties are excluded by expressions like “as is,” 
“with all faults” or other language which in common 
understanding calls the buyer’s attention to the exclusion 
of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied 
warranty; and 
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has 
examined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he 
desired or has refused to examine the goods there is no 
implied warranty with regard to defects which an 
examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed 
to him; and 
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified 
by courses of dealing or course of performance or usage 
 
 257. See, e.g., Dorman v. Int’l Harvester Co., 120 Cal. Rptr. 516 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1975); Koellmer v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 276 A.2d 807 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1970); 
Cate v. Dover Corp., 790 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1990). 
73
Prince: Defective Products and Product Warranty Claims in Minnesota
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005
PRINCE 4/25/2005  1:46:44 PM 
1750 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:4 
of trade. 
These three exceptions to the disclaimer requirement of 
subsection (2) “are common factual situations in which the 
circumstances surrounding the transaction are in themselves 
sufficient to call the buyer’s attention to the fact that no implied 
warranties are made or that a certain implied warranty is being 
excluded.”258 
Subsection 3(a) provides that a seller may disclaim implied 
warranties by using “as is” or similar language and is not required 
to specifically mention “merchantability” or fitness “unless the 
circumstances indicate otherwise.”  In circumstances where the use 
of “as is” or similar language makes clear to the buyer that he takes 
the risk that the product may contain latent safety or quality 
defects, then use of such language will effectively disclaim implied 
warranties.  But not all sales transactions occur under such 
circumstances.  Such language is more likely to be a valid 
disclaimer in a commercial transaction in which the buyer is a 
knowledgeable business party, or in transactions involving the sale 
of used goods.  For example, in St. Croix Printing Equipment, Inc. v. 
Rockwell Intern. Corp.,259 the buyer, whose business was the purchase 
and resale of used printing equipment, purchased a used printing 
press from the seller.  The printing press was located in Florida and 
the buyer did not inspect the press before agreeing to its purchase.  
The contract for sale contained “AS IS – WHERE IS” language in 
describing the product being sold.  When the buyer subsequently 
found the press to be unsatisfactory, it sued for breach of warranty.  
In upholding the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the 
defendant-seller, the court of appeals made the following 
observations: 
Here we have a contract between “merchants.”  There is 
no unequal bargaining power.  Both St. Croix and 
Rockwell are in the business of buying and selling used 
printing equipment.  Both St. Croix and Rockwell use “as 
is” language in their own agreements with their respective 
clients and were aware of the consequences of the 
language.  Both parties were aware of the location of the 
press.  While St. Croix could have inspected the press 
prior to “sealing” the agreement, [it] declined any 
opportunity to inspect the press.  At minimum, [St. Croix] 
 
 258. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-316, U.C.C. cmt. 6 (2002). 
 259. 428 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). 
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was fully aware of the danger in foregoing personal 
inspection and should have foreseen the possibility that 
the printer would not be in the same condition as was 
alleged, especially since such equipment is disassembled 
prior to shipping. 
While a different outcome might present itself if this 
dispute concerned an unequal bargaining situation, the 
knowledge, skill and expertise concerning printing 
equipment in this case is comparable.  Both parties stood 
on an equal footing.260 
In consumer sales, where the buyer is not a sophisticated 
purchaser, a court may be more reluctant to treat “as is” language 
as a valid disclaimer of warranties.261  The same reluctance may be 
encountered where the sale is of a new, not a used, product.262  A 
careful product seller ordinarily should not depend upon these 
subsection (3) exceptions to the more explicit requirements of 
subsection (2) of section 336.2-316.  In order to be certain that any 
implied warranties are disclaimed, the magic words 
“merchantability” and “fitness for a particular purpose” should be 
used in a written and conspicuous disclaimer. 
According to subsection 3(b) of section 336.2-316, the buyer’s 
prior inspection, or the seller’s demand that the buyer inspect the 
product prior to sale,263 will effectively disclaim implied warranties 
so long as the defect is obvious.  The buyer’s inspection does not 
disclaim warranty liability for latent defects that cannot reasonably 
be discovered by an inspection.  Generally speaking, a consumer 
will be expected to discover only quite obvious defects.264  On the 
 
 260. Id. at 880–81 (citations omitted).  See also Buettner v. R.W. Martin & Sons, 
47 F.3d 1086 (4th Cir. 1995) (“as is” disclaimer valid because purchaser was 
sophisticated business buyer); Buettner v. Super Laundry Mach., 857 F. Supp. 471 
(E.D. Va. 1994), aff’d, 47 F.3d 116 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 261. See, e.g., Knipp v. Weinbaum, 351 So.2d 1081 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). 
 262. See, e.g., Gindy Mfg. Corp. v. Cardinale Trucking Corp., 286 A.2d 345 (N.J. 
1970) (disapproved of in Ramirez v. Autosport, 440 A.2d 1345 (N.J. 1982). 
 263. See MINN. STAT. § 336.2-316, U.C.C. cmt. 8 (2002) (“In order to bring the 
scope of ‘refused to examine’ in paragraph (b), it is not sufficient that the goods 
are available for inspection.  There must in addition be a demand by the seller 
that the buyer examine the goods fully.  The seller by the demand puts the buyer 
on notice that he is assuming the risk of defects which the examination ought to 
reveal.”). 
 264. See id. (“A professional buyer examining a product in his field will be held 
to have assumed the risk as to all defects which a professional in the field ought to 
observe, while a nonprofessional buyer will be held to have assumed the risk only 
for such defects as a layman might be expected to observe.”) 
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other hand, a sophisticated buyer is expected to bring more 
expertise to the process and to know what to look for.265  Even a 
sophisticated buyer, however, cannot reasonably be expected to 
discover latent defects.  Furthermore, the inspection, or the seller’s 
demand that the buyer inspect, must be prior to the agreement to 
purchase.  A subsequent inspection will not change the warranty 
terms of the contract. 
The remaining alternative way in which a disclaimer may arise 
is “by course of dealing or course of performance or usage of 
trade.”266  This language represents a hidden danger for buyers and 
an opportunity for sellers to argue that past dealings between the 
parties, or the general practices of the seller’s trade, have effectively 
disclaimed or limited any warranties.  Section 336.1-205(1) of the 
Code defines “course of dealing as a “sequence of previous conduct 
between the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be 
regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for 
interpreting their expressions and other conduct.”  Under section 
336.2-208, a “course of performance” arises whenever “the contract 
for sale involves repeated occasions for performance by either party 
with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity 
for objection to it by the other.”  Thus, both a “course of dealing” 
and “a course of performance” arise from the relationship between 
buyer and seller and the established pattern of dealing between 
them. 
Section 336.1-205(2) of the Code defines “usage of trade” as 
“any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of 
observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation 
that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question.”  
This provision is rooted in a common understanding held by both 
buyers and sellers, as a class, in a particular trade or business. 
Even where there is no explicit disclaimer, or the disclaimer 
fails to use the magic word “merchantability” or is not 
“conspicuous,” the prior dealings between the parties or trade 
usage may effect a disclaimer.  These subsection (3)(c) disclaimers 
are most likely to arise in commercial transactions where the 
parties have a history of dealings with one another, and not in 
consumer transactions where, typically, the buyers and seller 
conclude only one or a very few transactions. 
 
 265. Id. 
 266. § 336.2-316(3)(c). 
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Therefore, a buyer’s pattern of accepting a price-adjustment 
formula for goods below a certain quality would effectively disclaim 
the implied warranty of merchantability.267  A long period of 
dealing between buyer and seller during which the buyer knew that 
any purchase of the product from the seller was contingent upon 
the exclusion of both Code implied warranties would effectively 
disclaim those warranties.268 
Dealers in a certain product may, as a matter of trade usage, 
buy and sell from one another with the understanding that they are 
not doing so on a “caveat emptor” basis.269 
Where there is a course of dealing or performance between 
the parties, the seller in particular should look carefully at their 
past practices.  She may find, for example, that she can show that 
past transactions included disclaimers, or that the buyer 
understood prior disclaimers even though they were inconspicuous 
and failed to mention “merchantability.”  Of course, past practices 
could also work in favor of the buyer where, for example, he can 
show that, despite disclaimers, the seller had repaired or replaced 
defective products.  In order to show a “usage of trade,” expert 
testimony may be required.  At a minimum, testimony from others 
in the same trade or business who have the experience to know the 
usages of the trade would be crucial. 
Finally, neither past practices between the parties nor trade 
usage will be effective to disclaim an express warranty.  A seller who 
makes an express representation upon which the buyer relies, and 
then subsequently seeks to disclaim that promise by showing that it 
runs counter to a prior course of dealing or trade usage, will run 
afoul of the provisions of section 336.2-316(1) which provides that: 
Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express 
warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit 
warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as 
consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of 
this article on parol or extrinsic evidence (section 336.2-
202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent 
such construction is unreasonable. 
 
 267. See J. D. Pavlak, Ltd. v. William Davies Co., 351 N.E.2d 243 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1976) (sale of meat products). 
 268. See Std. Structural Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 597 F. Supp. 164 
(D. Conn. 1984) (a 62-year course of dealing in the sale of structural steel). 
 269. See Robert Miller Gallery, Inc. v. Shepard Gallery Assocs., Inc., 6 U.C.C. 
Rptr. Serv. 1076 (N.Y. 1988) (the trade usage among fine art dealers). 
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E. Unconscionability 
Product manufacturers and sellers are well aware that they 
cannot contract out of liability in tort for defective products.  
However, in an effort to limit risk as much as possible, they typically 
seek to limit the scope of their warranty liability by carefully 
defining the remedies available for breach of warranty and by 
disclaiming as much liability as possible for implied warranties. 
An important question, therefore, is whether an otherwise 
valid under section 336.2-316 disclaimer of implied warranties may 
ever be invalid because it is unconscionable.  This is a question of 
statutory interpretation. 
Two provisions of the U.C.C. appear to be relevant to this 
issue, section 336.2-302, the general provision of the Code that 
deals with unconscionability, and section 336.2-719(3) the 
provision that deals specifically with unconscionable limitations on 
consequential damages for breach of warranty.270  Minnesota 
Statutes section 336.2-302(1) provides as follows: 
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any 
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the 
time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the 
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract 
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the 
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any 
unconscionable result. 
The U.C.C. does not define “unconscionable.”  U.C.C. 
Comment 1 to section 336.2-302 says that “[t]he principle is one of 
the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise . . . and not of 
disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining 
power.”  The precise meaning of “unconscionable” has escaped 
numerous attempts by courts and commentators to define the 
term.  It is, therefore, not surprising that different courts strike the 
balance at different places along the continuum between rigorously 
enforcing the parties’ bargain, on the one hand, and exercising the 
chancellor’s power to prevent inequities on the other.271 
Whatever unconscionable may mean in other contexts, a prior 
question in the case of a warranty disclaimer is whether such a 
 
 270. See infra Part VIII.F for a general discussion of limitations of remedies for 
breach of warranty. 
 271. For a good general discussion of the debate among courts and 
commentators over the applicability of U.C.C.§ 2-302’s applicability to otherwise-
valid warranty disclaimers, see CLARK & SMITH, supra note 66, § 8:12. 
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disclaimer that is otherwise valid under section 336.2-316 can ever 
be invalidated as unconscionable.  The better answer is that section 
336.2-316 strikes a balance among the contracting parties’ interests 
that is independent of other provisions of the Code, contains its 
own provisions for guaranteeing fairness and avoiding unfair 
surprise, and is the sole measure of the validity of warranty 
disclaimers.  Therefore, if the disclaimer is valid under section 
336.2-316, it is not additionally subject to section 336.2-302’s 
unconscionability limitation. 
The arguments in favor of this conclusion include: 
1)  Section 336.2-316 makes no mention of unconscionability 
or section 336.2-302 anywhere in its language or in its comments.  
It sets forth in some detail the requirements for a valid disclaimer 
and explicitly refers to course of dealing, course of performance 
and trade usage— general commercial concepts defined in the 
Code—but does not refer to unconscionability.  Thus, there is a 
strong negative implication that the general unconscionability 
provision of the Code is inapplicable to warranty disclaimers.272 
2)  Section 336.2-719(3), the section of the Code that deals 
with limitations of remedies, provides, by way of contrast, that 
“[c]onsequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the 
limitation or exclusion is unconscionable.”  Again, the implication 
is that section 336.2-316, which deals with the related matter of 
limitation or exclusion of warranties but which does not mention 
unconscionability, is not subject to an unconscionability 
limitation.273 
3)  Furthermore, U.C.C. Comment 2 to section 336.2-302 
provides: 
This Article treats the limitations or avoidance of 
consequential damages as a matter of limiting remedies 
for breach, separate from the matter of creation of 
liability under a warranty.  If no warranty exists, there is of 
course no problem of limiting remedies for breach of 
warranty. 
The comment says, in other words, that if there is no breach, 
there can be no consequential damages; if there is no warranty, 
there can be no breach; and there can be no warranty if the seller 
 
 272. See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code – The Emperor’s New 
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 516–28 (1967) (noting the classic argument against 
applying the Code’s unconscionability limitations to warranty disclaimers.) 
 273. Id. 
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has disclaimed in accordance with the provisions of section 336.2-
302.  This message is fortified by U.C.C. Comment 3 to section 
336.2-719(3): 
Subsection (3) recognizes the validity of clauses limiting 
or excluding consequential damages but makes clear that 
they may not operate in an unconscionable manner.  
Actually such terms are merely an allocation of unknown 
or undeterminable risks.  The seller in all cases is free to 
disclaim warranties in the manner provided in Section 2-
316. 
In other words, a seller is constrained by unconscionability 
concerns in limiting remedies but “in all cases is free” of such 
constraints in disclaiming warranties altogether. 
4)  Subjecting warranty disclaimers to the uncertain effects of 
an ill-defined unconscionability limitation undermines commercial 
certainty and subjects the validity of warranty disclaimers to case-by-
case judicial analysis.  The requirements of section 336.2-316 clearly 
and precisely balance the interests of buyer and seller and provide 
explicit tests for valid disclaimers.  These provisions are designed to 
provide the certainty that is such an important policy goal of 
commercial transactions.274 
A majority of courts that have spoken to the point favor the 
view that a disclaimer valid under section 2-316 of the U.C.C. 
cannot be invalidated because it is unconscionable under section 2-
302.275  This view of both courts and commentators is strengthened 
by subsequent legislative developments that further police 
contracts, especially in regard to warranty disclaimers in sales or 
leases to consumers.276  These statutes impose explicit limits on 
warranty disclaimers and are designed to assure fairness and avoid 
overreaching while still maintaining freedom of contract.  They 
suggest that explicit requirements for and limitations on warranty 
disclaimers277 are favored over the general and ultimately somewhat 
vague notion of unconscionability. 
 
 274. Id. 
 275. See, e.g., Moulton v. Ford Motor Co., 511 S.W.2d 690 (1974), cert. denied 
419 U.S. 870 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1974) (No. 74-91); Koehring Co. v. A.P.I., Inc., 369 F. 
Supp. 882 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (commercial case); Rio Grande Jewelers Supply, Inc. 
v. Data Gen. Corp., 689 P.2d 1269 (N.M. 1984) (commercial case); Marshall v. 
Murray Oldsmobile Co., 154 S.E.2d 140 (Va. 1967) (consumer sale); Avery v. 
Aladdin Prod. Div., Nat. Serv. Indus., Inc., 196 S.E.2d 357 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973). 
 276. See infra Part VIII.G. 
 277. Including the requirements of U.C.C. § 2-316. 
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There is, naturally, another view regarding this issue.  The 
opposite view argues (1) that the language of section 2-302 is very 
broad, referring to “any clause of the contract,” and that it should 
be broadly applied, and (2) that most of the illustrative examples 
found in the comments to section 2-302 are of cases involving 
unconscionable warranty disclaimers.278  Some courts have 
suggested in dicta that an otherwise valid disclaimer may be 
unconscionable279 but, “it is hard to find a single decision to date 
that squarely holds that a properly drafted section 2-316 warranty 
disclaimer is unconscionable per se.”280 
There are no cases in Minnesota decided under the U.C.C. 
that deal squarely with this issue.281  Especially where consumer 
buyers are concerned, the courts will presumably continue to 
interpret contract language strictly against the seller and may even 
strain the interpretation of contract language to avoid a warranty 
disclaimer thus making it unnecessary to face the question of 
whether an otherwise-valid disclaimer of warranties, may be invalid 
because it is unconscionable under Minnesota Statutes section 
336.2-302.  One pre-Code case illustrates the “strained 
interpretation” approach to preserving for the buyer a warranty 
that the seller thought had been disclaimed.  In Bekkevold v. Potts,282 
the seller included in the contract for sale of a tractor and some 
other equipment the following provision: “No warranties have been 
made in reference to said motor vehicle by the seller to the buyer 
unless expressly written hereon at the date of purchase.”  None 
were written thereon.  The seller knew, however, the particular 
 
 278. See M.P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969) 
(noting the classic argument in favor of applying the Code’s unconscionability 
limitations to warranty disclaimers).  See also Russell J. Weintraub, Disclaimer of 
Warranties and Limitations of Damages for Breach of Warranty Under the U.C.C., 53 TEX. 
L. REV. 60, 75–83 (1974). 
 279. These cases typically invalidate the disclaimer on some other ground or 
provide a strained interpretation of the contract in order to find the existence of a 
warranty.  See, e.g., Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 240 A.2d 195 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. 1968) (attempted disclaimer did not meet requirements of § 2-316); 
Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969) (Spanish 
buyer could not read disclaimer written in English); Henningson v. Bloomfield 
Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960) (pre-Code case finding disclaimers to be 
contrary to public policy). 
 280. CLARK & SMITH, supra note 66, § 8:12. 
 281. But cf. Holt v. First Nat. Bank of Minneapolis, 297 Minn. 457, 214 N.W.2d 
698 (1973) (waiver of defenses against third-party assignees in installment sales 
agreement not unconscionable). 
 282. 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927). 
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purpose for which the equipment was to be used and knew that the 
buyer was relying on the seller’s judgment to provide suitable 
equipment.  The court, observing that an implied warranty “is a 
child of the law”283 that “arises independently and outside of the 
contract,”284 concluded that the disclaimer applied only to 
warranties “made . . . by the seller,” not those arising by operation 
of law.  Consequently, the implied warranty of fitness that had 
arisen as a matter of law out of the circumstances of the sale was 
not disclaimed by the language in the contract! 
F.  Limitations of Remedies 
In many product sales, the seller does not attempt to nullify 
warranties altogether through an outright disclaimer, but instead 
attempts to modify or limit the remedies available to the seller for 
breach.  A typical example is a warranty against all defects for sixty 
days which limits the buyer’s remedy to repair or replacement of 
the defective product.  In this example, there is an express 
warranty, but the warranty is limited in duration and the remedies 
for breach of the warranty are limited. 
Even though the parties are free to shape their agreement, 
including the remedies available for breach, to suit their particular 
interests and requirements, Minnesota Statutes section 336.2-719 
controls their ability to do so in the interests of fairness and 
informed dealing.  Section 336.2-719 provides as follows: 
(1)  Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of 
this section and of the preceding section on liquidation 
and limitation of damages, 
(a)  the agreement may provide for remedies in 
addition to or in substitution for those provided in 
this article and may limit or alter the measure of 
damages recoverable under this article, as by limiting 
the buyer’s remedies to return of the goods and 
repayment of the price or to repair and replacement 
of nonconforming goods or parts, and 
(b)  resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless 
the remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in 
which case it is the sole remedy. 
(2)  Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited 
 
 283. Id. at 89, 216 N.W. at 791. 
 284. Id. 
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remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had 
as provided in this chapter. 
(3)  Consequential damages may be limited or excluded 
unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable.  
Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the 
person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie 
unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss 
is commercial is not. 
The remedies “provided in this article” (Article 2) are 
described in sections 336.2-714 and 336.2-715, and include 
damages for the loss of value of the goods as well as consequential 
damages including injuries to persons or other property.  In the 
event of breach, these are the remedies available to the buyer 
unless the parties have agreed to modify or limit the remedies. 
U.C.C. Comment 1 to section 336.2-719 explains: 
However, it is of the very essence of a sales contract that at 
least minimum adequate remedies be available.  If the 
parties intend to conclude a contract for sale within this 
Article they must accept the legal consequence that there 
be at least a fair quantum of remedy for breach of the 
obligations or duties outlined in the contract.  Thus any 
clause purporting to modify or limit the remedial 
provisions of this Article in an unconscionable manner is 
subject to deletion and in that event the remedies made 
available by this Article are applicable as if the stricken 
clause had never existed.  Similarly, under subsection (2), 
where an apparently fair and reasonable clause because of 
circumstances fails in its purpose or operates to deprive 
either party of the substantial value of the bargain, it must 
give way to the general remedy provisions of this Article. 
Subsection (1) subjects any limitation on remedies for breach 
of warranty to the requirement that the contract make express and 
clear that the limited remedy is the “exclusive” remedy.  If this is 
not made very clear, then the remedy provided by the terms of the 
contract will be treated as a supplement to, rather than as a 
displacement of, the usual array of Code remedies for breach.285  
The case law suggests that the seller must be crystal clear in 
drafting limitations of remedies language, especially in consumer 
 
 285. See MINN. STAT. § 336.2-719, U.C.C. cmt. 2 (2002) (Subsection (1)(b) 
creates a presumption that clauses prescribing remedies are cumulative rather 
than exclusive.  If the parties intend the term to describe the sole remedy under 
the contract, this must be clearly expressed). 
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sales.  An illustrative example is Ford Motor Co. v. Reid, in which the 
contract provided that an express warranty with a remedy of repair 
or replacement was “in lieu of any other express or implied 
warranty . . . and of any other obligation on the part of [the 
seller].286  The court concluded that the limiting language referred 
to warranties and obligations and not to remedies, and allowed the 
buyer to utilize other Code remedies for breach of express 
warranty.287 To be as certain as can be, a seller wishing to limit 
remedies for breach of warranty should use express language 
saying that the parties agree that the remedy provided by the 
contract is the “exclusive remedy for breach of warranty.” 
Subsection (2) of section 336.2-719 will invalidate a remedies 
limitation where the remedy provided in the contract has failed of 
its essential purpose.  If the breach effectively deprives the buyer of 
the essential value of the product and cannot be remedied within a 
reasonable period of time, then the buyer has no effective remedy.  
The classic example of an exclusive remedy that has failed of its 
essential purpose is the repair-or-replace remedy applied to a car 
which is a true lemon.  If the car has recurring defects which result 
in the vehicle spending an inordinate amount of time under repair 
and unavailable for use by the buyer, a repair-or-replace remedy 
has failed of its essential purpose, which is to provide a serviceable 
car within a reasonable time. If the remedy limitation fails this test, 
the buyer then has access to the full range of remedies provided in 
Article 2 of the U.C.C. even if the seller is making her best efforts to 
repair or replace defective parts and get the car back on the road.288  
In the case of motor vehicles, virtually every state now also has a 
“lemon law” that supplements the U.C.C. “fail of its essential 
purpose” language.  Minnesota’s motor vehicle lemon law is found 
in Minnesota Statutes section 325F.665. 
 
 286. 465 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Ark. 1971). 
 287. Id.  See also Stream v. Sportscar Salon, Ltd., 397 N.Y.S.2d 677 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 
1977); Herbstman v. Eastman Kodak Co., 330 A.2d 384 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1974). 
 288. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Rosemount Dodge-Winnebago S., 310 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 
1981) (failure to repair defects in motor home brought in several times for 
repairs); Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977) 
(defective car that dealer could not or would not put car in reasonably good 
operating condition).  Cases involving products other than motor vehicles include: 
Soo Line R.R. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1977) (railroad cars); 
Minn. Forest Prods., Inc. v. Ligna Mach., Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 892 (D. Minn. 1982) 
(fact questions precluded summary judgment on issue of whether repair-or-
replace remedy in contract for sawmill equipment failed of its essential purpose). 
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Subdivision (3) of section 336.2-719 provides that remedy 
limitations may be unconscionable.  This contrasts clearly with the 
provisions of section 336.2-316 which, by its own terms, does not 
subject warranty disclaimers to an unconscionability test.289  
Furthermore, subdivision (3) provides that any limitation in the 
contract on damages for personal injuries is prima facie 
unconscionable.  This language suggests that there could be 
circumstances in which the seller can overcome the “prima facie” 
language but it is difficult to imagine a contractual exclusion of 
personal injury damages that would overcome this presumption of 
unconscionability.  However, while limitations on consequential 
damages that amount to some form of property loss such as 
business interruption losses or other economic loss may be shown 
to be unconscionable in a particular instance, they nevertheless are 
not prima facie unconscionable.  In Transport Corp. of America v. 
International Business Machines Corp.,290 a computer reseller, 
Innovative Computing Corporation (ICC), sold a computer system 
to a commercial trucking business which used the system for 
various business functions and for the storage of certain business 
records.  A disk drive failure led to certain business interruption 
losses for which the buyer sued claiming breach of warranty.  The 
contract disclaimed all implied warranties and provided an 
exclusive repair-or-replace warranty which specifically provided 
that: “IN NO EVENT SHALL ICC BE LIABLE FOR ANY 
INDIRECT, SPECIAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES SUCH 
AS LOSSES OF ANTICIPATED PROFIT OR OTHER ECONOMIC 
LOSS IN CONNECTION WITH . . . THIS AGREEMENT.”291 
The buyer argued that this limitation of remedies was 
unconscionable.  In concluding that the limitation was valid, the 
court said that “[a]n exclusion of consequential damages set forth 
in advance in a commercial agreement between experienced 
business parties represents a bargained-for allocation of risk that is 
conscionable as a matter of law.”292 
It is not surprising that limitation of remedies terms are most 
likely to be upheld in commercial transactions involving 
experienced business parties.  For example, in Kleven v. Geigy 
 
 289. See supra Part VIII.E. 
 290. 30 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 1984). 
 291. Id. at 960. 
 292. Id.  See also Nelson Distrib., Inc. v. Stewart-Warner Indus. Balancers, 808 F. 
Supp. 684 (D. Minn. 1992). 
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Agricultural Chemicals,293 a farmer-buyer of herbicide brought a 
breach of warranty claim against the product manufacturer.  While 
the court concluded that the seller’s warranty was breached, it 
rejected the buyer’s claim that the seller’s exclusion of 
consequential damages was unconscionable.  The court points out 
that “[i]t is general knowledge in the buyer’s rural area that the 
eventual yield of a farm crop, such as corn, is affected by many 
factors such as soil, weather, seed, weeds, and other conditions,” 
implying that the buyer was a sophisticated commercial party who 
knew the risks associated with purchase of the seller’s product.294  
However, even where the transaction is clearly a consumer 
transaction, courts in several other jurisdictions have found 
circumstances in which limitations and exclusions of consequential 
property damages are not unconscionable.295 
Since there is rarely, if ever, good reason under Minnesota law 
to bring a claim for personal injury on a breach of warranty theory 
instead of in tort, the question of the unconscionability of such a 
contract limitation should very rarely arise.296 
In addition to these requirements in section 336.2-719, other 
law, particularly law aimed specifically at protecting consumers in 
sale or lease transactions, may constrain a seller’s ability to limit 
remedies for breach of warranty.297 
G. Anti-Disclaimer Law 
To the average consumer, the term “warranty” suggests a 
promise that a product will be free of defects and, if defective, that 
the seller will bear the loss.  But in fact many warranties are mainly 
disclaimers designed by the seller to substantially limit the seller’s 
potential warranty liability.  While this may not represent a problem 
to sophisticated commercial buyers, many consumers are thus 
effectively mislead as to who really bears the risk of loss if the 
product is defective.  Despite the supposed protections built into 
the U.C.C.’s provisions regarding warranty disclaimers and remedy 
 
 293. 303 Minn. 320, 227 N.W.2d 566 (1975). 
 294. Id. at 329, 227 N.W.2d at 572. 
 295. See, e.g., NEC Techs., Inc. v. Nelson, 478 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. 1996) (television 
set); Lobianco v. Prop. Protect., Inc., 437 A.2d 417 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (home 
burglar alarm); Gladden v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 416 A.2d 
394 (N.J. 1980) (automobile tire). 
 296. See supra Part V. 
 297. See infra Part VIII.G. 
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limitations, both the federal Congress and many state legislatures 
have concluded that the U.C.C. fails to adequately protect 
consumer interests against unfair seller practices.  The result has 
been the enactment of legislation designed specifically to tip the 
law’s balance in favor of protecting consumer warranty rights by 
sharply limiting, or altogether prohibiting, a product seller’s ability 
to disclaim implied warranties in consumer transactions. 
1.  Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 
Congress enacted the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act298 in order 
to strengthen and clarify consumer product warranties.  The Act is 
designed to protect consumers from deceptive warranty practices.  
It does not apply to transactions involving only commercial parties 
or warranties for services.299  It authorizes the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) to make regulations implementing the Act’s 
protections300 and creates a federal cause of action for violations of 
the act.301 
The most important provision of the Act prohibits disclaimers 
of implied warranties in the sale of consumer products costing 
more than ten dollars.302  This provision effectively preempts state 
law, such as the provisions of Minnesota Statutes section 336.2-316, 
which authorizes such disclaimers in consumer transactions.303  
Although a seller offering either a “full” or a “limited” written 
warranty may not altogether disclaim implied warranties, she may 
limit the duration of implied warranties if offering only a “limited” 
written warranty.  This is true so long as this limitation is 
reasonable, conscionable, and clearly communicated on the face of 
the warranty.304  Warranty limitations that do not meet these criteria 
are void.305 
 
 298. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312 (2000).  For an excellent, in-depth discussion of 
the intricacies of Magnuson-Moss, see CLARK AND SMITH, supra note 66, at Part 2, 
chs. 14–21. 
 299. 16 C.F.R. § 700.1(h) (1986). 
 300. 15 U.S.C. § 2302.  The FTC rules authorized by the Magnuson-Moss Act 
are found in 16 C.F.R. §§ 700–703. 
 301. 15 U.S.C. § 2310. 
 302. Id. § 2308. 
 303. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-316 (2002).  See also supra Part VIII.D. 
 304. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(b) (providing that “[f]or purposes of this chapter (other 
than section 2304(a)(2) of this title), implied warranties may be limited in 
duration.”).  Section 2304(a)(2) provides that the duration of implied warranties 
may not be limited in the case of “full” warranties. 
 305. Id. § 2308(c). 
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Magnuson-Moss does not require a product seller to provide a 
warranty.  However, if a written warranty 306 is offered to a consumer 
on a consumer product,307 then the provisions of the Act are 
triggered. 
Any written warranty within the scope of the Act must meet 
several basic requirements.  First, the warrantor must disclose its 
terms “fully and conspicuously.”308  This disclosure obligation 
applies to warranties on consumer products that cost more than 
five dollars.309  The full disclosure requirement ensures that 
consumers have clear and fair notice if the warranty is 
unenforceable by a subsequent purchaser,310 if the warranty is 
limited to only certain parts of the consumer product,311 if the 
duration of the warranty is limited to a specific time or number of 
uses,312 if the warrantor is limiting its performance obligations,313 if 
the consumer must follow any procedures for performance of the 
warranty,314 if the warrantor has created an informal dispute 
resolution mechanism,315 if the written warranty restricts the 
duration of an implied warranty,316 and if a consumer must return a 
registration card before the warranty will be effective.317  In 
addition, compliance with the Act requires the warrantor to inform 
consumers that, “[t]his warranty gives you specific legal rights, and 
you may also have other rights which vary from State to State.”318 
Under the Act, the warrantor must also ensure that the terms 
of the warranty are available for review by the consumer prior to 
sale.319  The FTC has established rules describing what constitutes 
 
 306. Id. § 2302. 
 307. Id. § 2301(1) (defining “consumer product” as “any tangible personal 
property which is distributed in commerce and which is normally used for 
personal, family, or household purposes”). 
 308. 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a). 
 309. § 2302(e).  The full disclosure rules established by the FTC are primarily 
found in 16 C.F.R. § 701.  These disclosure requirements only apply to consumer 
products which cost more than fifteen dollars.  16 C.F.R. §701.2 (1986). 
 310. 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a)(1). 
 311. Id. § 701.3(a)(2). 
 312. Id. § 701.3(a)(4). 
 313. Id. § 701.3(a)(3). 
 314. Id. § 701.3(a)(5). 
 315. Id. § 701.3(a)(6). 
 316. Id. § 701.3(a)(7).  The FTC rule also requires disclosure of the fact that 
“[s]ome States do not allow limitations on how long an implied warranty lasts, so 
the above limitation may not apply to you.”  Id. 
 317. Id. § 701.4. 
 318. Id. § 701.3(a)(9). 
 319. Id. § 702.3.  Congress required the FTC to prescribe rules governing the 
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adequate pre-sale disclosure by sellers,320 warrantors,321 catalog or 
mail-order sellers,322 and door-to-door sellers.323  Although this 
section of the Act applies to warranties on products sold for more 
than five dollars, the scope of the FTC regulations are limited to 
products worth more than fifteen dollars.324 
Finally, the warrantor must label a written warranty as either 
“full” or “limited.”325  This last major requirement applies to 
products costing consumers more than ten dollars.326  A warranty 
will qualify as a full warranty only if it meets the federal minimum 
standards for such warranties set out in the Act.327  The minimum 
standards require that (1) the warranty promises to remedy defects 
within a reasonable time and for no charge,328 (2) the warranty 
does not limit the duration of any implied warranty,329 (3) if the 
warranty limits consequential damages, it must do so 
conspicuously,330 (4) the warranty must allow the consumer to 
choose a refund or replacement of the product after a reasonable 
number of attempts by the seller to remedy the defect,331 (5) the 
consumer has no duty to the warrantor beyond notification of the 
defect,332 and (6) the warranty applies to any subsequent owners of 
the product during the warranty’s duration.333  A consumer product 
warranty that does not meet these minimum standards must be 
conspicuously titled as a limited warranty.334  This designation 
requirement is met if it “appear[s] clearly and conspicuously as a 
caption, or prominent title, clearly separated from the text of the 
warranty.”335 
 
pre-sale availability of warranties.  15 U.S.C. § 2302(b) (2000). 
 320. Id. § 702.3(a). 
 321. Id. § 702.3(b). 
 322. Id. § 702.3(c). 
 323. Id. § 702.3(d). 
 324. Id. § 702.3. 
 325. 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a) (2000). 
 326. Id. § 2303(d). 
 327. Id. § 2303(a)(1).  The minimum standards are established in § 2304. 
 328. Id. § 2304(a)(1). 
 329. Id. § 2304(a)(2). 
 330. Id. § 2304(a)(3). 
 331. Id. § 2304(a)(4). 
 332. Id. § 2304(b)(1). 
 333. Id. § 2304(b)(4).  A “consumer” under the Act includes “any person to 
whom such product is transferred during the duration of an implied or written 
warranty.”  15 U.S.C. § 2301(3). 
 334. 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a)(2). 
 335. 16 C.F.R. § 700.6(a) (1986). 
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At first blush, the Magnuson-Moss Act appears to make any 
breach of a warranty under state law a violation of the Act which 
would thus give rise to federal jurisdiction and the possibility of 
recovery of attorney’s fees.  Section 2310(d)(1) provides that “a 
consumer who is damaged by the failure of a supplier . . . to comply 
with any obligation under this chapter, or under a written warranty, 
implied warranty, or service contract, may bring suit” in state court 
or in federal court so long as the amount in controversy is $50,000 
or more.336  If the consumer prevails, he may also recover 
reasonable attorney’s fees.337  Read in isolation, this section of the 
Act appears to provide that a breach of warranty under the 
provisions of Minnesota Statutes sections 336.2-313, 336.2-314, or 
336.2-315 (the provisions relating to express warranties, implied 
warranties of merchantability, and implied warranties of fitness for 
a particular purpose) becomes a violation of Magnuson-Moss which 
may give rise to federal jurisdiction and effectively “federalize” 
products liability claims, including claims for personal injury, so 
long as they are brought on a warranty theory.  However, section 
2311(b)(2) of the Act provides: 
Nothing in this chapter (other than sections 2308 and 
2304(a)(2) and (4) of this title) shall (A) affect the 
liability of, or impose liability on, any person for personal 
injury, or (B) supersede any provision of State law 
regarding consequential damages for injury to the person 
or other injury. 
Read together, these provisions of the Act appear to permit 
personal injury claims under the Act only when an important 
substantive provision of the Act has been violated, such as section 
2308’s prohibition of disclaimers of implied warranties or section 
2304(a)’s prohibition of limiting the duration of full warranties.  
This is the conclusion reached by a number of courts that have 
considered the matter.338 
2. Minnesota Consumer Protection Law 
Along with the federal warranty provisions created by the 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, the Minnesota legislature has passed 
 
 336. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3). 
 337. Id. 2310(d)(2). 
 338. See, e.g., Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 748 F.2d 1058, 1060, 1071 (5th 
Cir. 1984); Voelkel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 846 F. Supp. 1468, 1474 (D. Kan. 1994); 
Santarelli v. BP Am., 913 F. Supp. 324, 333 (M.D. Pa. 1996). 
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several statutes to further protect consumers from confusing or 
surprising warranty disclaimers or limitations.  Although the 
general freedom to contract is still available, consumers are 
protected by these laws which require that warrantors state the 
warranty terms in language that can be easily understood by the 
buyer prior to creation of the contract. 
These Minnesota laws apply to warranty disclaimers on sales of 
“[goods] purchased primarily for personal, family, or household 
purposes, and not for agricultural or business purposes.”339  A 
warrantor’s failure to follow the provisions in sections 325G.17-20 is 
treated as consumer fraud340 and is enjoinable.341 
Consumer sales of new goods in Minnesota have a statutory 
implied warranty of merchantability and, where the buyer makes 
known that the goods are required for a particular purpose and 
that he is relying on the seller’s skill and judgment, an implied 
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.342  These implied 
warranties can be disclaimed on an “as is” or “with all faults” basis 
only in a conspicuous writing that clearly and concisely informs the 
consumer that the goods are being sold on that basis and that 
“[t]he entire risk as to the quality and performance of the goods is 
with the buyer.”343 
Express warranties are also regulated in the interests of 
consumer protection.  A manufacturer, distributor or retailer who 
makes an express warranty in a consumer purchase of a new good 
cannot disclaim the implied warranties of merchantability or fitness 
for a particular purpose.344  The statute establishes the duties of 
retailers, manufacturers, and distributors based on express 
warranties made by any of those parties.345  Express warranties are 
created when a “retailer, distributor, or manufacturer undertakes 
(1) to preserve or maintain the utility or performance of the goods 
or provide compensation or replacement if there is a failure in 
utility or performance; or (2) declares that in the event of any 
sample or model, that the whole of the goods conforms to the 
sample or model.”346  It is not necessary for the retailer, distributor, 
 
 339. MINN. STAT. §325G.17, subd. 2 (2002). 
 340. Id. § 325G.20. 
 341. Id. § 325F.70 (2002). 
 342. Id. § 325G.18, subd. 1. 
 343. Id. § 325G.18, subd. 2. 
 344. Id. § 325G.19, subd. 1. 
 345. Id. § 325G.19, subd. 2; § 325G.17, subd. 5. 
 346. Id. § 325G.17, subd. 5. 
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or manufacturer to use the words “warranty” or “guarantee” or 
even to have specific intent to create an express warranty, but 
statements of the value or commendations of goods will not be 
enough to create an express warranty.347  An advertisement may 
create an express warranty, but only if it makes specific claims or 
promises for the product’s performance.348 
Purchasers of new and used cars are given specific warranty 
protection by other provisions of the law.  Purchasers of new 
vehicles are protected by Minnesota’s “lemon law”349 which 
establishes a manufacturer’s duty to repair,350 replace or refund the 
full purchase price of a defective vehicle.351  Provisions for informal 
dispute resolution procedures are also outlined by the statute.352  A 
seller of used cars must also provide certain warranty protections353 
but the statute provides some exclusions including cars sold for less 
than $3,000.00,354 custom built vehicles,355 cars with 75,000 miles or 
more,356 and cars more than eight years old.357 
H. Effect of Disclaimers or Limitations on Third Party Beneficiaries 
As earlier discussed, Minnesota Statute section 336.2-318 
extends to non-buyers—parties who are not in horizontal privity 
with the immediate seller of the product but who may reasonably 
be expected to use or be affected by the product—the same 
warranty protections extended to the immediate buyer of the 
product who is in privity with his seller.358 
Because such a third party’s warranty protection derives from 
the warranty extended to the immediate buyer, a third party 
logically has no greater warranty protection than has the 
immediate buyer.  Disclaimers or limitations affecting the warranty 
terms extended to the immediate buyer apply with equal force to 
third-party beneficiaries.  This means, for example, that if a buyer’s 
 
 347. Id. 
 348. Masepohl v. Am. Tobacco Co., 974 F. Supp. 1245, 1253 (D. Minn. 1997). 
 349. MINN. STAT. § 325F.665 (2002). 
 350. Id. § 325F.665, subd. 2. 
 351. Id. § 325F.665, subd. 3. 
 352. Id. § 325F.665, subd. 6. 
 353. Id. § 325F.662.  Warranty provisions are found in subdivision (2). 
 354. Id. § 325F.662, subd. 3(1). 
 355. Id. § 325F.662, subd. 3(4). 
 356. Id. § 325F.662, subd. 3(7). 
 357. Id. § 325F.662, subd. 3(5). 
 358. See supra Part VI.B. 
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warranty is limited in duration to twelve months, then that same 
twelve-month limit applies to third parties.  It also means that if all 
warranties are effectively disclaimed by the seller so that the buyer 
receives no warranties, then there is no warranty protection for 
third parties either. 
A good illustration of this principle is found in Hydra-Mac, Inc. 
v. Onan Corp.359  Onan sold engines to Hydra-Mac, a small 
manufacturer that produced skid loaders for International 
Harvester Company.  When the engines failed to perform as 
expected, Hydra-Mac and International Harvester sued Onan for 
breach of warranty.  Onan defended by asserting that it had 
effectively disclaimed all warranties in its sales invoices delivered to 
Hydra-Mac and that that disclaimer defeated International 
Harvester’s claim that it could recover damages from Onan as a 
third party beneficiary of product warranties made to Hydra-Mac.  
The supreme court concluded that “International Harvester, as 
purchaser of the skid loader containing the Onan engine, was a 
third party beneficiary of any warranties running to Hydra-Mac . . . 
[b]ut, as beneficiary of those warranties, International Harvester is 
equally subject to any disclaimers of warranty which would have 
been effective to bar any of Hydra-Mac’s claims.”360 
While a third party has no more warranty protection than that 
afforded the immediate buyer, the language of Minnesota Statutes 
section 336.2-318 assures that he also has no less protection: 
A seller’s warranty whether express or implied extends to 
any person who may reasonably be expected to use, 
consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured 
by breach of the warranty.  A seller may not exclude or 
limit the operation of this section. 
The last sentence of this section precludes, for example, a 
seller limiting his warranties to the buyer only and cutting off those 
same warranty rights for third parties not in horizontal privity with 
the seller.  As Official Comment 1 to this section explains: “What 
this last sentence forbids is exclusion of liability by the seller to the 
persons to whom the warranties which he has made to his buyer 
would extend under this section.”  Those persons are the “third 
parties” to whom this section of the Code refers—those who are 
 
 359. 450 N.W.2d 913 (Minn. 1990). 
 360. Id. at 916.  See also Transp. Corp. of Am. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 30 F.3d 
953, 958–59 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying Minnesota law); SCM Corp. v. Deltak Corp., 
702 F. Supp. 1428, 1432–35 (D. Minn. 1988) (applying Minnesota law). 
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not in horizontal privity with the seller but who may reasonably be 
expected to use or be affected by the product. 
However, as earlier discussed, this last sentence does not 
preclude a seller from contractually limiting her extension of a 
warranty to the first buyer of the product only and not extending 
the warranty to subsequent owners of the product who are not in 
vertical privity with the seller.361 
IX. INDEMNIFICATION 
A seller, such as a retail dealer, who is an intermediary in the 
chain of a product’s distribution and who is made liable to the 
ultimate buyer for breach of an implied warranty of 
merchantability362 may be able to seek indemnification from her 
own seller.  Although intermediate parties such as distributors and 
retailers are liable to their buyers for losses caused by 
unmerchantable goods, they are typically mere conduits through 
whom the unmerchantable good passes.  In most instances, they 
have not caused the product to be defective and they are typically 
not negligent for failing to discover the defect.  In such cases, the 
intermediate sellers should be able to pass their liability upstream 
so that the ultimate loss falls on the party, often the manufacturer, 
who created the defect in the product. 
This right to indemnification is implicit in the relationship 
between the intermediaries in the product’s distributional chain.  
This is a contractual right, not one based in tort.  An example is 
Jacobs v. Rosemount Dodge-Winnebago South,363 in which a motor home 
dealer and motorhome manufacturer were sued for breach of 
warranty after the buyer of the vehicle discovered many defects and 
after the dealer made several unsuccessful attempts to repair the 
defects.  The court concluded that “[t]he defects in this case were 
attributable to the faulty design of the motorhome, for which [the 
 
 361. See supra Part VI.D. 
 362. A seller is liable for breach of an express warranty or an implied warranty 
of fitness for a particular purpose when the product fails to match a 
representation made by that seller to the buyer about some attribute of the 
product.  There is no one else to turn to for indemnification because no one else 
made the same promise about the product.  No one other than the warrantor has 
caused a promise or representation about the product to be made to the buyer.  
By way of contrast, everyone in the chain of manufacture and distribution of a 
product to the ultimate buyer impliedly warrants that the product is of 
merchantable quality. 
 363. 310 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1981). 
94
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 11
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss4/11
PRINCE 4/25/2005  1:46:44 PM 
2005] PRODUCT WARRANTY CLAIMS IN MINNESOTA 1771 
manufacturer] alone was responsible.  The manufacturing defects 
caused the inability of Rosemount Dodge to make the repairs 
required by the warranty.  Rosemount Dodge was, in effect, a mere 
conduit in the chain of distribution and should be allowed 
indemnification.”364 
The measure of damages in such an indemnity action includes 
the loss to the indemnitee resulting from her warranty-based 
liability to the ultimate consumer.  The damages should also 
include reasonable attorneys fees incurred as a result of the claims 
brought by a third party (the product buyer or user) against which 
she is indemnified.365 
The parties may, of course, expressly agree to indemnification 
or to limit the right to indemnification or limit the losses to be 
indemnified. 
 




Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, including the 
provisions relating to warranties, was substantially revised by the 
American Law Institute and those revisions were approved by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 
2003.366  The amendments to Article 2 are yet to be adopted by the 
Minnesota Legislature, but it seems very likely that chapter 336 of 
the Minnesota Statutes, Minnesota’s version of the U.C.C., will be 
amended to reflect these changes in the uniform act.  Some 
changes in the Code language appear to be significant; but other 
differences in the language do not appear to signal intent to 
change the law.  It will take several years of experience with and 
judicial interpretation of this law, if and when it is adopted in 
Minnesota, to fully evaluate its impact.  The changes in the revised 
U.C.C. most relevant to products liability law are summarized 
 
 364. Id. at 80. 
 365. See, e.g., Natco, Ltd. P’ship v. Moran Towing of Fla., Inc., 267 F.3d 1190, 
1194 (11th Cir. 2001); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Farmers Union Oil Co., 207 F.3d 
526, 534 (8th Cir. 2000); Peter Fabrics, Inc. v. S.S. “Hermes,” 765 F.2d 306, 315 
(2nd Cir. 1985); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Love, 538 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Ark. 
1976).  However, the fees and expenses incurred in establishing the right to 
indemnification are not recoverable against the indemnitor since they fall within 
the general rule requiring a party to bear her own costs of litigation. 
 366. See U.C.C. REVISED ARTICLE 2 (2003). 
95
Prince: Defective Products and Product Warranty Claims in Minnesota
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005
PRINCE 4/25/2005  1:46:44 PM 
1772 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:4 
below. 
B. Express Warranty 
Revised Article 2 divides the provisions regarding express 
warranties, now found in section 2-313, into three separate sections 
numbered sections 2-313, 2-313A and 2-313B.  Section 2-313 deals 
with express warranties extended by a seller to an “immediate 
buyer,” one who has contracted directly with the seller.367  Section 
2-313A address the seller’s obligations to a remote purchaser368 
arising out of representations contained in the product’s packaging 
or accompanying the product, typically in the form of a writing369 
that describes the obligations that the manufacturer is willing to 
undertake in favor of the final party in the distributive chain.  This 
section is meant to codify the extensive case law that has developed 
regarding pass-through warranties to parties not in privity with the 
product manufacturer.  Section 2-313B addresses obligations to 
remote purchasers created by the product’s advertising.  This 
section deals with obligations analogous to an express warranty that 
a seller has to a remote purchaser.  This obligation is created, 
typically, by a manufacturer’s advertising campaign which makes 
representations which, if made to an immediate buyer, would 
amount to an express warranty.  However, the product is not sold 
to the recipient of the advertising, but to some intermediary who 
then resells or leases the product to the recipient who is not in 
vertical privity370 with the manufacturer. 
Sections 2-313A and 2-313B address obligations to a remote 
purchaser, meaning one who “buys or leases goods” from someone 
“in the normal chain of distribution.”  In a typical distributional 
chain of a product, there is a manufacturer, one or more 
wholesalers or distributors, and a retailer.  A buyer or lessee from 
the retailer fits within this definition of “remote purchaser,” but 
others who may be harmed by the product’s defects are not.  
 
 367. An immediate buyer “means a buyer that enters into a contract with the 
seller.”  U.C.C. REVISED ARTICLE 2, § 2-313(1)(a). 
 368. A remote purchaser “means a person that buys or leases goods from an 
immediate buyer or other person in the normal chain of distribution.”  U.C.C. 
REVISED ARTICLE 2, §§ 2-313A(1)(b), 2-313B(1)(b). 
 369. The revised Code language uses the term “record” which includes, but is 
broader than, a writing.  U.C.C. REVISED ARTICLE 2 § 2-103(1)(m) defines record 
to mean “information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in 
an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.” 
 370. See supra Part VI.C. 
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Whether someone other than the remote purchaser can enforce an 
obligation under either of these sections depends upon the law 
governing third-party beneficiaries, including section 2-318. 
Taken together, these three new sections leave essentially 
intact the existing criteria for establishing an express warranty or 
analogous obligation.  If the seller makes a representation of fact 
regarding the product, offers a description of the product, or 
provides a sample or model, any of which becomes part of the basis 
of the bargain, it creates an express warranty that the product shall 
conform to the representation, description or sample.  Mere 
puffing, i.e., “an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a 
statement purporting to be merely the seller’s opinion or 
commendation of the goods”371 does not, as it does not under 
existing law, form the basis for a warranty. 
Finally, these new sections do not conflict with existing 
Minnesota consumer protection laws which define an “express 
warranty” arising out of a consumer sale372 and address the matter 
of who is responsible for honoring an express warranty arising out 
of such sales.373  Nor do these new sections conflict with Minnesota 
case law which has allowed subpurchasers to recover as third-party 
beneficiaries for breach of an express warranty in situations 
comparable to those addressed by these sections, i.e., remote 
purchasers to whom the seller has made a representation about the 
product in or on its packaging or in the product’s advertising.374 
 
 371. U.C.C. REVISED ARTICLE 2, § 2-313(4). 
 372. MINN. STAT. § 325G.17(5) (2002) (“’Express warranty’ means a written 
statement arising out of a consumer sale pursuant to which the manufacturer, 
distributor, or retailer undertakes: (1) to preserve or maintain the utility or 
performance of the goods or provide compensation or replacement if there is a 
failure in utility or performance; or (2) declares that in the event of any sample or 
model, that the whole of the goods conforms to the sample or model.  It is not 
necessary to the creation of an express warranty that formal words such as 
“warranty” or “guarantee” be used or that a specific intention to make a warranty 
be present, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement 
purporting to be merely an opinion or commendation of the goods does not 
create a warranty.”).  Under the U.C.C., an express warranty may arise from an 
oral representation as well as from a written statement. 
 373. MINN. STAT. § 325G.19, subd. 2 (2002) (“The maker of an express 
warranty arising out of a consumer sale in this state shall honor the terms of the 
express warranty.  In a consumer sale, the manufacturer shall honor an express 
warranty made by the manufacturer; the distributor shall honor an express 
warranty made by the distributor; and the retailer shall honor an express warranty 
made by the retailer.”). 
 374. See supra Part VI. 
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C. Implied Warranty of Merchantability 
Revised section 2-314 would make a few style changes to the 
language of the existing Minnesota Statutes section 336.2-314, but 
the substance of the Code’s provisions regarding the implied 
warranty of merchantability would remain unchanged. 
An interesting addition is found in the comments to revised 
section 2-314 which address a topic that has been the subject of 
considerable discussion over time.  The comments note that there 
is 
disagreement over whether the concept of defect in tort 
and the concept of merchantability in Article 2 are 
coextensive where personal injuries are involved, i.e., if 
goods are merchantable under warranty law, can they still 
be defective under tort law, and if goods are not defective 
under tort law, can they be unmerchantable under 
warranty law?  The answer to both questions should be no, 
and the tension between merchantability in warranty and 
defect in tort where personal injury or property damage is 
involved should be resolved as follows: When recovery is 
sought for injury to person or property, whether goods 
are merchantable is to be determined by applicable state 
products liability law.375 
This comment describes the current state of Minnesota law. 
D. Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose 
There is no revision to either the language of section 2-315 
regarding the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose 
nor any change in the Official Comment to this section. 
E. Privity 
Revised section 2-318 includes, as did the earlier Official Text 
of this section,376 three alternative versions of subsection (2) 
intended to accommodate the differences in various states’ law 
regarding the extent to which warranty protection extends to 
persons other than the buyer of the product.  Revised sections 2-
313A and 2-313B make clear the circumstances under which express 
warranties, which these two sections call “obligations,” are 
 
 375. U.C.C. REVISED ARTICLE 2, § 2-314, cmt 7.  See also supra Part III.A. 
 376. See supra Part VI.B. 
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extended to remote purchasers, thus eliminating any possible 
argument by a remote seller that her express warranty obligations 
do not extend beyond her immediate buyer and that the absence 
of vertical privity bars any such claims by remote purchasers.  
Revised section 2-318 makes clear that a seller’s warranty, whether 
express or implied, extends to third parties not in horizontal privity 
with the seller.  Alternative C to subsection (2), which provides the 
broadest description of these third parties, extends warranty 
protection to “any person that may reasonably be expected to use, 
consume, or be affected by the goods and that is injured by breach 
of the warranty, remedial promise, or obligation.” 
This parallels the existing language in Minnesota Statutes 
section 336.2-318 and would not result in a change in Minnesota 
law.  As under existing law, however, this section purports to 
address only the question of horizontal privity.  As under existing 
law, there are circumstances under which the lack of vertical privity 
should bar certain warranty claims.377 
F.  Notice of Breach 
Revised section 2-607 leaves largely unchanged the law 
regarding a buyer’s obligations to give timely and sufficient notice 
of breach of warranty to the seller.  A product buyer who fails to 
give such notice risks being barred from a remedy for breach.  One 
important difference in the language of this revised section 
compared to the current law is found in subsection (3).  Under 
Minnesota Statutes section 336.2-607(3), a buyer who fails to give 
timely and adequate notice of breach is “barred from any 
remedy.”378  Under revised section 2-607(3), failure to notify “bars 
the buyer from a remedy only to the extent that the seller is 
prejudiced by the failure.”  An example of circumstances in which a 
buyer’s failure to give timely and adequate notice may prejudice a 
seller would include a case in which delay in giving notice 
precluded the seller from discovering and developing evidence 
relevant to the claim of breach. 
 
 377. See supra Part VI.C for a full discussion of this question. 
 378. This includes not only a damages remedy but also the right to reject the 
goods or revoke acceptance of the goods. 
99
Prince: Defective Products and Product Warranty Claims in Minnesota
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005
PRINCE 4/25/2005  1:46:44 PM 
1776 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:4 
 
G. Disclaimers and Limitations of Remedies 
Much existing law with respect to warranty disclaimers and 
limitations of remedies would be unaffected by the new Code.  
First, the provisions relating to disclaimers of express warranties are 
virtually unchanged.379  Second, as under current law, revised 
section 2-316(3) provides that all implied warranties are disclaimed 
by expressions like “as is,” “with all faults” or other language that is 
commonly understood by buyers to exclude warranties.380  Third, as 
under current law, subdivision (3) also provides that (1) there is no 
implied warranty as to defects that an examination of the product 
should have revealed where the buyer examines the goods prior to 
sale or refuses to examine them after a demand by the seller to do 
so,381 and (2) implied warranties may be excluded by course of 
performance or usage of trade.382  Finally, revised Article 2 makes 
no change whatsoever to the language of section 2-719 which 
governs a seller’s right to limit the remedies for breach of warranty. 
However, revised section 2-316 would make some important 
changes to the disclaimer provisions of Minnesota Statutes section 
336.2-316.  These changes would impose additional requirements 
on a seller who wishes to disclaim warranties in transactions with 
consumers.  Any implied warranty in a consumer sale that is 
disclaimed using “as is” or similar language must be set forth 
conspicuously in a record.  Furthermore, unless an implied 
warranty is disclaimed in one of the ways described in revised 
section 2-316(3), revised section 2-316(2) provides that in order to 
exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability in a 
consumer sale, “the language must be in a record, be conspicuous, 
and state ‘[t]he seller undertakes no responsibility for the quality of 
the goods, except as otherwise provided in this contract . . . .’”383  
This new language fortifies the present tendency of courts to favor 
consumer interests in interpreting attempts to disclaim warranty 
liability. 
Revised section 2-316(2) also provides that in order to exclude 
 
 379. U.C.C. REVISED ARTICLE 2, § 2-316(1). 
 380. Id. § 2-316(3)(a). 
 381. Id. § 2-316(3)(b). 
 382. Id. § 2-316(3)(c). 
 383. Id. § 2-316(2). 
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or modify the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose in 
a consumer sale, the exclusion must be in a record, be 
conspicuous, and must state “[t]he seller assumes no responsibility 
that the goods will be fit for any particular purpose for which you 
may be buying these goods, except as otherwise provided in the 
contract.” 
H. Unconscionability 
Revised section 2-302, the general unconscionability provision, 
contains only a few minor style changes compared to the language 
of Minnesota Statutes section 336.2-302.  Taken all together, the 
lack of any substantive change in this section, combined with (1) 
the  lack of any change at all in section 2-719(3)’s explicit provision 
that limitations on consequential damages for breach may be 
unconscionable, (2) the additional protection in revised section 2-
316 for consumers against disclaimers of implied warranties, and 
(3) the anti-disclaimer protections given to consumers in the 
federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and Minnesota consumer 
protection law, make a persuasive argument that an otherwise-valid 
disclaimer of warranty liability, one not barred by these several 
explicit limitations on warranty disclaimers, would not be 
unconscionable under the provisions of Revised Article 2.384 
XI. CONCLUSION 
Though warranty law is an important supplement to tort law 
principles governing liability for defective products, those tort law 
principles provide the primary law for resolving such claims.  
Generally, plaintiffs should limit themselves to pleading their tort 
claims and not add a claim for breach of the implied warranty of 
merchantability.  However, there are circumstances in which 
products liability claims must be brought on a breach of warranty 
theory.  Where the plaintiff’s claim is for economic loss, the claim 
cannot be brought in tort and must proceed on a breach of 
warranty basis.  The most likely claim will be breach of the implied 
warranty of merchantability, the warranty law equivalent of a claim 
in tort that the product is defective.  Even where the product is not 
defective in tort law terms, a claim for breach of express warranty 
or for breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular 
 
 384. See supra Part VIII.F. 
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purpose is appropriate where the seller has made a representation 
about some feature of the product or about its suitability for the 
buyer’s particular need and where the buyer has relied upon that 
representation. 
All of these claims carry with them the baggage of contract law 
doctrine.  Defendants should look carefully for several issues that 
may limit a product buyer’s warranty claims—limits that do not 
arise if the claims are plead in tort—such as whether notice of 
breach was timely given, whether the warranty has been disclaimed, 
or whether the buyer’s remedies for breach have been limited. 
In the case of consumer sales, both state and federal law 
provide additional warranty protections to buyers, especially by 
limiting the right of the seller to disclaim warranties. 
Finally, a revised Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
including the provisions relating to warranties, has recently been 
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws.  The Minnesota Legislature is likely to adopt 
these changes as part of Minnesota’s U.C.C.  If Minnesota law is 
amended to reflect these changes in the uniform act, they will not 
represent a significant change in Minnesota warranty law.  
However, some of the changes would be important, especially those 
that strengthen a consumer’s protection against warranty 
disclaimers.  It will take several years of experience with and 
judicial interpretation of this law, if and when it is adopted in 
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